

Themelios

An International Journal for Pastors and Students of
Theological and Religious Studies

Volume 1

Issue 2

Spring, 1976

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The way home: an exposition of Hosea 14

Derek Kidner

While Themelios is primarily concerned with the academic interests of the student of theology, we recognize that the ultimate aim of such study, and particularly of study of the Bible, is to enable us to understand and respond to the Word of God. From time to time, therefore, Themelios will publish an exposition of a passage of Scripture, designed not primarily to solve exegetical puzzles, nor even as an example of expository preaching (though it may well be taken as such), but 'for our own souls' good'. The first such contribution is from Derek Kidner, the Warden of Tyndale House, Cambridge, whose gift for concise and illuminating exposition is already well known from his Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries on Genesis, Psalms and Proverbs.

This little chapter of only nine verses,¹ as quiet and gentle as its predecessors are tumultuous, leads us back again through the main areas of the book of Hosea, this time on our way home. Israel is being beckoned, and the way is signposted with the landmarks she has passed on her journey into the far country.

'Draw near to God . . .' (verses 1-3)

The first word, 'Return,' is an old friend, a strong feature of the book. Up to now it has brought only disappointment and reproach. Basically it means 'turn'; and Israel has habitually turned the wrong way. They have been 'bent on turning away from me', as 11:7 puts it. This, incidentally, was obscured by the older translations that spoke of 'backsliding', which has a sound of failure rather than perversity, whereas in fact there had been a flat refusal to respond (11:5), born of pride (7:10) and of settled preference (5:4, 'Their deeds do not permit them to return to their God'). Even the sudden change of mind which had prompted the words, 'Come, let us return to the Lord', had been as shallow as a passing impulse (6:1, 4). But God will not give up—how could he? If their repentance has been shallow, he will deepen it. There is warmth in the emphatic form of the word, 'Return' (1a; verse 2 uses the

ordinary form), and the preposition is a strong one.² We could almost translate it, 'Oh turn, Israel, right back to the Lord.' Even the familiar words 'your God' have gained a new intensity from the threat which Israel's fickleness had seemed to pose to her marriage bond with the Lord. Against all deserving, the marriage holds; he is still hers. Here is the costly equivalent of his word to the cuckolded Hosea: 'Go again, love a woman who is beloved of a paramour . . . , even as the Lord loves the people of Israel, though they turn to other gods' (3:1).

Repentance, then, will be first and foremost personal. 'I will allure her . . . and . . . she shall answer as in the days of her youth' (2:14f.). As George Adam Smith finely puts it, 'Amos cries, "Turn, for in front of you is destruction;" but Hosea, "Turn, for behind you is God."' ³

For all its warmth, though, God's call is exacting. It leaves no room for humbug: there must be 'fruit that befits repentance'. Already 12:6 (Hebrew, verse 7) has held up to us the challenging implications of the word 'return'. Manward, it will mean, 'Hold fast to love and justice;' heavenward, 'Wait continually for your God.' It is the second of these that our chapter will be chiefly spelling out.

First, then, 'Take with you words' (verse 2). Words can be facile, but so can actions. A major contrast in this book is between articulate, meaningful encounter, and the mere formalities and gifts which people try to substitute for it. 'With their flocks and their herds they shall go to seek the Lord, but they will not find him' (5:6). Sub-personal religion never will (cf. 5:15).

These 'words' are to be without reservations or excuses. God has spoken of 'your iniquity' (verse 1); man must accept and echo that (verse 2), not jib at it as he did in 12:8 (Hebrew, verse 9), with his boast, 'they shall find in me none iniquity that were sin' (RV).

But what of the next plea, 'Accept that which is good'? The AV, perhaps scenting salvation by works, gave the rather forced translation, 'Receive (us) graciously.' Another just-possible rendering is mentioned by G. A. F. Knight (Torch Commentary): 'Receive (us), O Good One.' But more probably it is simply a plea that God will accept the

¹ The Hebrew Bible has ten verses, through starting the chapter at 13:16; so its numbering runs one verse ahead of the English versions throughout the chapter. The numbering of the English versions is followed in this exposition.

² Cf. 11:8f.

³ Cf. BDB, s.v. 'ad, citing this verse.

⁴ *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*, I, p. 339.

offering from the lips and the heart which he has required of his people. This chimes in with the famous saying in 6:6 about the things which he desires above sacrifice, and with Psalm 51:17; perhaps, too, with the verbal echo, obscured in translation, between God's call, 'Take with you . . .', and man's responding plea, 'Accept (lit. 'take') . . .'

The offering of words, which began with one kind of confession, the acknowledgment of sin, now turns into confession in its other sense, the acknowledgment of God in praise. The Hebrew of verse 2c is awkward again: lit., 'and we will render bullocks, our lips'; but at least the word 'render' gives a good clue to the sense. It is the term used for paying one's vows (e.g., Ps. 116:14), in due gratitude for answered prayer. Lips, then, will be our votive offering, our 'bullocks'. But the point is made more gracefully in the Greek and Syriac versions, which read the same consonants to mean 'the fruit of our lips', and this is how Hebrews 13:15 quotes it.

So far, then, the positive side of repentance has been uppermost. The runaway must return, the sinner plead, the formalist use his mind and lips, to come back into fellowship with God. It is a turning to the light.

Now with verse 3 comes the negative requirement, a turning *from* the old ways, in a clear farewell to futile hopes and false beliefs. Both are familiar from the earlier chapters. For security, Israel has been flitting like 'a silly senseless pigeon' (7:11, NEB) between the two great powers of the day: placating Assyria, cultivating Egypt (that source of chariots and horses, verse 3a; cf. Is. 31:1). Those two names appear in almost every chapter in the latter half of Hosea—for Israel was as loth as we are to think God relevant to practical affairs. *His* name carried no weight in politics. As a consequence, Israel's outlook had become as worldly as her friends'. 'Ephraim mixes himself with the peoples; . . . Aliens devour his strength, and he knows it not' (7:8f.).

As for false beliefs, the gods of verse 3b are constantly in evidence throughout this book. Hosea's scorn for them is as total as Israel's infatuation. 'Men', he exclaims, 'kiss calves!' 'A workman made the thing they bow to, using the very gold that the true God had lavished on them (13:2; 8:5; 2:8). The lunacy and ingratitude of all this is of course more obvious to us than are its modern counterparts. But as long as man-made deities, visible and invisible, keep their power to seduce us, verse 3b will still have words for us to use.

The trustful climax of the confession is beautifully if freely expressed in NEB: 'for in thee the fatherless

find a father's love'—which brings out the allusion in the Hebrew to the way the book began, with the prophet's broken marriage and disowned daughter, Lo-ruhamah, which means virtually 'Unloved' (1:6). For Lo-ruhamah was to be re-named Ruhamah, 'She is loved' (2:1, 23), in token of the Lord's reclaiming grace for Israel. The word is usually translated by some expression for pity, which it certainly implies; but it is an emotional word, well suited to express a father's or a mother's tender affection (cf. Ps. 103:13; Is. 49:15). Once again this chapter has taken up the opening themes of the book, filling them with hope.

' . . . and he will draw near to you' (verses 4-7)

Now God speaks, and the whole scene lights up before us. The word '(Re)turn' still echoes through the chapter, as it has echoed through the whole book. It was heard in verses 1 and 2, and will reappear in verse 7; meanwhile it comes twice in verse 4, first concealed in the word 'faithlessness' (verse 4, RSV; lit., 'turning'; i.e., 'apostasy', NEB), to remind us that our waywardness is incurable until God heals it, and then in the assurance of the last line that his anger has turned away. Between these two reminders of the past comes one of the purest expressions of what the New Testament will call grace, prevailing over the language of judgment and desert heard in 9:15 ('I will love them no more'). The NEB translates our present line, 'Of my own bounty I will love them.' We can notice, too, a striking contrast, not only between this outgoing love and the scant affection of Israel's paramours (2:7), but between this tireless Giver and the reluctant hirelings of 8:8f.

After the perfect clarity of these promises—and clarity is vital to the anxious and conscience-stricken—the poetry is free to spread itself in the next verses (5-7). All the imagery of them is from nature, at its happiest and most bountiful.

Without labouring the details, we can gain from this a threefold impression of Israel revived and reconciled to God. First, freshness (dew, flowers, fragrance, beauty, shade); secondly, stability (rooted like the poplar, perhaps; or like Lebanon; verse 5);⁵ thirdly, vigour (the spreading shoots of new growth, verse 6; the 'corn in abundance', verse 7, NEB).⁶

⁵ Most modern versions reckon that 'Lebanon' in verse 7 (Hebrew, verse 8) has induced a scribal error in verse 5 (Hebrew, verse 6), where *libneh* (poplar; cf. 4:13) is conjectured to have stood originally. But the Hebrew text and the ancient versions read 'Lebanon', which makes tolerable sense either as referring to its mountain range or to its cedars.

⁶ See RSV mg. The Hebrew text has 'they shall make corn (*dāgān*) flourish' (lit., 'live'), which RSV emends to 'they shall flourish as a garden' (*gan*).

But such a summary is only useful if it makes us look more closely at the passage, which has all the grace and vitality to match the realities of which it speaks. There is nothing stifling or constricting in the divine love expressed here. Like the river of Ezekiel 47, it brings life to everything it reaches.

The appeal pressed home (verse 8)

'O Ephraim!' In Hosea such an exclamation has more than once laid bare the heart of the prophecy and of its ultimate Author. Like David's cry, 'O my son Absalom!' or our Lord's 'O Jerusalem, Jerusalem!' it has voiced both love and anguish—'What shall I do with you, O Ephraim?' 'How can I give you up, O Ephraim!' (6:4; 11:8). Now (as I see it) it is as though God turns to reason with the hearer for the last time—for the penitent words of verses 2f. and the fair prospect of verses 4-7 were part of an invitation (verses 1, 2a) which has yet to be accepted and made Israel's own.

The plea (on this view)⁷ rests on the incomparable claims of God. Can he any longer⁸ be spoken of, even thought of, in the same breath as idols? Can Egypt's or Assyria's protection compete with his? Do they answer when you call? Do they care as he cares?

⁷ The English versions reflect something of the variety of possible interpretations. In the first line, JB and NEB ('What has Ephraim any more to do with idols?') follow LXX. In AV and RV, Ephraim is the speaker. In the last two lines, opinions differ as to the identity of the speaker or speakers; it has even been suggested that in the four lines of the verse, God and Ephraim speak alternately (Pusey).

⁸ RSV eases the question by omitting 'any longer'. But the note of time is intelligible if it refers to the effect of the prophecy on the hearers' understanding.

The last two lines of verse 8 read strangely until we remember that Hebrew thought has none of our inhibitions against mixed metaphors. God, these lines can well be saying, has all the constancy of the evergreen, all the richness of the fruit tree. Ephraim, if he is to live up to his own name ('For God has made me fruitful . . .', Gn. 41:52), need look no further.

To the reader (verse 9)

Whether the prophet himself or an editor added these words need hardly concern us here. The point that they drive home is that the prophecy is open-ended: its eloquence and passion could win Israel to repentance or could leave her unmoved. The response was hers to make. But not only hers. The 'whoever' of this verse suddenly exposes us to the same searching encounter, for the word of God goes on speaking; it never slips safely into the past. The rightness of God's ways as revealed in this book is so far above us in both holiness and love, as to leave self-sufficient man without excuse, self-condemned, while those who turn into the way of righteousness find themselves met more than halfway.

'To turn aside from thee is hell,
To walk with thee is heaven.'

The comment of G. A. F. Knight on this verse deserves to be the last word: 'Therefore, dear reader, so runs the content of this Epilogue, ask yourself the question—how would you apply this message of Hosea to your own knowledge and experience of Israel's God?'

The poor man's gospel

Peter Davids

Evangelicals are increasingly recognizing the need to discover and present a biblical perspective on the urgent social and political issues of our age. Among these issues, that of wealth and poverty ranks high in importance. Dr Davids, an American lecturer at the Bibelschule Wiedenest in West Germany, here contributes a 'redaction-critical' study of the teaching of the synoptic Gospels on this subject, based in part on his doctoral thesis presented to the University of Manchester.

A theological student needs little enlightenment to realize that theologies of liberation and demands to actualize the social implications of the gospel abound in every theological forum. Yet the evangelical student often feels a sense of unease at the extent to which this atmosphere lacks a serious concern for the biblical data. He recognizes that it is not sufficient to sprinkle the discussion with texts from Amos, Paul, or Jesus. He wishes rather to grapple with what Jesus or Paul taught in context and to make this material the basis of his discussion of these subjects.

With this in mind, we shall survey the teaching of the synoptic Gospels on wealth and poverty to discover an exegetical basis for further discussion and research. Naturally, the student must combine this material with that in James, Paul and other authors, but we maintain that the synoptic Gospels are the logical beginning-point for this study, that they introduce the major issues and that followers of Jesus of Nazareth must take the tradition of his teaching as the foundation of all other biblical discussion.

1. Mark

Mark logically begins the inquiry into the synoptic teaching on wealth and poverty (although he admittedly includes no systematic teaching on the subject),¹ for the Gospel contains one key passage on this subject, the incident of the rich young man (Mk. 10:17-31). This pericope is not only significant

in the context of Mark, but it is also included in both remaining Synoptics.²

Although the three Synoptics do not make significant variations in this pericope, it is relatively difficult to interpret. The difficulty, however, lies more in the application of this story within the early church (and perhaps in the willingness of its interpreters to accept its message due to theological preconceptions) than in the narrative itself. The following points are clear: first, the questioner does not come to seek a special status (*i.e.*, apostle) among the followers of Jesus, but rather simply seeks eternal life. Therefore Jesus' answer revolves around the means of gaining eternal life or of entering the kingdom.³ Second, the citation of the decalogue and the response, 'Teacher, all these I have observed from my youth,'⁴ set the background for the ending, for they designate this man a pious Jew. Jesus does not challenge this claim, but accepts him as one who has come as far as the law can bring him. He is, to use Paul's terminology, 'in legal rectitude, faultless'.⁵ Third, Jesus asserts that discipleship is that which stands between the seeker and eternal life. The questioner is called to fulfil his submission to God, for now 'obedience to God must be demonstrated by acknowledging that God meets us in Jesus'.⁶

The difficulty arises in Jesus' demanding the renunciation of wealth as part of the call to discipleship. The promise of treasure in heaven does not soften the shock which even the modern reader receives when he reads this response. Nor does the clarification in the following verses (10:23-25) remove the cause for consternation; on the contrary, it heightens the surprise, for in it the evangelist points out to the reader that this teaching is valid

² Matthew 19:16-30 and Luke 18:18-30.

³ See E. Schweizer, *The Good News According to Mark* (London, 1970), p. 210.

⁴ Mark 10:20, rsv.

⁵ Philippians 3:6, NEB. That Jesus 'loved him' is Mark's indication that Jesus accepts his claim to legal righteousness.

⁶ Schweizer, *op. cit.*, p. 212. We therefore reject the claim that Jesus calls the questioner to become a higher class of follower (*e.g.*, an apostle); for discussion see T. W. Manson, *The Teaching of Jesus* (Cambridge, 1931), p. 206; E. Percy, *Die Botschaft Jesu* (Lund, 1953), pp. 91-93; V. Taylor, *The Gospel According to St Mark* (London, 1952), p. 429; H.-J. Degenhardt, *Lukas—Evangelist der Armen* (Stuttgart, 1965), p. 141.

¹ The Gospel does present the poor favourably and does value charity (an Old Testament tradition Mark has no intention of rejecting): see the pericopes about the widow's mite (12:41-44), the anointing at Bethany (14:3-9), and the call of the disciples (1:16-20). But these form no developed theology about wealth.

for all disciples, not simply for this single case.⁷

Exegetes have suggested three basic solutions to this difficulty, all appearing relatively early in church history. The first solution notes that Jesus is after all interested in the relationship between God and men; therefore the real point at issue is not the giving up of wealth but the *attitude* towards wealth. The disciple is free to keep his wealth so long as he maintains the proper detachment towards it. We admit that this explanation brings out the inwardness without which the outward act would be meaningless, but we wonder if this explanation is not often at heart an attempt to soften the radical call which the evangelist intends.⁸ Can there be a true inwardness without outward consequences?

The second solution explains that although the text singles out wealth, the real call is to renounce anything which comes between the individual and God.⁹ This solution correctly observes that Mark 10:24 broadens its sights beyond the wealthy and that the application in Mark 10:28-31 applies the 'giving up' to a group which was by no means rich. But can we ignore the fact that the narrative does centre on wealth and that the explanation twice (10:23, 25) returns to the theme of the wealthy? Is not this story more than simply a 'pericope of crisis'?

The third solution goes beyond both previous ones, while attempting to retain their insights that the inward attitude is decisively significant and that the demands of Christ go beyond possessions alone. Wealth and the wealthy are the examples in this pericope because in the Gospel tradition wealth is one of the greatest (if not *the* greatest) dangers to the spiritual life. Mark passes on a tradition in this pericope which the other evangelists and James express more directly. Wealth is dangerous to faith, for it blocks one's entrance into the kingdom; but for the grace of God, no-one, and especially no wealthy person, would ever enter that kingdom.

2. Matthew

If we have reason to suspect that Mark contains a prejudice against wealth, an examination of Matthew confirms that this prejudice exists in the synoptic tradition. Matthew not only includes Mark's pericope, but he also adds three 'Q' passages which reinforce it, two of them within the Sermon on the Mount. The first of these, the sayings complex in Matthew 6:19-34, turns on the categorical statement in verse 24; the rest of the

passage works this statement out in practice. As in the Marcan pericope, the command to share with the poor forms the background (verse 19), but the account slips beyond this good rabbinic sentiment in verse 21, which may imply that it is better to have no treasure on earth. The next three verses confirm this implication. Verses 21, 22 are a difficult saying until one recognizes that *haplous* ('sound' or 'single') can refer to generosity, making the 'single eye' mean 'if you are generous'. This links the saying to that which precedes. At the same time *haplous* connotes undivided loyalty to God, joining the saying to the either-or alternative in the following saying. Therefore the 'single eye' saying means: if one is undividedly devoted to God and thus generous (*i.e.*, puts his treasure in heaven), he is on the right way (*i.e.*, full of light); if, however, he is niggardly, he is on the evil way (*i.e.*, full of darkness), despite his claims to be a servant of God.¹⁰ This saying, then, prepares the reader for the either-or (two ways) construction in verse 24. It is either wealth or God; one cannot serve both.¹¹ Matthew then resolves the practical problems which this uncompromising teaching suggests in his great passage on trust, which follows (6:25-34).

The two remaining 'Q' sayings differ from the previous one in that they exalt the poor rather than devalue wealth. Matthew 11:5 presents the preaching of the gospel to the poor (Is. 61:1) as the climactic evidence of the arrival of the Messiah, and Matthew 5:3 pronounces a blessing on the poor in spirit. Both of these passages are rooted deeply in Israel's piety, in the long tradition of God's help for the poor and oppressed (the *'anāwīm*).

This tradition appears in all strata of the Old Testament. In the Pentateuch it appears in passages such as Deuteronomy 15:1-18, in which Yahweh's interest in and provision for the poor demonstrates itself. The prophets apply this tradition in concrete situations, as in Amos' condemnation of Israel's treatment of the poor (Am. 4:1-3). In the Psalms the concept of the oppressed and poor (*'ānī w^o ebyōn*) reaches fruition. Psalm 40:18 (English,

¹⁰ For fuller discussion of this passage, including its background in Qumranic literature, see D. Hill, *The Gospel of Matthew* (London, 1972), pp. 142f.; H. J. Cadbury, 'The Single Eye', *Harvard Theological Review* 47 (1954), pp. 69-74; W. C. Allen, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Matthew* (Edinburgh, 1912), p. 62.

¹¹ It is clear that one dare not serve mammon, whether or not the word itself implies 'wealth gained unjustly' (*i.e.*, that Jesus accepts the concept that most wealth is gained by injustice), as R. Schnackenburg, *The Moral Teaching of the New Testament* (London, 1965), p. 125, claims. The term has a mixed background in rabbinic literature, but non-conformist Jewish literature (especially 1 Enoch) uses it with a strongly negative connotation.

⁷ Schweizer, *op. cit.*, pp. 209, 213.

⁸ In *Quis dives salvetur* Clement of Alexandria obviously attempts this.

⁹ Schweizer, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-13,

verse 17), for instance, uses this phrase as the basis of the sufferer's claim upon God. Because he is oppressed and poor, the sufferer is among those who fall under the special concern of God.¹² Two features stand out in this tradition: (1) it assumes that the poor in question are pious, for dependence upon God is *the* characteristic of the poor, and (2) 'the poor' as a title always refers to suffering and oppression, actual or perceived.

'The poor' appear again in later Jewish literature. 'The poor' is a title for the pious sufferers (perhaps the *Hasidim*) in the Psalms of Solomon; it describes the elect of God in 1 Enoch 108; and it designates the oppressed who receive the victory in 1QM. This last example is especially interesting. First, the men in question are clearly sufferers who depend upon God, who, true to character, will answer by granting them the victory over their rich oppressors. Second, 1QM XIV, 7 contains the Hebrew equivalent of Matthew's 'poor in spirit' ('*anwé rûah*). Matthew's expanded form of the beatitude, then, has a Palestinian background, but it, like Luke's form, refers to the pious poor who look to God to redeem them from their oppression.¹³

We have observed, then, two streams in Matthew's thought. On the one hand, wealth is a great—perhaps the greatest—hindrance to following God single-mindedly. The disciple is advised to give to the poor, putting his treasure in heaven. On the other hand, the poor (who in their poverty depend upon God) are singled out as the special recipients of the gospel. Theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Matthew stresses neither of these streams; the 'Q' material simply clarifies the incident which he has taken over from Mark. It remains for Luke to develop these concepts fully.

3. Luke

Luke's presentation of the beatitudes is indicative of how he will handle this theme. He addresses the church (disciples) as the poor, the hungry, and the suffering; they will be blessed. Although it is clear that this group is pious, Luke centres on their present economic situation. To reinforce his point he includes curses on the wealthy, the well fed and the satisfied (perhaps meaning the oppressor). This strong 'reversal of fortunes' teaching with its special

interest in the poor is a key theme in the Gospel.¹⁴

While we cannot forget that this theme begins with the Magnificat and Luke's double use of Isaiah 61:1,¹⁵ the bulk of Luke's material is concentrated in his central section. God's interest in the poor appears in chapter 14, in which, in the context of one of Luke's well-known meals, Jesus turns to his host and counsels him to share his food with the poor and oppressed (*i.e.*, those cut off from the temple). Since these unfortunates cannot pay him back, God will reward him in the future in their stead.¹⁶ Immediately follows the parable of the great banquet. The rich invited guests reject the invitation and return to their goods; the host in turn replaces them by inviting the poor and helpless to fill their places. This indicates God's turning from the powerful to the poor to fill his messianic banquet; people who heed God should be inviting the poor to their banquets now.

Turning back to chapter 12 we discover a related theme. In 12:14 a man requests Jesus to perform a typical rabbinic task—arbitrate a dispute. Jesus refuses, terming the request greed (*pleonexia*), and arguing that real life has nothing to do with such concern over quantity of goods. The parable of the rich fool advances the thought, for he is a man who keeps his (honestly earned) goods to himself instead of distributing to the poor (he was not 'rich towards God').¹⁷ Luke interprets this through 'Q' material, but reverses Matthew's order, changing the emphasis. Now the disciples stand in contrast to the rich fool, who carefully provided for himself, in that they must not concern themselves with their own needs. Verses 33, 34 make the point explicit: whereas Matthew simply presents Jesus' advice (put your treasure in heaven) Luke gives his command—Sell! Give! But both evangelists give the same reason: maintaining wealth upon earth pulls the heart away from God.

These ideas recur in chapter 16. Again we deal with large blocks of material rather than isolated verses. The chapter begins with counsel to use money wisely: use money to make the type of friends who will receive you into heaven.¹⁸ Then

¹⁴ See J. Dupont, *Les Béatitudes* (Bruges, 1954), pp. 222, 223; Degenhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 51. Luke's curse goes beyond both the Old Testament and Qumranic literature, which call the oppressor of the poor 'the wicked' never 'the rich'. Only 1 Enoch and James have something comparable.

¹⁵ The Magnificat contains the theme of reversal of fortunes (1:52, 53), and Luke cites Isaiah 61:1 in both 4:18, 19 (making it the title over Jesus' ministry) and 7:22.

¹⁶ Cf. W. Grundmann, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas* (Berlin, 1974), p. 295.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 258; cf. I. H. Marshall, *Luke: Historian and Theologian* (Exeter, 1970), p. 142.

¹⁸ The passage clearly teaches one to disburse to the poor; it is possible that the poor are pictured as receiving

¹² For an extended discussion see G. J. Botterweck, 'ebyôn', *Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament* 1, (Grand Rapids, 1974), pp. 27-41. The good bibliography reflects the fact that the vast majority of the literature on the subject is German.

¹³ See D. Hill, *Greek Words and Hebrew Meanings* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 251; E. Percy, *op. cit.*, p. 42; K. Elliger, *Studien zum Habakuk-Kommentar vom Toten Meer* (Tübingen, 1953), p. 222.

Luke adds a series of short sayings about wealth (mammon), which picture it as dangerous, foreign to one's true wealth, and standing in radical contrast to God. The Pharisees stand condemned, for they serve money rather than God. The parable of the rich man and Lazarus then represents this teaching in picture.

The difficulties of this parable lie in the fact that neither man is explicitly characterized and no explanation is included. Yet the end of the parable contains the severest rewards and punishments imaginable. Two possible interpretations of the parable commend themselves for consideration. According to the first, this parable concerns the reversal of fortunes *per se*. That is, in the life to come those now rich will suffer and those now poor will enjoy life; one receives his share in the 'good life' either now or in the world to come irrespective of sinfulness or guilt.¹⁹ According to the second, this parable pictures the reward of a rich man who, as any Jewish hearer would have recognized, was wicked in that he ignored the demands of charity and retained his wealth. The beggar Lazarus is, by implication, one of the humble, pious poor.²⁰

We choose the second interpretation for the following reasons: (1) the appeal to Moses and the prophets (16:29) cites literature which commends charity and condemns niggardliness, but which does not reject wealth *per se*; (2) the parable applies Luke's blessing-woe combination, which implies that the poor in question are pious, and (3) the parable in context applies the teaching about serving two masters, about wealth in heaven or on earth. The rich man served money, not God; he had no concern to put his wealth in heaven and thus fits with the already condemned Pharisees.

Before leaving Luke we must consider two more areas of evidence. First, unlike Matthew, Luke never calls a disciple rich. Rather, when the rich become disciples they voluntarily part with their possessions, as in the case of Zacchaeus (19:1-10);²¹ the preaching of John the Baptist expresses the same principle (3:10-14). Likewise the apostles never have possessions after their call, and those disciples (*e.g.*, the women in 8:2) who do have possessions appear sharing them.

their benefactors into heaven. See R. H. Hiers, 'Friends by Unrighteous Mammon,' *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 38 (March, 1970), p. 34.

¹⁹ E. Bammel, 'ptōchos,' *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, VI (Grand Rapids, 1968), p. 906; Percy, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-102; Dupont, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

²⁰ J. Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus* (London, 1954), p. 129.

²¹ Zacchaeus proves that Luke never gives up on the rich completely: here is a rich man demonstrating that with God all things are possible.

Second, the examples given in Acts support the theology of the Gospel. Acts is Luke's answer to the question, How should this teaching work in practice? The wealthier converts part with their goods and give to the poor (Acts 2:44, 45; 4:32-5:6); Zacchaeus has become a pattern of Christian behaviour for Luke. Furthermore an examination of Acts 4 would reveal that Luke is claiming that the Christian community fulfils the Greek ideal of communal fellowship and the Jewish ideal of a society without poverty (*i.e.*, Dt. 15); the teaching of Jesus leads towards the ideal society.²²

4. Summary

We end this brief survey with a summary of the teaching of the synoptic Gospels concerning wealth and poverty.

(1) None of the Gospels is against wealth in the sense of glorifying an ascetic life-style. Not the possession-free life, but the total investment of life in the kingdom is the goal of the teaching.

(2) This does not, however, absolve the wealthy. To retain wealth is to retain a great hindrance to entering the kingdom. As we progressed from Mark to Luke, we observed a constantly increasing criticism of wealth, stressing its dangers. To maintain wealth on earth is not to invest in heaven; to serve wealth is to render service of God impossible.

(3) Thus the wealthy come increasingly under suspicion. This questioning of their status appears first in Mark and Matthew, but is strongest in Luke, where the rich merit a series of woes. It is not, however, that they are without exception marked out for perdition, but that they are so bound by wealth and blinded to the needs of the poor that they can hardly be saved. Some few of these are released by God's grace to serve him, and they demonstrate this fact by identifying with the poor and sharing their possessions with them.

(4) Luke, and to a lesser extent 'Q', point to the poor as the primary recipients of the gospel. This partly reflects the historic actuality of the results of the preaching of Jesus and his followers, and it is partly a development of the Old Testament tradition of the pious poor. This interest in the poor does not preclude the repentance of the rich: it simply again questions the propriety of their retention of their wealth.

Evangelicals must work with this data when confronting the issues of poverty and wealth in the

²² E. Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Oxford, 1971), p. 192, and F. F. Bruce, *A Commentary on the Book of Acts* (London, 1954), p. 108, discuss these points more fully.

world. It is obvious that one must supplement this material with studies in Paul, John, and especially James and then must reflect on it using historical and theological disciplines. But the evangelical must

never forget the significance of the synoptic Gospels for this subject nor dare he handle them piecemeal as a supply of convenient texts to support a predetermined position.

The meaning of man in the debate between Christianity and Marxism

Andrew Kirk

We reprint here (in a slightly revised form) the first part of an article which first appeared in the Latin American Theological Fraternity Bulletin in 1974. This first part sets out the nature of the Christian-Marxist debate, and analyses the concept of man in Marxism. The second part, which we hope to print in the next issue of Themelios, will present a Christian critique of Marxist anthropology, and suggest a way forward for the Christian church in its confrontation with Marxist thought. Professor Kirk has been engaged in theological education in Argentina since 1967, and is editor of the Theological Fraternity Bulletin. He has recently completed a doctoral thesis on the theology of liberation.

In a certain sense the debate began just as soon as Karl Marx had assimilated Feuerbach's criticism of religion.¹ Marx poured out his own most celebrated criticisms in the manuscript *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction* (1844), for example:

'The criticism of heaven is thus transformed into the criticism of earth,
the criticism of religion into the criticism of law,
and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics.'²

These words summarize well his attitude towards all religions as reflections of man's basic alienation, which in fact is political. In the same work he continues his thought on religious alienation:

'man as the world of man, the state, society.
This state, this society, produces religion's inverted attitude to the world,

¹ L. Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*. For the influence of Feuerbach on Marx, consult D. McLellan, *The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx* (London, 1969).

² K. Marx, *The Early Texts*, ed. D. McLellan (Oxford, 1971), p. 115.

because they are an inverted world themselves. Thus the struggle against religion is indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.'³

In another of his writings, *The Jewish Question* (1843-44), he affirms that

'the existence of religion is the existence of a defect . . .

History has for long enough been resolved into superstition:

we now resolve superstition into history.'⁴

After the so-called 1844 manuscripts, Marx hardly returned to the subject of religion. Apparently he did not show any particular personal disquiet about religious matters.⁵ On the other hand, his closest collaborator, Friedrich Engels, continued to be attracted by the subject of religion, and by Christianity in particular.⁶

The modern debate, often referred to as 'the Christian-Marxist dialogue', began to take shape once N. Kruschew, in 1955, had buried the 'personalistic' era of Stalin and encouraged a new openness among Communist parties, particularly in the West. It gathered momentum after John XXIII became head of the Roman Catholic Church (1959). In the last fifteen years or so various meetings between Marxist theorists and Christian theologians have taken place;⁷ on the Christian side both Protestants and Catholics have participated.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁵ Cf., Ignace Lepp, *Psicoanalisis del ateismo moderno* (Buenos Aires, 1963) p. 66.

⁶ Cf., especially *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State and Anti-Duhring*.

⁷ For example, the conference in Marienbad, Czechoslovakia (1966), organized by the Society of St Paul. Cf. also the results of a series of meetings which were held in 1964 between French theologians and Marxist theorists in *El Hombre Cristiano y el Hombre Marxista* (Barcelona, 1967).

1. The content of the dialogue and the presuppositions which make it possible

In so far as Marxism is, for its followers, a humanism which seeks to elevate man to the maximum point of his self-realization, so that, in order to reach this goal, it is necessary to eliminate every barrier which obstructs it (including religion), the most important question for the Marxists within this debate is the following: is it true that religion, *per se*, constitutes a necessary brake to human progress? On a lower level, Marxists would also place on the agenda the following subjects for debate: work and its significance, the condemnation of capitalism, the suppression of the class system and the construction of socialism.

For many Christians the central problem which needs to be solved is the relationship between the individual and the historical process. It is a problem which has become particularly serious in the later development of Marxism, due to the fact that once Marxism has achieved power in the state it has pursued a policy of 'integralism' which has elevated the institution over the people and authority over initiative.⁸

Both sides recognize that the problem of man must occupy a central place in the debate. Garaudy, for example, asserts emphatically that it is impossible to put the concept of man in parentheses, limiting the debate to the purely political. As he rightly stresses, neither Marxism nor Christianity separates socio-political problems from philosophical principles.⁹

Various Christian writers have stated that the essential element in the debate about man concerns his future.¹⁰ In this sense the concerns of the Marxist H. Marcuse about man's future expectations in an increasingly mechanized society which seems to propel him onwards to an ever-increasing dehumanization should also be highlighted.¹¹

Within a general concern about man, one of the most critical questions, which will constitute a special subject for study in this essay, concerns the

⁸ G. Girardi, *Marxism and Christianity* (Dublin, 1968), pp. 173-181. A. Schaff recognizes this fundamental problem when he says that 'Marxism must give positive answers to the problems of individual man' (*Filosofía del Hombre: Marx o Sartre?* (Mexico, 1965).

⁹ *From Anathema to Dialogue* (New York, 1966), p. 37. Even within Marxism, the nature of the humanism which is being looked for is still the object of study and polemic, cf. Althusser, 'Dos humanismos socialistas' in *La Revolución Teórica de Marx* (Buenos Aires, 1971), *passim*.

¹⁰ For example, Ogletree in *Apertura para el Diálogo* (Buenos Aires, 1971), p. 13, and J. Moltmann, 'La Revolución de la Libertad', *ibid.*, p. 50.

¹¹ Above all his book *One-dimensional Man*; also his essay 'Socialist Humanism', in E. Fromm *et al.*, *Socialist Humanism* (London, 1967).

relationship between theory and *praxis*, in the context of man's being and activities.¹²

Evidently, if a dialogue of this nature, which represents the breaking down of a century-old mutual hostility, is going to have any chance of success, both sides are going to have to agree on certain common criteria prior to the initiation of the discussions. Leslie Dewart, in his introduction to the book by Garaudy, states that dialogue requires that each side be open to the possibility that the truth of the other can develop. He distinguishes between a body of beliefs which is confessed as being totally certain and a body of beliefs which is confessed as the totality of an immutable truth. Only in the first case can there be any hope of intellectual interchange, even when the beliefs are contradictory.¹³

On the level of attitudes, it is important that both sides are open to the possibility of achieving a new kind of society, even a new man, which can arise only as a consequence both of the negation of present western civilization and of fundamental changes in present experiments in socialism.¹⁴ Gozzini asks Marxists to recognize that they belong to a heritage which has erred both in theory and practice on many occasions¹⁵ (a concept which he could equally have applied to his own Catholic confession¹⁶).

Following the idea that a qualitatively new kind of search, undertaken together, is the only way of discovering new options for man because of the theoretical and practical failures of the actual capitalist and socialist systems, B. Zylstra comments, 'We must rediscover a concept of the value, structure and purpose of human life which is neither Capitalist nor Marxist.'¹⁷

The 'success' of the dialogue depends, to a large extent, on the possibility of its taking place at the

¹² Cf. Girardi, *op. cit.*, pp. 181ff., 198; and the famous work of Mao Tse-Tung, 'On Practice' in *Essential Works of Marxism* (New York, 1961), pp. 499ff.

¹³ L. Kolakowski says with regard to the immutability of Marxist ideology, 'The purity of Marxist doctrine is useful only if Marxism considers itself to be a religious phenomenon instead of being a science' ('Permanent vs. Transitory Aspects of Marxism' in *Towards a Marxist Humanism: Essays on the New Left Today*, New York, 1968, p. 184).

¹⁴ Garaudy, *op. cit.*, pp. 63, 64; H. Cox, 'A New Phase in the Marxist-Christian Encounter' (*Christianity and Crisis*, XXV, 18, 1965), p. 229; Rosales in G. Gozzini *et al.*, *El Diálogo de la Epoca: Católicos y Marxistas* (Buenos Aires, 1965), p. 12.

¹⁵ Gozzini, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁶ Cf. H. Küng, *Infalible? An Inquiry* (London, 1971), *passim*; Girardi, *op. cit.*, pp. 175, 176. Lepp (*op. cit.*, p. 78) points out that in practice the claim to possess an absolute truth, absolutely defined, has always led to reactionism and conservatism.

¹⁷ 'Karl Marx: Radical Humanist' (*Vanguard*, December 1973).

level of individuals rather than institutions, and within the western tradition of 'protest'.¹⁸ As Girardi well says, 'Marxism (Christianity) which is open to dialogue is the Marxism (Christianity) of men, closed to dialogue is that of institutions.'¹⁹

According to Moltmann, both sides are struggling with new problems which the traditional doctrines of each one do not really solve.²⁰ This study hopes to contribute to this struggle, taking as its starting-point man who is once again at the crossroads of his existence and destiny.²¹

2. Which Marxism?

Before arriving at the main part of the discussion, it is necessary to enquire about the essence, synthesis or central teaching of Marxism.

Such a task is somewhat complicated by the fact that there are three principal currents within Marxism and each one varies partially from the others in its view of man. There is the Marxism of Marx himself;²² the Marxism of Lenin, known as 'Marxism-Leninism';²³ and the Marxism of the 'revisionists' or the 'new left'.²⁴

A really thorough discussion of Marxism would require us to analyse both the internal links and the causes which have produced the theoretical development between the different stages. In each tendency, however, there do exist certain constants which allow us to classify Marxism in a particular way as a unique philosophy and theory concerning revolution.

¹⁸ Gozzini, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 36.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 204.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

²¹ 'Marx began from the philosophy of man in order to be able later to reach scientific socialism' (A. Schaff, *op. cit.*, p. 14). 'Christian apologetic does not start out from some place beyond the stars. It starts out from man and what man can know about himself' (F. Schaeffer, *The God Who Is There*, London, 1968, p. 123).

²² Marx was a prolific writer. His concept of man is not systematically spelt out in any one of his writings. Rather it has to be deduced from a comparison of various works which ostensibly treat different subjects at different periods of his life. In the course of our discussion we will quote from the majority of his relevant works.

²³ Lenin's principal works are: *The State and Revolution* (1917); *What Should Be Done?* (1902); *Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder* (1920); *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* (1918); *Imperialism the Final Stage of Capitalism* (1917).

²⁴ The main works of the new left which we have consulted in this study are those of Kolakowski and Schaff (already quoted); M. Djilas, *The New Class* (New York, 1951); the symposium edited by E. Fromm, *Socialist Humanism*; R. Garaudy (already quoted) and the contributions by Marxists to the various symposia quoted throughout these footnotes. Mao Tse-Tung and Fidel Castro claim to be orthodox Marxist-Leninists. They, however, have developed this orthodoxy according to the particular circumstances of their respective revolutions. Thus they represent a different evolution of Leninism from that of either Russian or west European Communism.

Marxism represents the most consistent humanism developed this side of the Enlightenment and the French revolution. As such it demonstrates a determined optimism in man's unlimited possibilities of self-realization.²⁵ Marxist humanism should be radically distinguished from other socialist humanisms,²⁶ particularly in its criticism of idealism and in its appeal to an objective, scientific analysis of society. According to Marxism, the history of humanity demonstrates a coherent pattern and development; all relationships between people are founded on the relationships of production,²⁷ and these relationships, due to the monetary system of exchange in society, have given rise to the class struggle.²⁸ This struggle arises from a basic alienation which every person suffers, whether he belongs to the proletariat or the bourgeois class,²⁹ which inhibits him from being fully man. The only way of abolishing this alienation, leaving man free to pass from the 'kingdom of necessity' to the 'kingdom of liberty', is by destroying the monetary system of exchange, using the socialization of the means of production in the name of the proletariat as a first step. After the revolution the proletariat will cease to be an alienated class, for society will no longer have classes: with the disappearance of the capitalist (owner) class, the producer will no longer be alienated from his production.³⁰

According to Kolakowski, typical of Marxist thought is its emphasis on historicism: the rejection of any interpretation of society which sets out from the point of view of an absolute ethic, and an emphasis both on those basic divisions of society which have most influenced history's development and on the force of that historic law which predicts the inevitability of the socialist system.³¹

²⁵ 'K. Marx is one of the most radical proponents of the myth of self-determinism,' Zylstra, *op. cit.* For the background to his humanism cf. I. Berlin, *Karl Marx: his Life and Environment* (London, 1960), chapter 2, 'Childhood and Adolescence': 'Marx also believed in perfectability and rationality; i.e.: the intelligibility of the process of social evolution; society inevitably progressive; its movement always ahead, each step being closer to the rational ideal than its predecessor' (p. 30).

²⁶ F. Engels in his work *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* demonstrates the differences.

²⁷ *The 1844 Manuscripts; Grundrisse*; cf. B. Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Critique of Man in Capitalist Society* (Cambridge, 1971).

²⁸ 'The history of every society which has existed until now is the history of the class struggle,' *Communist Manifesto*; also *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* and *The Civil War in France*.

²⁹ *The Holy Family; Capital*; cf. D. Bell, 'The Debate on Alienation' in L. Labedz *et al.*, *Revisionism* (London, 1962).

³⁰ *The 1844 Manuscripts; The German Ideology; Critique of the Gotha Programme*.

³¹ Kolakowski, *op. cit.*, p. 180; cf. also H. W. Laidler, *Social Economic Movements* (New York, 1949), ch. 16.

Marxist anthropology can be tentatively resumed in the following mini-thesis: man creates himself in his struggle to subdue nature; man humanizes nature; he is the thinking product of his practical activity and the myths of his conscience are due solely to his alienations, whose real source must be revealed and overcome.²²

In the central part of this study we will try first to summarize briefly Marx's concept of man. Secondly we shall dedicate a little more space to a consideration of the concept in those two branches which have sprung from the main trunk of Marxist thought, Marxism-Leninism and 'revisionism'. Thirdly we shall point out the most serious objections which Marxism has put against the Christian faith and also the basic differences which Christianity finds between its concept of man and that of Marxism. Finally, we hope to embark upon a creative discussion whose principal purpose will be to call upon evangelical biblical faith to reconsider, in the light of the challenge of Marxism, both the concept of man which it possesses in practice, and the practical consequences derived from this debate for the life and mission of the church.

Methodologically, we are concerned that the debate does not remain on a purely theoretical plane (which can lead to an easy escapism) nor on the level of a discussion of the practical effects of the theory (where it is easy to subordinate the ends to the means), but rather that it incorporates a reflection on theory as the *foundation obligation and possibility of praxis* (which we understand to be both the prophets' and apostles' understanding of the relationship between faith and obedience). We have already stressed that the relationship between theory and practice, hearing and doing the word, is one of the critical points in the debate between man and man in the two systems.

3. The vision of man: principal themes

a. *Man in the thinking of Karl Marx*

Marx's thought, which had already been established in essence by the time he wrote the 1844 manuscripts, can be summarized in four interrelated stages.²³ (The divisions are mine and not Marx's.)

²² Kolakowski, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

²³ The following bibliography on Marx's anthropology may be helpful: A. Schaff, *op. cit.*; L. Althusser, *op. cit.*, B. Delfgaauw, *The Young Marx* (London, 1967); L. Dupré, *The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism* (New York, 1966); A. Schmidt, *The Concept of Nature in Marx* (London, 1971); V. Venable, *Human Nature: The Marxian View* (London, 1946); L. Farré, 'El Hombre según el Materialismo Dialéctico' (*Filosofía*, XXIV, 92, 93, 1965), pp. 23-49; G. A. Wetier and E. Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York, 1961).

The most basic stage, the one from which his materialism is derived, is the *negation of any essence in man*.²⁴ According to Marx, there does not exist in man any essential residue (his being) which somehow is impervious to change. If Marx were to have used biblical categories to express himself, he would have denied that man is created in the image of a personal and infinite God, an image that belongs to all men irrespective of time and place. From this negation Marx draws two very important conclusions. (1) Man belongs exclusively to matter. He is to be distinguished from the rest of nature by being its reflexive part (man is nature turned conscious). In stating this view of man Marx aligns himself with 'scientific humanism' (amongst whose modern representatives can be found the distinguished scientist Jacques Monod),²⁵ which places the principal distinction between the animal kingdom and man in the superior development of the latter's brain. (2) Man is changeable. Wherever matter exists, and for Marx it is eternal, infinite and unlimited, mutability reigns. This idea gives rise to the concept of dialectical materialism, according to which man is a perpetually flowing stream of consciousness.

In brief, for Marx man arises from nature, in the full sense of the word 'arise'. Marx divides all anthropologies into two possible groups: materialism (oneself) and idealism (everyone else).

The second stage is intimately linked to the first one. *Man is the aggregate of his social relationships*.²⁶ Man arises from his context in society in the full sense of the word 'arise'. Criticizing Feuerbach's anthropology, Marx says that man's essence is not an abstraction in man. He is the aggregate of his social relationships.²⁷ From this argument Marx concludes that it is precisely man's social existence which determines his conscience and not the opposite way round (*i.e.*, for man *praxis* antecedes theory). Everyone acts according to his material circumstances, and in particular his economic relationships.

The third stage that we can encounter in Marx appears as a development of the idea that man arises from matter: *man realizes himself through work*.²⁸ His work is to be understood as the

²⁴ Cf. A. Schaff, *op. cit.*, pp. 69, 169; Farré, *op. cit.*, p. 23; Althusser, *op. cit.*, p. 187; E. Fromm, 'The Application of Humanist Psycho-Analysis and Marx's Theory' in E. Fromm *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

²⁵ Cf. *Chance and Necessity* (London, 1972).

²⁶ Cf. A. Schaff, *op. cit.*, pp. 109, 118-120; I. Svitak, 'The source of Socialist Humanism' in E. Fromm *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 17; I. Berlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-27; Mao Tse-Tung, *On Practice*, p. 499.

²⁷ *Thesis on Feuerbach*.

²⁸ Cf. A. Schaff, *op. cit.*, p. 164; G. A. Wetier, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-19; Zylstra, *op. cit.*, Garaudy, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

subjecting and forming of matter. Man creates himself by the creative act of his labour. At the same time, this concept helps to explain Marx's very precise view of man's alienation.³⁹ Man is alienated from himself by the bad use of his labour, and as a result of his economy. History demonstrates a continual struggle to achieve a greater superiority in the possession of property. This possession has always given man a greater say in the exercise of political power (*the economic factor predominates over the political*). This whole process began when man passed from a society which practised community property to one which encouraged private property.⁴⁰ The proletariat is alienated both within himself and from his fellows because another expropriates the work of his hand for his own benefit. The bourgeois person, on the other hand, is alienated from everyone because he has converted all human relationships into money transactions.

The fourth and final stage appears as a development of the idea that man arises from his social relationships: *man realises himself by making (or changing) history*.⁴¹ The identification which Marx presupposes between the nature of man and his social relationships explains the strong emphasis which he places on *praxis*: man is man, not when he is meditating, but when he is transforming the objective world freely (he is *homo laborans*). If he loses this possibility he loses his humanity. The only way he can recuperate the possibility is by means of the revolution, the final phase of the class struggle. Marx speaks of pre-history which is the conflictive part of human history, and history proper (after the revolution) which he calls the kingdom of liberty, where there will exist no more coercion nor limitation. History proper, freed from all class antagonisms, is the place of man's complete humanization.

In the first two stages, Marx explains man's origin: matter and the aggregate of his social

relationships. In the third and fourth stages he defines man from the point of view of his action: in nature and in history. It may also be seen, from this brief study, that his twin concepts of alienation (or evil) and revolution (or salvation) are closely linked to his starting-point in man.

Marx places himself firmly within a Hebrew cultural background when he speaks of 'total' man or 'being-in-species' (*Gattungswesen*).⁴² He avoids, apparently, the idealist dichotomy of Greek culture, which can best be understood as the consequence of a speculative escapist tendency. On the contrary, he makes of man a 'being-in-history'.⁴³

On the other hand, he also follows the basic presuppositions of the Enlightenment, when he emphasizes the fact that man is the only subject of his own history; it is as he, alone, becomes aware of the causes of his alienation and the objective laws of the historical process that he can achieve his true selfhood.

According to Marx, man must be 'total', personal and self-activating (*selbsttätig*).⁴⁴

b. Development in the Marxist concept of man

(i) *Marxism-Leninism*. Lenin's contribution to Marxist theory is very much disputed. In general terms, however, we can affirm that one of his most significant points was to propose and develop the thesis of imperialism as the last phase of capitalism. Capitalist expansion necessitated more and more markets for its products. In order to secure these markets the capitalist nations were forced to enter into such severe competition amongst themselves that they were involuntarily brought to the point of war.⁴⁵

Lenin called capitalism 'moribund imperialism' because of its recurrent crises and because of its naked and aggressive exploitation of the colonial countries. Like Marx and Engels before him, he expected to see, especially after the first world war, the sudden and complete shipwreck of the whole capitalist system.

In reality, contrary to the example of Marx and

³⁹ Althusser, *op. cit.*, p. 187; Wetier, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-24. 'Marx pointed out four aspects of alienation in capitalism. First, man is alienated from the product of his work. . . . Second, he is alienated in the process of production itself . . . Work is not an end, but a means. Third, he is alienated in himself. He is a social being, whose social needs are not satisfied by capitalism. Finally, he is alienated from his neighbour . . . who becomes his competitor': Zylstra, *op. cit.* Cf. also D. McLellan, *The Thought of Karl Marx*, Part 2, ch. 1.

⁴⁰ Cf. Marx, *Capital*, ch. 26, 'The Secret of Primitive Accumulation'; Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, ch. 9, 'Barbarism and Civilization'.

⁴¹ Cf. W. Ash, *Marxism and Moral Concepts* (New York, 1964), pp. 112-114; M. Eliade, *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return* (New York, 1949), p. 149.

⁴² Cf. D. McLellan, *Marx's Grundrisse* (St Albans, 1973), p. 23; O. Schatz and E. Winter, 'Alienation, Marxism and Humanism: A Christian Viewpoint' in E. Fromm *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

⁴³ Ogletree, *op. cit.*, pp. 22, 23.

⁴⁴ Marx paints a utopic picture of the future state of man in Communist society in various of his works. For the details consult M. Fritzhand, 'Marx's Ideal of Man' in E. Fromm *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-165; D. McLellan, *The Thought of Karl Marx*, Part 2, ch. 8.

⁴⁵ Lenin, *Imperialism* (see note 23); Stalin, *The Foundations of Leninism, passim*; R. Conquest, *Where Marx Went Wrong* (London, 1970), ch. 4; A. P. Mendel, in *Essential Works of Marxism*, ch. 11.

Engels, Lenin's contribution did not consist so much in his theorizing as in his practice, what he accomplished by bringing about the first ever revolution inspired by Marx. If it is true that Marx turned Hegel upside down,⁴⁶ Lenin also turned Marx on his head. According to Plekhanov, Lenin was not so much a theoretician of Marx as of the revolution. As P. Lehmann asserts, 'Lenin transformed the Marxist analysis of the power of ideology into an ideology of power'.⁴⁷ His most faithful sons are all those who conceive the revolution strictly in terms of the conquest of power.⁴⁸ In other words, Lenin, appealing to the idea of progress in Marxist thought, changed the basis of Marxist theory from the predominance of economic factors as the substructure which *explains* the whole of history to the predominance of the political factors which *changes* it.

Due to the accelerating changes taking place at the end of the nineteenth century in Europe, Lenin came to the conclusion that the Second International no longer served as a revolutionary force. Faced by the power of 'financial capitalism' it compromised and became impotent. He began, therefore, to reorganize the revolutionary forces for a final assault on western imperialism.⁴⁹ In his book *What Shall Be Done?* (1902) he presents the dictatorship of the proletariat in terms of the dictatorship of the Communist party. The development of this idea is the key to understanding the whole subsequent historical development of Marxism-Leninism and its contemporary offshoots.⁵⁰ From then on it was the party, and largely Lenin within the party, who decided which course history should take.

In practice he showed himself to be very far distant from the 'democratic' participatory practice opted for by Marx in the days of the First International.⁵¹ Marx placed his confidence in the course

⁴⁶ *The 1844 Manuscripts*.

⁴⁷ 'La Teología cristiana en un mundo en Revolución' in Ogletree *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁴⁸ E.g., Mao Tse-Tung, 'Long Live Leninism' in Mendel, *op. cit.*, *passim*; R. Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution* (New York, 1967) (although in the last five years or so he has modified his opinion in this respect); Che Guevara, 'Guerilla Warfare: A Method' in G. Lavan (ed.), *Che Guevara Speaks: Selected Speeches and Writings* (New York, 1967). F. Castro believed that the objective pre-conditions for the revolution could be caused by the armed section of a minority group, even when comparatively small, as long as it was disciplined and determined. Cf. R. Conquest, *op. cit.*, ch. 9.

⁴⁹ Stalin, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-222.

⁵⁰ Cf. the magnificent analysis of the cultural and historical origin of Russian Communism in N. Berdyaev, *The Sources and Meaning of Russian Communism* (London, 1937), especially ch. 6. According to him, because the first proletariat revolution had to be brought about in an agrarian society, 'Lenin placed himself within the current

of history, *i.e.*, in the natural and inevitable ruin of capitalism. He also believed that the proletariat would take hold of the reins of history, its history, in order to bring into being a new society, without a party and without classes.

Lenin, on the other hand, did not have confidence in the predetermined course of the successive stages of capitalism. Neither did he trust the proletariat in general as the true generator of all history, subsequent to the revolution.

The drastic change from Marx's theory to Lenin's revolutionary practice produced a profound effect in the latter's 'socialist humanism'. The implantation first of the party and then, as an extension of this, of the whole apparatus of the state as the arbiter of history, involved substantial changes in the way in which a Communist society of the future would be achieved. In effect, the desired 'new man' would have to be created by the organization of a centralized state power.⁵²

Classically, the function of ethics has been to direct and orientate every human activity in the light of a totality (in Christianity, for example, in the light of the totality of a transcendent revelation). For Marx, this totality was the unavoidable direction of history as it moved dialectically from a class-bound to a classless society. For Lenin, on the other hand, the totality was the ideology of 'the iron will', exercised by an exclusive group which had captured the state power.

For Marx, history becomes relatively autonomous because it obeys laws which are imminent to its trajectory. For Lenin, on the other hand, history must be subordinated to the demands of a new theory: 'Without a revolutionary theory there cannot be a revolutionary movement' (*Complete Works*, IV, p. 380). Thus, in practice, in spite of all disclaimers, theory still predominates over practice in Lenin's thought. In consequence, man has to obey a *new interpretation of history* which is essentially non-Marxist.

(ii) *Revisionism*. Within the Marxist camp 'revisionism' is a label which is used depreciatingly. We use it in a neutral sense to describe every Marxist theorist or activist who disagrees with Lenin's voluntarist interpretation of Marx or who disas-

of populist socialism, affirming that in Russia the revolution has to be original.' The Leninist ideology erected the revolutionary will into absolute truth.

⁵¹ Although Marx also acted individualistically and arbitrarily when he established the headquarters of the First International in New York, an act which effectively caused its dissolution. Cf. I. Berlin, *op. cit.*, ch. 9.

⁵² Another of Lenin's departures from Marx's theories; cf. M. Buber, *Caminos de Utopía* (Mexico, 1955), chs. VIII and IX.

sociates himself from Lenin's revolutionary orthodoxy.⁵³

According to this definition one of the first of the revisionists was Rosa Luxemburg (died in 1919), who was keenly critical of what she considered to be the Machiavellism of the Bolsheviks, agreeing with Marx's principle that 'government only hears its own voice, and demands that the people share the same illusion'. She stated that 'freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the person who thinks in another way, its efficacy vanishes when "freedom" becomes a special privilege'.⁵⁴ (This statement, naturally, is valid for any kind of dictatorial regime.)

One of the most remarkable characteristics of revisionism is the desire to return to the right of the individual or group openly to discuss the current teaching of the Communist party's magisterium, in defence of a socialism which would be more integral and more human. The old left, due to the 'triumphalism' of the Stalinist era, had become paralysed in opportunist structures. The new left proposes a new hermeneutic of Marx's writings with the idea of creatively applying to new situations his conceptual analysis. In other words it claims to be a Marxist criticism of Marxism which takes seriously the way in which capitalism has progressed and changed in the last 100 years.⁵⁵ It seeks to be a dynamic type of Marxism, *propter semper reformanda*. In the sections which follow we will note some of its main characteristics.

(1) *Its attitude towards freedom.* One of the most serious objections levelled against 'maximalist' Marxism is that it has resolutely opposed the western tradition of independent non-authoritarian thinking won only after many prolonged struggles.⁵⁶ This objection must not be confused with an attitude which is favourably disposed to neo-capitalism, as official Marxist propaganda would like to make out,⁵⁷ nor understood as a truce with bourgeois reactionary forces, whatever form they may take. On the contrary, in so far as revisionism has arisen in those countries which have abolished the capitalist system of the means of production, it fights against an excessive centralization of state

⁵³ When China accuses Russia of having fallen into 'revisionism', it is thinking of something else. Its criticism, apparently, is directed against (a) its compromising attitude towards capitalism, and (b) its imperialistic territorial claims along the border with China.

⁵⁴ Conquest, *op. cit.*, pp. 92, 93.

⁵⁵ Kolakowski, 'Permanent vs. Transitory Aspects of Marxism' (see note 13).

⁵⁶ Cf. especially the allocution of Solzhenitzyn pronounced on the occasion of receiving the Nobel Prize for literature.

⁵⁷ E.g., Mao Tse-Tung in 'Combat Liberalism' in *Essential works of Marxism*.

power and against the delay in the implementation of a society which is truly collectivist.⁵⁸ In other words, taking seriously Marx's distinction between pre-history and history, it proposes a pluralism of 'non-antagonistic' ideas within a society which supposedly has already abolished the class system.⁵⁹

(2) *The importance of the individual.* According to Marx the individual as he actually exists is not a free being but the object of various social circumstances which impede the full development of his personality. Once these barriers have been destroyed, man's personality has every chance of being created freely. In those societies which have passed through a Marxist revolution, sometimes due to the challenge of western existentialist philosophy, the fundamental question of the place, purpose and worth of the individual has insistently arisen. As Adam Schaff recognizes, the idea of the individual is the starting-point for any philosophy of man; every type of reflection depends upon the question, What is the human individual? As far as Schaff is concerned the central problem of the individual rests in the ambiguous nature of an approach to ethics without absolutes, and also in the real meaning of happiness.⁶⁰ It is the concern of these Marxists to recover the individual's initiative in the process of reconstructing society: 'The task of man is not simply to walk in the direction history takes but to move history in a human direction'.⁶¹

(3) *The possibility of new alienations.* Admission to failures and retrogressions in the process of man's socialization is perhaps the most important characteristic of the new left. At least it is a sign that it takes history seriously and this for two reasons. (a) Man can be a responsible author of the historical process only if it is possible for him to be wrong; if a man or a party is incapable of error they can never advance beyond endless historical justifications of the actual *status quo*. (b) It admits that the aggregate of man's social relationships changes quite substantially from one generation to another. In taking history seriously it responds, in theory at least, to the spirit of Marx. It is not surprising, then, that revisionism is well known for its withering attacks on the self-justification of any socialist system which has shown itself to be incapable of sustaining revolutionary impulse. Part

⁵⁸ E. Bloch, 'Man and Citizen according to Marx' in E. Fromm *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 204: 'The rights of man under socialism are essentially the rights of an objective and practical criticism, in order to advance the construction of Socialism within a structure of solidarity.'

⁵⁹ Farré, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁶⁰ Schaff dedicates the whole of his book to the elaboration of a consistent reply to this problematical question.

⁶¹ Girardi, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

of this self-justification manifests itself in the unwarranted assumption that by calling a movement a revolution the old class society is automatically abolished. Such crude propaganda, according to Althusser, very often is a cover up for a new kind of class privilege.⁶²

It is Djilas who has best demonstrated the essentially class nature of the *aparatchiks* who arose as a logical consequence of Lenin's particular revolution. The party's initiative is transformed into the traditional oligarchy of a new class which sees an almost pathological need to suppress every person or group which shows any propensity to having different ideas. The inevitable outcome of any Communist party which has come to power is that 'the former grows weaker whilst the class grows stronger'.⁶³

The fundamental problem, then, of the post-revolutionary society is not increasing bureaucracy, as Trotsky and many modern Marxists imagine, but the *appearance of a new class* who effectively control the means of production. This is the reality. So as Djilas maintains, 'It is an historical illusion which is sustained by a new alienating ideology that socialism has already been completed as the first stage of Communism,' for the proletariat has once again been suppressed by an institution which is wholly inaccessible to them. Thus, the central problem for the new left is how to ensure that the proletariat really is, in practice, the last class.⁶⁴

(4) *The decentralization of power.* One of the theoretical solutions to this problem most widely held amongst the new left is that the manual worker should be allowed to participate fully in the duties of government. Goldmann says, for example, that the 'self-administration' of the workers would seem to be the only possible foundation for an authentically socialist programme in the modern world.⁶⁵ The Communist countries of Europe have apparently already abandoned the attempt to construct a true socialism in which the popular masses are the real owners of the means of production and really participate in the profits realized. In order for this to happen, there would have to be a totally new revolution in which the party is deprived of its administrative monopoly.⁶⁶ M. Buber, a little idealistically, suggests that, if the means of production

were to pass effectively into the hands of the nation as such, then small communities would have to be formed, made up of diverse groups, to ensure that the people became the true subjects of the process of production. The demands of collectivity ought to rule the affairs of state.⁶⁷

We have tried to do justice to certain Marxist ideas concerning man, and particularly man as he is placed in society. We have noted that, under the pressure of very different circumstances from those in which Marxist theory originally arose, certain fundamental changes have been made in practice. We would, however, want to stress once more that Marxist theory is much more homogeneous than Marxist practice and that, therefore, the philosophical substratum which underlines its basic anthropology has not undergone any radical, or even very significant, transformation. The problem of fitting a relatively systematized theory to the complex reality of man is as much a problem for Marxism as it is for any other contemporary philosophy or ideology, particularly when it is set within an inflexible humanist framework.

Before trying to get at the root causes of the failure of Marxism to produce a totally adequate anthropology, from a Christian point of view, we should be genuinely open to listen to those criticisms which the Marxists of the Christian-Marxist dialogue have thought it necessary to make of the Christian faith.

(iii) *The Marxist criticism of Christian anthropology.* (1) Every religion, according to Marx, demonstrates the existence of a falsified conscience. Belief in any kind of object beyond man and his world reveals man's search for a compensation, a substitutionary recompense produced because of his inability to terminate his relationships of alienation.

(2) Religion is an integral part of the superstructure of any human culture. It arises as a necessary consequence of man's economic substructure.⁶⁸ As the superstructure responds to an alienated substructure, religion is also a logical extension of this alienation. Inversely, when the alienation ceases, religion will also disappear.

(3) Following the thought of Feuerbach, Marx concludes that man is alone in the universe. If he was not alone he would be dependent upon something or someone. But no form of dependence

⁶² *Op. cit.*, p. 196.

⁶³ 'The New Class' in *Essential Works of Marxism*, p. 321. After the revolution, the new class changes its original revolutionary ideology for a static apologetic ideology; cf. L. Goldmann, 'Socialism and Humanism' in E. Fromm *et al.*, *op. cit.*

⁶⁴ M. Buber, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-18.

⁶⁵ 'Socialism and the Problem of Alienation' in *ibid.*, pp. 281f.

⁶⁶ 'Socialism and Humanism' in *ibid.*, pp. 46, 49.

⁶⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 197.

⁶⁸ The relationship between the substructure and the superstructure in Marx's thought is very well clarified in letters which Engels wrote towards the end of his life; e.g., his letters to Conrad Schmidt, Heinz Starkenburg, Joseph Bloch and Franz Mehring.

can be squared with that absolute liberty which is necessary if man is going to be the real and not imaginary subject of his own history.⁶⁹

(4) Whatever kind of religion may be imagined, its real force lies in its ability to project human aspirations from this world to a world beyond the grave. This being so, no religion can finally and absolutely dedicate itself to changing this world; it will tend rather to support the *status quo* in this life so that it can concentrate undisturbed on the next.

(5) Part of the attack that Marx launched against Hegel in the latter part of his *Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts* had to do with Hegel's defence of the Prussian state. Marx considered that this defence was a logical conclusion of his idea of a transcendent universal Spirit which somehow guaranteed the necessity of everything that existed. Confusing Hegel's universal Spirit with the Christian God, Marxists have often tried to point out that Christianity is likewise bound to defend the powers that be, because these are always, automatically, decreed by God.⁷⁰

(6) But the Marxist criticism of religion is even more subtle and challenging. Marx used the Hegelian dialectic to analyse trans-human relationships from the very earliest times up to his own century. It is well known that Marx divided human history into consecutive ages, each one following the other with complete inevitability. He begins with the primitive community society and follows on to society based on slavery; then feudal society, guild-society and capitalist society.⁷¹ Each of these societies arose as a result of a certain historical necessity. Religion also arose of necessity. It too has changed according to changing historical circumstances. History, however, has now reached its final stage. With the coming of the working class as a 'class for itself', and with the break-up of capitalist society, pre-history has finally reached its limit. When real history is initiated, all religion will become totally superfluous.⁷²

⁶⁹ Marx's hero, as he was also that of Fichte, Goethe, Schiller and Nietzsche, is Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods. Cf. Zylstra, *op. cit.*; I. Lepp, *op. cit.*, pp. 64. 'The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the highest being for man' (Marx, *Early Texts*, p. 122).

⁷⁰ Although Engels was prepared to admit that the first Christian community had some value as a protest movement in the first centuries.

⁷¹ E.g., *The Communist Manifesto*; Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*.

(7) The fact that Marxism has erected itself into a historical science has meant that it rejects every point of view which goes beyond strictly scientific controls. 'The religious solution is unacceptable for everyone who does not want to reject the scientific point of view,' says Schaff.⁷³ Moreover, Garaudy rejects the notion that the development of human history since Marx now makes the search for transcendence outside of man absolutely imperative. Garaudy believes that transcendence is already present in the complete break with the old order and the ushering in of a new one. The transcendence of man is not an attribute of his nature which was printed on him on the first day of creation, but rather of his culture, the work of history, man creating himself as he goes along. Man continually transcends himself as he freely develops his material and spiritual capacities.⁷⁴ Marxism, therefore, naturally rejects any idea of man's salvation coming to him from outside as a gift, on the grounds that such a notion empties of any significance man's efforts to construct a better world.⁷⁵

(8) Finally, Marxism criticizes the Christian faith for its belief in an absolute ethic. The Marxist in his search for an ethic which is consistent to his thought system sets out from two basic premises: (a) man's central problem is always social and not individual; (b) history is a project which continues to be realized indefinitely.⁷⁶ According to Schaff, any absolute ethic shows its bankruptcy when a situation rises in which contradictory precepts are equally applicable. The only way of solving such a problem is by choosing the solution which is closest to a scientific analysis of man in society.⁷⁷ This analysis arises from an evaluation of those social conditions which are most necessary in order to guarantee man's happiness.⁷⁸

⁷² According to the Marxist theorist G. Klaus, the insights of dialectical materialism make all religion superfluous. Cf. H.-G. Koch, *The Abolition of God* (London, 1963), p. 171.

⁷³ *Op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁷⁴ 'The Meaning of Life and History in Marx and Teilhard de Chardin' in B. Towers *et. al.*, *Evolution, Marxism and Christianity* (London, 1968), pp. 68, 69.

⁷⁵ A. C. Dyson, 'Marxism, Evolution and the Person of Christ' in *ibid.*, p. 77.

⁷⁶ Cf. Schaff, *op. cit.*, pp. 56, 57; 137-51.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 142, 143; Berlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 146, 147; K. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies* (London, 1948): 'Moral decisions... are based on scientific historical prophecy; they are not based on any moral system.'

⁷⁸ Schaff, *op. cit.*, pp. 234, 235; W. Ash, *op. cit.*, pp. 108ff.

Resurrection and Immortality: Eight Theses

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It is a curious fact that few theological issues are as potentially explosive as the doctrines of resurrection and immortality. In the preface to the English translation of his *study Immortalité de l'âme ou résurrection des morts?* O. Cullmann confesses 'No other publication of mine has provoked such enthusiasm or such violent hostility.'¹

Several factors may account for the heat so often generated by the discussion of these issues. First, serious misunderstanding not infrequently arises from the ambiguity of the terms 'immortality' and 'resurrection'. What a student of Greek philosophy means by 'immortality' is certainly not what the term signifies to a New Testament exegete. What a physicist understands by the phrase 'resurrection of the flesh' differs markedly from the meaning attached to that phrase by a systematic theologian. Secondly, the two terms are often (erroneously) thought to symbolize the difference between Greek philosophy and biblical revelation: Plato argued for immortality, Paul preached resurrection, it is said; the word 'immortality' has no proper claim to a place in the vocabulary of Christian theology. Some imagine that to defend the doctrine of 'the resurrection of the dead' against any notion of 'immortality' is to contend for the faith against the encroachment of philosophical paganism. Thirdly, many who are convinced by arguments for the immortality of the soul find themselves repelled by the view (mistakenly taken to be Christian) that resurrection simply amounts to reanimation: decomposed corpses are to be revived or scattered fragments are to be reassembled, the resurrection body having the same atomic structure as the body that was laid in the grave or was cremated.

Rather than attempting to include a cursory treatment of such matters as the Old Testament and intertestamental views of resurrection and immortality² or the evidences for the resurrection of Christ, this article will focus attention on the New Testament (particularly the Pauline) use of the terms 'resurrection' and 'immortality' and their interrelation. A convenient way of raising the relevant issues will be to state eight theses which one may then seek to explain or defend.

¹ *Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? The Witness of the New Testament* (London, 1958). Of the many reviews of this monograph, see in particular Ch. Masson in *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* 8 (1958), pp. 250-67.

² For a discussion of these concepts as they are found in Old Testament and intertestamental literature, see A. T. Nikolainen *Der Aufernehmungsglauben in der Bibel and ihrer Umwelt* (2 vols.) (Helsinki, 1944-46); R. Martin-Achard, *De la mort à la résurrection d'après l'AT* (Paris, 1956); G. W. E. Nickelsburg, *Resurrection, Immortality and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism* (London, 1972); G. Stemmerger, *Der Leib der Auferstehung* (Rome, 1972); H. C. C. Cavallin, *Life After Death*, Part 1 (Lund, 1974).

1. *In the New Testament, immortality involves not so much endless personal survival through the avoidance of physical death as participation in the eternal life of God and therefore immunity from eternal death.*

It is true that in itself the word 'immortality' simply denotes immunity from death (*athanasia*, 1Cor. 15:53, 54; 1 Tim. 6:16) or from decay (*aphtharsia*, Rom. 2:7; 1 Cor. 15:42, 50, 53, 54; Eph. 6:24; 2 Tim. 1:10). But given a New Testament context, the word should be defined positively as well as negatively, qualitatively as well as quantitatively. To be immortal is more than being immune from extinction³ or free from corruption. It is to share the nature of God (2 Pet. 1:4) and to enjoy fellowship with Christ (Lk. 23:43; 2 Cor. 5:8; Phil. 1:23). Deathlessness and incorruptibility result from full and immediate participation in the eternal divine life. A comparison of 2 Corinthians 5:4 with I Corinthians 15:53, 54 shows that '(eternal) life'⁴ is equivalent to 'immortality'. Note also the significant juxtaposition of these two terms in Romans 2:7 ('to those who by patience in well-doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, he (God) will give eternal life') and 2 Timothy 1:10 ('...Christ Jesus, who abolished death and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel'). The

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Christian is destined to gain an immunity to that principle of decay and deterioration which characterizes humanity in Adam, through sharing the endless life of God.

2. *In distinctive New Testament usage, resurrection signifies not the reanimation of corpses but the transformation of the whole person into the image of Christ by the power of the indwelling Spirit, in spite of the intervention of death.*

The majority of pagan Greeks of the first century AD would probably have understood the New Testament phrase *hē anastasis tōn nekrōn* ('the resurrection of the dead') to mean nothing more than 'the standing up of corpses' (cf. Acts 17:32a). Since, for the Greeks, 'resurrection' was either impossible or at most an isolated miracle,⁵ it is little wonder that some Athenians understood Paul's reference to Jesus (*Iēsous*) and the resurrection (*anastasis*) as an allusion to two new deities, the 'Healer' (*Iēsō*) and his consort 'Restoration' (*Anastasis*) (Acts 17:18).⁶ And no doubt some Christians understood resurrection in crassly materialistic terms as simply the revival of dead persons, the restoration of decomposed bodies to their original atomic structure. But others would have inherited from Judaism the more developed view that resurrection involved the receipt of a new body as the permanent home of the soul that had been preserved intact in heavenly treasures since the time of death.⁷

³ The biblical doctrine of the judgment and consequent reward or punishment of all without exception implies the persistence of every person through and beyond death.

⁴ 'Life' and 'eternal life' are interchangeable in Pauline usage, as in Johannine (see R. W. Thomas, 'The Meaning of the Terms "Life" and "Death" in the Fourth Gospel and in Paul', *Scottish Journal of Theology* 21 (1968), pp. 199-212, especially p. 204).

⁵ A. Oepke in *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, I, p. 369.

⁶ See the note in F. F. Bruce, *The Acts of the Apostles. The Greek Text with Introduction and Commentary* (London, 1952), p. 333.

⁷ P. Volz (*Die Eschatologie der jüdischen Genreinde*, Tübingen, 1934, pp. 249-55; cf. pp. 117-21) traced the three basic views concerning the nature of resurrection that he found in Jewish literature (viz., 'Neubeseelung des alien

One distinctive feature of the Christian view of resurrection is that the dead are not only revived but also transformed. As for Christ, so for Christians, resurrection brings personal transformation and exaltation as well as the return of life. To be revived is not to be resurrected: the raising of Lazarus (Jn. 11:1-44) or of the widow of Nain's son (Lk. 7:11-17) was a restoration to temporary physical life (they came to life only ultimately to die once more), not a resurrection to permanent spiritual life. Christ, however, was resurrected, never to die again (Acts 13:34; Rom. 6:9) and always to be exalted at the right hand of God (Rom. 8:34, and note the significant *oun*, 'therefore,' linking vv. 32 and 33 of Acts 2).

What is raised and transformed is not some impersonal corpse but dead persons. The New Testament nowhere explicitly refers to 'the resurrection of the body' or 'the resurrection of the flesh', only to 'the resurrection of the dead' or to 'resurrection from the dead'. The subjects of resurrection are whole persons, who are transformed outwardly and inwardly in what may be called an acceleration of the process of Christification (see Rom. 8:29; 1 Cor. 15:49; 2 Cor. 3:18; Col. 3:10). With this in mind, some appeal to biblical usage of 'flesh' or 'body' in the sense of 'whole person' in support of the traditional phrases 'resurrection of the flesh'⁸ and 'resurrection of the body'⁹ which appear regularly in the creeds of the church. Both of these formulations, rightly understood, preserve a fundamental aspect of the truth (*viz.* that the subject of resurrection life is identical with the subject of physical life), but equally, both are open to the grave misinterpretation that resurrection means simply the resuscitation of corpses. Even the phrase 'resurrection in the body'¹⁰, is not without its difficulty. Perhaps the way of wisdom is to be content with the biblical formulation 'resurrection of/from the dead' or with the unqualified term 'resurrection'. If a qualification be thought imperative, the phrase 'resurrection of the person' (preferred by P. H. Menoud¹¹) seems least open to objection.

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Körpers'; 'Wiedervereinigung des alten Körpers and der alten Seele'; 'Neubelebung der aufbewahrten Seele'—see *op. cit.*, p. ix) to a materialistic, a materialistic-spiritual, and a spiritual anthropology (respectively). He located the religious motive behind the emphasis on the body and its restoration in the necessity for the maintenance of personal identity, and the religious motive behind the stress on the spirit and its embodiment in a new corporeality in the need for divine perfection and freedom from sin.

⁸ On the significance of the phrase 'the resurrection of the flesh' in credal formulations, see W. Bieder, 'Auferstehung des Fleisches oder des Leibes? Eine biblischtheologische and dogmengeschichtliche Studie', in *Theologische Zeitschrift*, I (1945), pp. 105-20; J. A. Schep, *The Nature of the Resurrection Body* (Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1964), pp. 220-27 (Appendix II); and J. G. Davies, 'Factors leading to the Emergence of Belief in the Resurrection of the Flesh,' in *Journal of Theological Studies*, 23 (1972), pp. 448-55. Definition of terms is again crucial. If 'flesh' can be shown to signify 'person' or 'man in his flesh-body' in biblical and patristic usage, one of the chief objections to the phrase 'the resurrection of the flesh' is removed.

⁹ For a discussion of the doctrine of 'The Resurrection of the Body' in the early Christian centuries, see articles bearing this title by R. M. Grant in *Journal of Religion*, 28 (1948), pp. 120-30, 188-208. A review of 'Contemporary Exegetical Understanding of "the Resurrection of the Body"' may be found J. Gnilka's article of this title in *Immortality and Resurrection*, ed. P. Benoit and R. Murphy (New York, 1970), pp. 129-41.

¹⁰ See C. R. Bowen, *The Resurrection in the New Testament* (New York, 1911), p. 76.

¹¹ *Le sort des trépassés*² (Neuchatel, 1966), pp. 60f. But Menoud tends to oversimplify when he distinguishes between three competing eschatologies (*op. cit.*, pp. 14, 15; see also p. 50, n. 1; pp. 85, 86): Greek idealistic eschatology, involving the immortality of the soul and deliverance from embodiment; Jewish materialistic eschatology, involving the resurrection of the flesh and the eternality of corporeality; and Christian realistic eschatology, involving the resurrection of the person and the redemption of corporeality itself.

On occasion, it must be noted, the New Testament appears to use the term 'resurrection' in a primitive sense of 'coming to life again' (*cf.* Jn. 5:21a) or emergence from the tomb (*cf.* Jn. 5:28, 29). There is a resurrection that leads to judgment, not life (Jn. 5:29; Acts 24:15; *cf.* Mt. 25:46; Lk. 11:32 and Dn. 12:2; 2 Esdras 7:32-38), a reanimation of 'the rest of the dead' that leads to 'the second death' (Rev. 20:4-6, 11-15).

But in the Pauline Epistles resurrection seems to be depicted as a privilege reserved for the new humanity in Christ.¹² In any event, whatever the anthropological state of the wicked dead after they have regained 'life', they are certainly not possessors of spiritual bodies, since the *sōma pneumatikon* is imperishable and therefore not subject to 'the second death'.

That the believer's resurrection is effected by God through the agency of his indwelling Spirit is shown by Romans 8:11 (where the genitive reading seems preferable). Moreover the pattern that the Spirit of God follows in giving life to 'mortal bodies' is the resurrection of Christ: Christ is the firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep (1 Cor. 15:20, 23; Col. 1:18; Rev. 1:5). Strictly speaking, the resurrection of Christ does not cause the resurrection of Christians (as Thomas Aquinas believed)¹³ but it does form its paradigm. The resurrection of Christ or the resurrected Christ is the prototype and pattern for the resurrection of believers. *Aparchē* ('firstfruits') denotes both priority in time (*cf.* Acts 26:23) and superiority in status; his resurrection forms the first and most significant part of a series.

So it is that Paul's doctrine of the resurrection of believers has a twofold basis: an historical fact (the resurrection of Christ—the objective aspect), and the personal experience of that fact (the possession of the Spirit of Christ—the subjective aspect). In Christ's resurrection through the power of the Spirit of God, the firstfruits of the Easter harvest, Christians have a pledge of the full ingathering; in their possession of the Spirit of Christ and in his activity in producing Christ-likeness, Christians have a guarantee of their individual participation in that ingathering (2 Cor. 1:22; 3:18; 5:4, 5).

3. *Only with the death and resurrection of Christ did the ideas of resurrection and immortality emerge from Old Testament shadows into the full light of New Testament day (cf. 2 Tim. 1:10).*

Few will deny that the Old Testament contains isolated adumbrations of Christian teaching about the raising of the dead in passages such as Deuteronomy 32:39; 1 Samuel 2:6; Job 19:25-27;

¹² Thus I. Héring, 'Saint Paul a-t-il enseigné deux résurrections?' in *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses*, 12 (1932), pp. 308f. J. B. Lightfoot, however, commenting on Philippians 3:11 (Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, London, 1894, p. 151) makes a distinction between *hē onastasis tōn nekron* (e.g., 1 Cor. 15:42) which includes both 'the resurrection of life' and 'the resurrection of judgment' (Jn. 5:29), and (*hē*) *anastasis* (*hē*) *ek nekron* (Lk. 20:35; Acts 4:2; 1 Pet. 1:3) which is restricted to 'the resurrection of life'. On the other hand, J. Jeremias believes that in 1 Corinthians 15 Paul draws a careful distinction between *hoi nekroi* (deceased Christians) and the anarthrous *nekroi* (the dead in general) ("Flesh and Blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God" (1 Cor. 15: 50)', in *New Testament Studies*, 2 (1955-56), p. 155)!

¹³ For an analysis of Aquinas's view, see M. E. Dahl, *The Resurrection of the Body* (SBT, 36, London, 1962, pp. 96f., Additional Note A).

Psalm 16:9-11; 17:15; 23:6; 27:4; 49:14-16; 73:23-26;¹⁴ Isaiah 26:19; Daniel 12:2, 3; 12:13. But in these matters Old Testament writers saw 'in a mirror dimly'; it remained for the dimness of reflected light to be replaced by the glow of direct light. Not only did Christ slay death by dying; he also brought immortality to light by rising. He now is the possessor of the 'keys of death' (Rev. 1:18) and the dispenser of eternal life or immortality (Jn. 5:21).

The rootage of the Christian view of the hereafter, however, is securely in Old Testament soil, as the dispute between Jesus and the Sadducees indicates (see Mk. 12:18-27; especially verses 26f. 'As for the dead being raised, have you not read in the book of Moses, in the passage about the bush, how God said to him, "I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob"? He is not God of the dead, but of the living.') It is indefensible to assert that Christianity owes its doctrine of resurrection to Jewish thought but its concept of immortality to Greek philosophy. In a splendidly comprehensive analysis of the Jewish background of I Corinthians 15, H. C. C. Cavallin has recently (1974) shown that in Jewish literature between c. 200 BC and AD 100

statements on an immortality of the soul which excludes the resurrection of the body are almost as common as those which explicitly state the resurrection of the body, and the same proportions can be asserted for statements on the soul's life after death without exclusion of the body and texts which state the resurrection without explicit reference to the body.¹⁵

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No longer can anyone maintain that 'resurrection' is Hebraic and 'immortality' Greek; the Judaism of the apostolic era knew both conceptions.

4. Immortality (as defined above) is not a present possession of all men as though it were some anthropological property but is a future acquisition of Christians.

1 Corinthians 15:42, 52-54 makes it clear that only after the resurrection transformation will believers 'put on' the garment of immortality.¹⁶ Immortality is therefore not a human right or heritage gained at birth. As C. K. Barrett has rightly observed, in Paul's thinking not immortality but death was inherited from Adam (Rom. 5:12; 1 Cor. 15:22).¹⁷ Man is not immortal because he

¹⁴ On these verses in the Psalms, see E. Smick, 'The Bearing of New Philological Data on the Subjects of Resurrection and Immortality in the Old Testament', in *Westminster Journal of Theology* 31 (1968-69), pp. 12-21.

¹⁵ *Life After Death. Paul's Argument for the Resurrection of the Dead in 1 Corinthians 15. Part I: An Enquiry into the Jewish Background* (Lund, 1974), p. 200.

¹⁶ The immortality gained potentially at the moment a person comes to be in Christ (1 Cor. 15:22b; cf. C. H. Dodd, *The Epistle to the Romans*, London, 1932, p. 126) becomes an actual possession in the resurrection of the dead. This seems preferable to the view of L. Cerfaux, who regards 'the personal Christian "self"' as acquiring immortality at death before the resurrection of the body at the parousia (*The Christian in the Theology of St Paul*, London, 1967, p. 202). If the resurrection of the individual occurs at the moment of his death, however (on this issue, see P. Benoit, 'Resurrection: At the End of Time or immediately after Death?' in *Immortality and Resurrection*, ed. by P. Benoit and R. Murphy, New York, 1970, pp. 103-14; and my article 'Paul's View of Death in 2 Corinthians 5:1-10', in *New Dimensions in New Testament Study*, ed. R. N. Longenecker and M. C. Tenney, Grand Rapids, 1974, pp. 317-28, especially pp. 322f.), immortality may be said to be gained at death.

¹⁷ 'Immortality and Resurrection', in *London Quarterly and Holborn Review*, 190 (1965), pp. 97, 101.

possesses or is a soul. He becomes immortal because God transforms him by raising him from the dead.

Again it may be seen how important is the matter of the definition of terms. The soul is not immortal in the sense that one of its properties is 'participation in the eternal life of God' (see thesis 1). The subsistence of the individual through and after death is not to be equated with immortality (in the Pauline sense). Sharing the divine nature is a future experience reserved for those who belong to Christ (1 Cor. 15:23, 54f.; 2 Pet. 1:4). Potentially immortal by nature, man actually becomes immortal through grace. Immortality is conditional in the sense that there is no eternal life except in Christ.

In Platonic thought, on the other hand, immortality is an inalienable attribute of the soul. When the body decomposes, the soul is not destroyed. Being spiritual in nature, the soul cannot be divided or dissolved.¹⁸ But the Bible contains no definition of the soul's constitution that implies its indestructibility. Indeed some would find in Matthew 10:28 ('Fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell') the implication that the soul is 'destructible'. At least the verse implies that 'soul and body' are punishable, and if all men were immortal in the sense 'immune from death', it is difficult to see how anyone could be consigned to the 'second death' (Rev. 20:6, 14; 21:8). What Matthew 10:28 emphasizes is not the potential mortality of the soul but the irreversibility of the divine judgment on unrepentant man. In his total being, whether viewed as 'soul' or as 'body', such a person will incur the divine wrath.

In much popular western thought, the soul is simply one part of man, distinguishable from his body not only in thought but also in reality. As a result, 'the immortality of the soul' implies nothing more than the persistence beyond death of that aspect of man which may be called the soul. The New Testament, however, with its basically monistic anthropology,¹⁹ promises the transformation of the whole person, not the survival of a disembodied ego. Immortality is not assignable to only a part of man.²⁰

To speak of immortality as a future acquisition and of resurrection as a future event is not to deny that man may proleptically enjoy eternal life and experience personal transformation during this life. The believer will gain immortality because the Spirit of life dwells within, already mediating the divine life (Rom. 8:2, 11). And resurrection is not *creatio ex nihilo*, a sudden divine action without antecedents. Rather it represents the culmination of an inward transformation which began at conversion and continues until the believer's death or Christ's advent.

¹⁸ See J. Burnet, 'The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul', in *Proceedings of the British Academy* 7 (1915), pp. 235-60; - M. P. Nilsson, 'The immortality of the Soul in Greek Religion', in *Eranos* 39 (1941), pp. 1-16; and W. Jaeger, 'The Greek Ideas of Immortality', in *Immortality and Resurrection*, ed. K. Stendahl (New York, 1965), pp. 97-114.

¹⁹ S. Laeuchli ('Monism and Dualism in the Pauline Anthropology', *Biblical Research*, 3 (1958), pp. 15-27) finds in Pauline anthropology a certain non-dualistic pluralism. 'Pluralism exists only *sub specie unitatis*, under the assumption that man is basically one' (p. 26).

²⁰ Paul uses the term *psyche* only thirteen times. This would seem to indicate that he was not dependent on Orphism or Platonism for his conception of the soul, or else a more developed view would have been reflected in his letters (see further W. D. Stacey, 'St Paul and the "Soul"', in *Expository Times* 66 (1954-55), pp. 274-77, and the chapter on *psyche* in his book, *The Pauline View of Man*, London, 1956, pp. 121-27).

The principal objection, however, to the notion of the natural immortality of the soul is Paul's unequivocal assertion in 1 Timothy 6:15f. that God 'the blessed and only Sovereign, the King of kings and Lord of lords ... alone has immortality'. God is the only being intrinsically possessing immortality

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(*cf.* Jn. 5:26; 1 Thes. 1:9). He is without diminution or decay (Rom. 1:23) and full of all life, holiness and power.

5. Just as resurrection is an act of God, so immortality is a gift of God.

The agent in the resurrection of the dead is generally said to be the Father (Jn. 5:21; Acts 26:8; Rom. 4:17; 8:11; 1 Cor. 6:14; 2 Cor. 1:9; 4:14b; Heb. 11:19) but on occasion the Son.²¹ (Jn. 6:39, 40, 44, 54). And for the preservation of resurrection life, man is also dependent on God acting through the Spirit of holiness (Rom. 1:4). Denial of the resurrection does not arise from ignorance of man's constitution (as though man were capable of raising himself); it stems from ignorance of God, his Word and his power (Mk. 12:24; 1 Cor. 15:12, 34). Without the exercise of God's power, there can be neither the act of resurrection nor sustained resurrection life.

With regard to immortality, the corollary of the view that only God is essentially immortal is the truth that man is only derivatively (not inherently) immortal. Man comes to possess immortality only as it is conferred on him through the divine will and grace. His immortality is not essential or intrinsic but derived or extrinsic. Some believe that man was created 'immortal' only to forfeit that immortality through disobedience. Others allege that man was created 'immortable' (that is, able not to die), with the possibility of gaining immortality through obedience to God,²² as Theodore of Mopsuestia observed, Genesis 2:17 does not say 'You will become mortal if you sin'. Whichever view be held (and again it is largely a problem of defining 'mortal' and 'immortal'), immortality comes to man as a gracious divine gift.

6. In Pauline thought, resurrection and immortality are inseparable and complementary ideas.

It is in 1 Corinthians 15 that these two ideas are most clearly juxtaposed.²³ From verses 42, 50-54 it is apparent that there can be no immortality without prior resurrection; resurrection is the sole means of acquiring immortality. Nor can there be resurrection without subsequent immortality; immortality is the inevitable outcome of resurrection. From a Christian perspective, the two

²¹ This second usage may be explained on the principle that the operations of the Persons of the Godhead *ad extra* are interchangeable or that Christ acts in obedience to the Father's will and as his agent (*cf.* Jn. 10:18).

²² For the distinction between 'immortable' and 'immortal', see F. S. M. Bennet, *The Resurrection of the Dead* (London, 1929), pp. 1-53.

²³ Those at Corinth who denied the resurrection (1 Cor. 15:12) may have been a minority of 'enlightened' rationalists who were promulgating the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and arguing that resurrection was both inconceivable and unnecessary. But in the light of 1 Corinthians 4:8 and 2 Timothy 2:17, 18 it seems more probable that they were the 'over-realized eschatologists' of the first century AD who asserted that the only real resurrection—the spiritual—was accomplished at baptism and therefore lay in the past. Against this view of resurrection as a spiritual *fait accompli* Paul insists on the futurity of the resurrection and the reality of the resurrection body.

doctrines stand or fall together. To deny resurrection is to deny immortality, since embodiment is necessary to meaningful existence. To deny immortality is to deny resurrection, since divine life is necessary to sustain transformed persons.

Secondly, immortality and resurrection are complementary notions. The Christian doctrine of resurrection prevents an impersonal and individualistic interpretation of immortality. It is 'dead persons' (*hoi nekroi*) not 'discarnate souls' that are raised. It is 'dead persons' who are resurrected, not the dead individual. The personal and corporate nature of resurrection life must never be overlooked. The New Testament knows nothing of a neo-Platonic immortality of 'the Alone with the Alone'. On the other side, the acquisition of immortality through resurrection guarantees that the resurrection state is not temporary. Those raised by Christ during his ministry rose, only ultimately to die; they had not gained immortality. Once resurrected, Christians will permanently bear the image of the man from heaven (Rom. 8:29; 1 Cor. 15:49; 1 Jn. 3:2).

7. All Christians will be transformed but not all will be resurrected.

In both 1 Thessalonians 4 and 1 Corinthians 15 Paul distinguishes between the dead in Christ and those who live to witness his parousia. Those who 'remain until the coming of the Lord' (1 Thes. 4:15) will be transformed ('changed', 1 Cor. 15:51) without experiencing death or resurrection.²⁴ The 'dead in Christ', however, will be both raised and transformed (1 Cor. 15:42, 52), or, better, will experience a resurrection-transformation. Thus the dictum 'the resurrection of the dead and the transformation of the living', if taken to imply that

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the dead are not transformed and the living are not raised, both distorts and preserves (respectively) the truth. Both the living and the dead are transformed—the latter by resurrection—with the result that, in either case, the outcome of the change is identical, *viz.*, the possession of the spiritual body.

8. The identity between 'the physical body' and 'the spiritual body' is not substantial but personal.

In describing the nature of resurrection, the New Testament uses two basic formulae: the physical body may be said to be *transformed into* the spiritual body or to be *replaced by* the spiritual body. That is, there are the complementary ideas of change and exchange: 'this corruptible body must put on incorruption' (1 Cor. 15:53), and, 'a physical body is sown, a spiritual body is raised' (1 Cor. 15:44). But whether continuity or discontinuity is stressed, the difference between the pre- and post-resurrectional states remains a crucial part of Paul's teaching. Without some

²⁴ If 'each in his own order' in 1 Corinthians 15:23 implies more than two categories (*viz.*, Christ and the Christian dead), the third 'order' may be Christians alive at the parousia (as in 1 Thes. 4:16, 17), who are not mentioned because they are not 'raised' but 'transformed' (thus J. Héring, *RHPR* 12 (1932), pp. 306f.). Nevertheless, A. Jones ('The Problem of the Vulgate Reading in 1 Corinthians 15:51', in *Scripture* 2 (1947), p. 47) claims that since the living are 'raised' at the parousia from a state of mortality by the putting on of immortality, they do not forfeit full participation in Christ's bodily resurrection; although *omnes quidem resurgemus* are not Paul's words, the sentiment they express is Pauline.

alteration to his whole being—be it a transformation or an exchange—no mortal may inherit immortality (1 Cor. 15:50, 53). Substantial or numerical identity between the successive forms of the Christian's embodiment seems excluded by the dual concept of a 'spiritual body' not yet possessed (2 Cor. 5:1) and the indispensability of change before such possession (1 Cor. 15:50).²⁵

In the midst of this somatic change or exchange, however, personal identity is preserved.²⁶ Those who are to bear the image of the heavenly man will not be personally different from those who bore the image of the man made of dust (1 Cor. 15:49). There are two dwellings but only one occupant. The subject of the successive forms of corporeality is the same 'self' who will be transformed, by the Spirit of life at the resurrection.²⁷

Conclusion

It may be helpful to conclude by suggesting four of the (many) ways in which the biblical doctrine of immortality differs from the Platonic. First, it is the whole person who gains immortality, not the soul or spirit that inherently possesses immortality. Secondly, immortality is gained by the resurrection transformation, not by birth, and therefore is a future gift of God, not a present inalienable characteristic of human nature. The Christian's entrance upon the state of immortality will be by God's act of resurrection which will be the climax of the Spirit's process of transformation. Thirdly, the destiny of the Christian is somatic immortality, not disembodied or purely spiritual immortality. Fourthly, possession of immortality is dependent on relationship to the Second Adam, not the first Adam. It results from union with Christ, not from being a mortal.

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Prepared for the Web in May 2006 by Robert I. Bradshaw.

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²⁵ H. Clavier ('Brèves remarques sur la notion de *sōma pneumatikon*', in *The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology*, ed. W. D. Davies and D. Daube (Cambridge, 1956) pp. 342-62) speaks of a 'changement d'organisme et de constitution', 'continuité, mais pas identité numérique' (p. 347). 'It ne s'agit pas d'une meme constitution physique autrement orientée, mais d'une organisation totalement différente, adéquate à l'Esprit qui la règle et qui la commande' (p. 351).

²⁶ Matthew 22:29 implies that the resurrection body has no procreative powers but this does not mean that all distinction between the sexes will be obliterated.

²⁷ Note the comment of W. G. Kümmel (in H. Lietzmann, *An die Korinther. I. II*', enlarged by W. G. Kümmel, Tübingen, 1949, p. 195): 'Die Kontinuität des mit dem *sōma psychikon* and dann mit dem *sōma pneumatikon* bekleideten Menschen ist... keine naturhafte, substanzielle, sondern eine geschichtliche; das "Ich" erhält zuerst einen irdischen and bei der Auferstehung einen himmlischen Leib'; and the observation of C. K. Barrett (*A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, London, 1968, p. 373): 'The same historically continuous ... *ego* makes use successively of two different kinds of body.'