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Contents

Evangelicals and theological creativity

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Creativity has come to be emphasized recently as one of the most important goals and criteria in many areas of human endeavour. Under other names it has always been highly valued. Achievements which have about them something new and fresh and original make a bigger appeal than those which are stereotyped and repetitive. A new discovery, a new style, a new idea, a new interpretation —even if such things do not always work out in practice, they all engender excitement and may well promote a better understanding.

In this significant field of originality or creativity, Evangelical theology seems to many people to be at an inherent disadvantage. By its very nature it has a commitment to the truth that has been passed on from previous generations extending back through the reformers to the early church and holy scripture. Much of its activity consists, not of pushing ahead creatively on its own, but of trying to block the path of those who wander off in creative aberration. Its fate, it appears, is to be in continual reaction against the positive actions of others. To put it in military terms, it spends its energy in defensive manoeuvres and leaves the initiative to the enemy. Ingenuity may be demanded but only the ingenuity of showing from different angles why things that have been held in the past should be maintained with very little modification in the present.

One should recognize, of course, that creativity is not to be endorsed or applauded without reservations. Indeed, in the strictest sense it might even be asked whether there really is such a thing as human creativity at all. When we speak of God as Creator, we have in mind creation out of nothing. Here is a creativity that human beings cannot achieve. They can produce things that did not exist before, but they can make them only out of things that exist already. In a world that talks incessantly of its creativity, recollection of this limitation—of

the reliance of human creativity on the true creativity of God—might not be a bad place to begin.

Along similar lines, a good deal that passes for creativity proves on closer examination to fall far short of it. The saying in Ecclesiastes that there is nothing new under the sun (1 : 9) may not apply to absolutely everything but it applies to a large number of theological ideas. For example, the I—Thou—It analysis of Martin Buber struck the early twentieth century almost with the force of a revelation and yet the distinction between God as It and God as He/Thou had been discussed at least a hundred years before, e.g., by Friedrich Schlegel. Original thoughts both orthodox and heterodox have an uncanny knack of being 'original' many times in many different generations. This does not mean that all 'creative' writers whose thoughts have been expressed before are plagiarists. In many cases they have simply not read their predecessors. Even if they have, they undoubtedly do something by way of expansion, development, modification, or restatement. The point, however, is that creativity is in any case harder to achieve or to find than is often imagined.

Even when authentic creativity appears in theology, it may just as well be a false creativity as a true one. Indeed, there is perhaps greater scope for a false creativity. This is why creativity poses more of a problem for Evangelical theologians. False creativity arises when theology is treated as one of the arts instead of the sciences, or as one of the humane sciences instead of the divine science. In the arts especially freer rein is given to the imagination. Only the flimsiest of contact need be maintained with the original data. Face to face with a tree or a star, the artist or poet can obviously be far more creative than the botanist or astronomer. He can view and interpret as his fancy pleases whereas the scientist must engage in more precise observation, analysis, and description. Creative theology will often turn out to be merely a form of subjective impressionism in relation to its object. It may even part company with the true object altogether when it makes religious man its object instead of God. If, however, theology has the scientific task of studying God and the things of God according to God's own self-revelation, this imaginative creativity is false. It may be authentically creative at the human level, but it is not authentically creative theology. It presents or even creates another object—its own idea or general human ideas of God instead of God. It is not theology at all.

These reservations remind us that too high hopes of creativity must not be entertained and that the easier path of false creativity must be avoided. This need not mean, however, that no place at all remains for creative work in the real theology which commits itself to the data of the divine self-revelation presented in holy scripture. Certainly we will have to curb subjectivity and exclude speculation. Theology must keep to a scientific procedure in studying and describing the data. Nevertheless, within this objective enterprise, as within all scientific endeavour, plenty of room remains for true creative activity. If, indeed, theology embraces biblical, historical and practical studies as well as the narrower doctrinal and dogmatic disciplines, the field is wide open for sober creative activity, first of all in research, but then also in interpretation and application. A little thought and a few illustrations will quickly make this apparent.

In biblical studies, for example, we confront at once a host of unfinished tasks even in the elementary research which is designed to establish what exactly the biblically reported data of revelation are. More linguistic work has still to be done in the languages of revelation and related languages over a very long historical period. Materials relating to the background of life, manners, events, and structures are still in process of discovery and stand in need of evaluation and correlation. Great strides have been made in archaeology but new evidence continues to be unearthed and scholars still have the task of weighing its bearing on the primary data. Even when linguistic, cultural and archaeological work has been done, the task of exegesis has still to be performed with the help of the steadily accumulating materials. Nor can one stop at more detailed exegesis, for the need still exists to put the results of exegesis together in the form of a connected account of the teaching of scripture (biblical theology) not merely in its constituent parts but also in its totality. Without abandoning a scientific method, without engaging in speculative flights, Evangelical scholars can display their creative gifts in the discharge of these various tasks. As they do so, they need not confine themselves to defensive reaction to speculative hypotheses but may do constructive work of their own which must eventually make a powerful impact, but which will in any case lead to a more accurate knowledge and understanding of the divine revelation mediated through the Bible.

The same obviously applies in historical studies, including dogmatic theology approached from the historical angle. Vast amounts of material now awaiting discovery and investigation can contribute directly or indirectly to a better knowledge of what has been thought, said and done through the

centuries of Christian history. In this field the linguistic task may not be so demanding but the incompleteness of information on the life and contacts of many historical figures presents a challenge to creative research. History, too, has a habit of obscuring even known facts and obvious data by traditional presentations and misrepresentations, so that one can never avoid the duty of fresh historical appraisal. In some cases opponents have covered over facts with motives, as in the older Roman Catholic accounts of Luther. In others they have left only a garbled version of a person's teaching, as in the standard accounts of Nestorius. In others again later controversialists have imported their own later concerns and made it difficult to achieve an objective understanding of what earlier authors were really saying in their own terms, e.g., in patristic statements about the eucharist. Finally admirers and followers have often developed a theology in a way that may not do justice to its original orientation so that one has to take a fresh look and ask, e.g., whether Thomas was really a Thomist, Zwingli a Zwinglian, or Calvin a Calvinist. The point is that history is so cluttered with traditional and often almost sacrosanct evaluations, backed in many instances by the authority of illustrious historians, that one can see the facts only through the spectacles of the evaluations. Quite apart, then, from the discovery of new facts, a need exists to look at existing facts in a way that is negatively sceptical but positively fresh and creative. Did this theologian really see it this way? Is this what he means in his own context? Is there something elsewhere in his works which sheds a different light on what he is thought to have said? May it be that his real thought has a special contribution of its own to make to theological understanding? These and similar questions open up at every turn, and while traditional views may often turn out to be right, and must not be rejected merely for the sake of novelty, an opportunity for creative work is clearly presented.

When it comes to interpretation, what we have in mind is not so much the interpretation of the data in and of themselves, but rather their interpretation for succeeding ages with their changing terms of reference. In the biblical field translation obviously takes the first step in this form of interpretation. The translator tries to make the original intelligible by rendering it into another language. Research into the meaning of the original, with all the accompanying linguistic, historical, and archaeological work that this involves, forms the necessary basis of this effort. But equal understanding of the new language and its background is demanded too. Nor can the work of translation be regarded as completed once and for all. New discoveries take place in the biblical field and at the same time changes constantly occur in the vocabulary, usage, and thoughtforms of the language into which translation is made. Nor is translation itself ever a simple matter of word for word rendering, for what is said in one language has to be expressed as accurately but also as naturally and idiomatically and intelligibly as possible in the other tongue. Indeed, if the message is to be properly understood, interpretation must take a step beyond translation and become exposition—the attempt to bring out in a different setting and under different influences of life and thought what precisely these translated words are all about in their own distinctive context. Just to read scripture in translation is in fact a difficult task, as one quickly sees from a study of earlier expositors who all brought their own spectacles with them and did work which was coloured by their own background. To this extent past interpretation always stands in need of scrutiny and correction, for exposition in contemporary context always tends to miss at points the real sense of the original. This work of correction, however, does not make the most serious demand. The real problem arises when it is a matter of updating the exposition in such a way that biblical truth is now expounded in one's own contemporary context. Here is the ultimate point of exposition and here is where the risk of subtle or not so subtle misinterpretation arises with the consequent possibilities of misunderstanding. Here then, if anywhere, is the place for interpretative creativity, i.e., the development of a fully contemporary presentation of biblical teaching which will still be faithful to the authoritative original.

It is here, too, that dogmatic theology plays what is perhaps its most important part and issues what is perhaps its most urgent call for creative effort. Dogmatic theology, of course, must be done creatively in relation to the history of theology. When dogmaticians of the past have been correctly investigated and presented, dogmatics has to consider their bearing on contemporary questions and their contribution to contemporary discussions. This in itself opens up a vast area for original thinking within which a living restatement of past teachings may occupy a valuable place. Nevertheless, it is in relation to the biblical material and its exposition that dogmatics really comes into its own as it considers and attempts the presentation of the biblical message in terms of its own age. As Karl Barth pointed out at the very beginning of his *Church Dogmatics*, dogmatics has a duty to do this

as its own particular task in the mission and ministry of the church. Preaching cannot be just a reading of scripture, not even in a modern translation. It has to present the scriptural message faithfully and accurately to a particular congregation in a particular age and place. It has the delicate responsibility of being both loyal in content and contemporary in expression. Dogmatics can and should serve preaching by pondering this demand, by considering how well or how badly it is being met, by indicating the lines along which a better and more effective fulfilment may be achieved. In doctrine, then, the mere repetition of past language and concepts does not suffice no matter how well these may have served a previous place or generation. Biblical terms may certainly be used. In many cases there is no avoiding them. But they need to be analysed and explained in the language of the day and in relation to the thought of the day so that unchanging truth may be appropriately proclaimed to the people of the day. For this purpose alert and creative thinking is required accompanied by originality of vocabulary and expression. Neither flights of fancy nor routine reactions against them will produce a true dogmatics. What is needed is independent action based on solid scholarship and taken within the limits of commitment to the biblical object.

Interpretation as we have here defined it leads on inexorably to application in both thought and life. In this area, too, questions of considerable complexity arise. From the earliest days of Christian theology opinions have varied widely on the detailed application of biblical statements and teachings. Indeed, the principles and criteria of application have been almost radically different. The situations in which application is made display a similar or, if anything, an even greater variety. Here again, therefore, there is an open door for creativity so long as the control of the scriptural data is acknowledged.

The sphere of application belongs more strictly to practical theology but not without the involvement of biblical, historical and dogmatic theology as well, for it is by means of biblical, historical and dogmatic study that the proper course of action is to be determined in the various problems of church and society. By biblical study the relevant materials are selected and pondered. By historical study similar problems and solutions in the past may be investigated and the development of present situations understood. By dogmatic study the more general bearing of fundamental Christian doctrine will be added to the picture.

The types of problems that arises in the field of application are unlimited. Apart from the constant reconsideration of agelong questions, e.g., in ethics, the movement of history either gives new forms to old issues, e.g. war in the light of nuclear weapons, or raises totally new issues, e.g. genetic engineering. Similarly the pressures of social change can add sharpness to perennial problems, e.g., divorce, abortion, homosexuality, or women's ordination. Developing political and economic structures force the church to continual reconsideration of its conformity or nonconformity to the world both in relation to the ethical validity of these structures and also in relation to its own adaptation to them, e.g., in its own forms of government and its financial policies and principles. Finally the extension of the gospel to peoples of different cultures with different political, social and economic structures raises the same question of conformity and nonconformity in new and unfamiliar ways in relation to the conduct of new Christians within the patterns of non-Christian life and society, in relation to general habits of thought, and also in relation to the structuring of the church, e.g., in order and in external forms of worship.

Behind all these detailed issues lie two basic questions of application in which as yet no concensus has been achieved. The first concerns the permanent validity of biblical injunctions and commands when these were given at different times and in different situations—some in the Old Testament and some in the New. The second concerns the relation between the core of biblical doctrines, injunctions and commands and the cultural medium in which they were expressed. In both areas some distinctions obviously have to be made. Christians may be under obligation to the decalogue but they do not have to observe all the commandments given as national or cultic legislation for Israel. Modern Christians surely have to forgive one another as the gospels and epistles command but they do not have to travel precisely as the apostles did and it may not be necessary to take a little wine for the stomach's sake. But where do the distinctions begin and end, and according to what criteria? Many of the debatable issues may be trivial but they can be fundamental too, as in the matter of biblical teaching on the relations of husband and wife, so that even if no absolute solution can be achieved, creative thinking is very much needed in this whole area.

One could argue, indeed, that the field of application might well be the one where the need is most urgent at this juncture in Evangelical history. For it is here that a principle of relativity threatens to establish itself which could spread easily to

doctrinal interpretation and finally undermine and destroy the practical functioning of scripture as the rule of both faith and practice. There can be no disagreement that Christians do not have to keep the cultic rules of the Pentateuch but what is the reason for this? Is it because of a general principle of cultural variation and adaptation which might equally well be applied to any or all of the New Testament commands, so that Christianity could then assume as many faces as the cultures to which it spreads with, e.g., monogamous marriage here and polygamous marriage there, or a patriarchate here and a matriarchate there? Or is it simply because the New Testament itself tells us so as it documents the divine movement from prophecy and promise in the Old Testament to fulfilment in the New, so that the authority of scripture remains unchallenged and unimpaired? In relation to the New Testament, of course, the issue raises rather greater difficulty, for things of specific application undoubtedly exist alongside those that enjoy universal validity and the boundary between them cannot easily be established. Yet again the question arises whether we must adopt as a criterion some general principle of relationship to culture which in the last resort might apply to anything and everything, or whether the distinctions should be made according to a strict study of biblical text and context in comparison, where necessary, with other biblical texts and contexts. It goes almost without saying that this whole matter demands hard, sober, objective, and properly creative thinking, for not only solutions to individual problems hang in the balance but the continued existence of an authentically biblical Evangelicalism.

From this brief sketch of prospective areas of creativity in theology it may be seen that innumerable opportunities exist for the Evangelical today in all branches of the discipline. The real problem does not lie, it would seem, in the relation of Evangelicalism as such to theological work but rather in a defensive mentality, a fixation on Liberal extravaganzas of speculation, which inhibits freedom of action in the field. Undoubtedly some response has to be made to erroneous developments and the false creativity which engenders them, but surely this need not claim a major part of Evangelical attention, time, and effort. The moment has arrived for a shift of the main enterprise to positive and constructive work —somewhat along the lines indicated or others like them—which will consider but not let itself be dominated by what others are doing. In the long run this could very well turn out to be the best strategy even in response to theological aberrations. When a strong and attractive alternative is constructed and presented, it cannot finally be ignored and can indeed result in a reassertion of theological leadership as neither defensive reactions nor the repetition of earlier orthodoxies, however sound, can ever do. Enough strength is now available for this creative endeavour. All that is needed is the vision and the will to undertake it.

Was the tomb really empty?

Robert H Stein

'If Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain' (1 Cor. 15: 14). For Christians the resurrection of Jesus constitutes the foundation stone of faith. Apart from the resurrection there is no gospel, no 'good news', for apart from Easter there is no hope but, as witnessed to by the first disciples, only despair. Yet the resurrection turned fearful and despondent men into men of courage and confidence, men who believed that the resurrection not only verified all that Jesus had said and taught but assured them of the defeat of death and the guarantee that they would share in this great victory of their Lord (Jn. 14: 19).

Evangelical apologetics has sought to support the

historicity, the 'facticity', of the resurrection by means of several arguments. The most important of these arguments in the NT is the resurrection appearances. (Note the pre-Pauline creedal formula in 1 Cor. 15: 3-11, especially vv. 5-8). Attempts to explain these appearances by means of apostolic fraud, hallucinations and visions, or parapsychology have never been convincing, and evangelicals have been quick to point out the inadequacy of such rationalistic attempts.[1]

A second argument in support of the resurrection is the existence of the Church. How does one explain such a phenomenon as the Church? Apart from the resurrection it is perhaps conceivable that a 'memorial society' might have arisen to commemorate the death of a much-loved teacher, but there certainly would not have been a Church meeting daily to celebrate the breaking of bread 'with glad and generous hearts' (Acts 2: 46). The very existence of the Church witnesses to the fact of the resurrection.

A third witness to the resurrection is the existential experience of the risen Christ in the heart of the believer. As one familar hymn states it, 'You ask me how I know He lives? He lives within my heart.' To those who would minimize this argument and reject it as unscientific and subjective, the evangelical would point out that millions of Christians have for nearly two thousand years made this very claim. It is a simple fact that throughout the history of the Church the single most important witness to the resurrection of Jesus has been the witness of the risen Christ within the heart of the believer!

A fourth argument for the resurrection is the witness of the empty tomb. If every effect has a cause, how does one explain the empty tomb (the effect) apart from the resurrection (the cause)? If one denies the resurrection, what other cause can one suggest to explain the empty tomb? Many scholars who do not believe in the resurrection have nevertheless felt compelled to explain this 'effect' by means of a rationalistic cause. Some of these attempts are:

the theory that the women went to the wrong tomb;[2]

the theory that Joseph of Arimathea stole the body of Jesus;[3]

the theory that Jesus did not really die on the cross but merely 'swooned';[4]

the theory that the disciples stole the body of Jesus;[5]

the theory that the gardener of the tomb removed the body of Jesus and placed it elsewhere to protect his lettuce from the spectators.[6]

There have been other theories as well (such as the theory that the body of Jesus completely decomposed or 'evanesced' within thirty-six hours!),[7] but all such rationalistic attempts to explain the empty tomb have only served to confirm the conviction of the evangelical that the only satisfactory explanation of the fact of the empty tomb is the resurrection of Jesus from the dead.

This fourth witness to the resurrection has been challenged in recent years by the claim that the account of the empty tomb is a late tradition created by the early Church to help explain the resurrection appearances. According to this view it was the resurrection appearances that led to the view that the tomb must have been empty, not *vice versa*. The account of the empty tomb is therefore seen as completely secondary, an apologetic legend, unknown to Paul and of no significance in the apostolic preaching.[8] It must be acknowledged

[1] For a concise survey of some of these views see G. E. Ladd, *I Believe in the Resurrection of Jesus* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975) pp. 136-142. For an older but still useful discussion of some of these theories see W. M. Smith, *Therefore Stand* (Boston: Wilde, 1945), pp. 393-398.

[2] See K. Lake, *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ* (New York: Putnam, 1907), pp. 251-252; P. Gardner-Smith, *The Narratives of the Resurrection* (London: Methuen, 1926), pp. 134-139.

[3] See J. Klausner, *Jesus of Nazareth* (Boston: Beacon, 1925), p. 357. Klausner was not by any means the first to suggest this explanation. As early as the eighteenth century K. F. Bahrdt portrayed Joseph of Arimathea as stealing the body of Jesus from the cave, but in Bahrdt's portrayal Jesus was revived and continued his ministry secretly via various 'resurrection' appearances. So A. Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 43-44. More recently G. Baldensperger, 'Le tombeau vide,' *RHPR* 12 (1932), pp. 413-443; 13 (1933), pp. 105-144; 14 (1934), pp. 97-125 set forth a somewhat similar theory. According to Baldensperger, although Jesus was buried in a common grave by the Jews, Joseph of Arimathea received permission from Pilate to transfer the body and rebury it in his own tomb. The women, who had seen the first burial, however, returned to the original burial place and finding it empty assumed that Jesus was raised from the dead. Despite the later proclamation of the resurrection of Jesus and the empty tomb, they kept this secret until his death. Cf. also R. Pesch, 'Zur Entstehung des Glaubens an die Auferstehung Jesu,' *TQ* 153 (1973), p. 206.

[4] This theory is one of the oldest rationalistic explanations of the resurrection and was suggested already in the eighteenth century by K. F. Bahrdt and in the early nineteenth century by K. H. Venturini and H. E. G. Paulus. So Schweitzer, *Quest*, pp. 43-44, 46-47, 54-55.

[5] See Matthew 28: 11-15.

[6] This rather strange 'theory' is found in Tertullian, *De Spectaculis*, p. 30.

[7] So L. D. Weatherhead, *The Resurrection of Christ* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), pp. 43-45.

[8] Cf. R. Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition* (New York: Harper, 1968), p. 290, who states, 'The Story of the empty tomb is completely secondary. . . . The story

that the main witness to the resurrection was the appearances of the risen Lord, not the empty tomb, for the empty tomb by itself did not lead to faith in the resurrection (cf. Luke 24: 21–24; Jn. 20: 13). It was therefore primarily the positive witness of the resurrection appearances rather than the negative witness of the empty tomb that led to faith in the risen Lord. Yet even if the emptiness of the tomb does not prove that Jesus has risen, in conjunction with the other evidence it is nevertheless a witness to the resurrection.* Furthermore, if the tomb was not empty, it would rule out the Christian claim that Jesus rose from the dead, for if someone in Jerusalem could have produced the body of Jesus, no manner of witness to the resurrection of Jesus would have been convincing.

There are, however, several powerful arguments that can be raised to support the fact that the Christian tradition of the empty tomb is very early and that the tomb in which the body of Jesus was placed was indeed empty. These are:

(1) The story of the empty tomb is found in all four gospels and in at least three of the gospel strata: Mark, M (Matthew's special material), and John. The very variation in the different narratives of the empty tomb, which are in one sense embarrassing, argues that these accounts stem from separate and independent traditions, all of which witness to the tomb's being empty.

(2) The presence of the various Semitisms and Semitic customs in the gospel accounts of the empty tomb indicates that these accounts were early and originated most probably in a Palestinian setting. (Cf. 'on the first day of the week' [Mark 16: 2]; 'angel of the Lord [Matt. 28: 2]; 'Miriam' [Matt. 28: 1]; '[answering] said' [Matt. 28: 5]; 'bowed

their faces to the ground' [Luke 24: 5]; etc.)[10]

(3) Jewish belief in the resurrection necessitated an empty tomb. Whereas ideas of immortality among the Greeks and certain Jews were divorced from, and even antagonistic to, the idea of bodily resurrection, the Jews in Jerusalem, especially the Pharisees and those influenced by Pharisaic teaching, would associate the idea of a resurrection with the physical resurrection of the body. In Jerusalem, therefore, there could be no apostolic preaching of the resurrection of Jesus unless the tomb was in fact empty.[11] Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the opponents of Jesus would not have investigated the place of burial to see if indeed the tomb was empty, for the display of the body of Jesus would be a simple way of refuting the claim of his resurrection.

(4) The fact that the witnesses to the empty tomb were women whose witness was disallowed by the Jews makes an apologetic fabrication of the account unlikely. It is most difficult to understand why the Church would have created a legend of an empty tomb in which the chief witnesses were women, since women were invalid witnesses according to Jewish principles of evidence.[12] If the account of the empty tomb were simply a legend, why not make the witnesses men? It would appear more reasonable to conclude that the reason the Church did not make the witnesses to the empty tomb men was simply because the witnesses to the empty tomb on that Easter morning were in fact not men but women.

[10] For a discussion of the Semitisms in the gospel accounts of the empty tomb see E. L. Bode, *The First Easter Morning* (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1970), pp. 6, 58, 71.

[11] Cf. W. Pannenberg, 'Did Jesus Really Rise from the Dead,' *Dialog* 4 (1965), p. 134; O'Collins, *Resurrection*, p. 43; Bode, *First Easter*, p. 177; Althaus, *Wahrheit*, p. 26; W. Künneth, *The Theology of the Resurrection* (St. Louis: Concordia, 1965), p. 92, n. 52. The latter is an excellent concise summary of this argument.

It has been claimed that Mark 6: 14, 16 refutes this claim, since some people thought Jesus might have been John the Baptist raised from the dead even though no claim was made that John's grave was empty. Yet such thinking in Tiberias by Herod Antipas, a patron of Hellenistic culture, was not possible with Pharisees in Jerusalem. For the Jew in Jerusalem, especially for a hostile and skeptical Pharisee, any claim of resurrection would require an empty tomb.

[12] C. F. D. Moule in his editor's introduction to *The Significance of the Message of the Resurrection of Faith in Jesus Christ* (London: SCM, 1968), p. 9 states that 'it is difficult to explain how a story that [supposedly] grew up late and took shape merely in accord with the supposed demands of apologetic came to be framed in terms almost exclusively of women witnesses, who, as such, were notoriously invalid witnesses according to Jewish principles of evidence. The later and the more fictitious the story, the harder it is to explain why the apostles are not brought to the forefront as witnesses.' See also Bode, *First Easter*, p. 158.

is an apologetic legend as Mark 16: 8 . . . clearly shows. Paul knows nothing about the empty tomb.' So also G. W. H. Lampe and D. M. MacKinnon, *The Resurrection* (London: Mowbray, 1966), pp. 46–48: H.-W. Bartsch, *Das Auferstehungszeugnis* (Hamburg: Herbert Reich, 1965), p. 22; H. Grass, *Ostergeschehen und Osterberichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1962), p. 93. Yet P. Althaus, *Die Wahrheit des kirchlichen Osterglaubens* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1941), p. 26, has pointed out that if the story of the empty tomb arose as an apology for the resurrection, it is most strange that it does not serve this function in the accounts themselves (cf. Mark 16: 8; Luke 24: 22–24; John 20: 11–15). In this regard see also X. Leon-Dufour, *Resurrection and the Message of Easter* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 210.

* So H. Schlier, *Uber die Auferstehung Jesu Christi* (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1968), p. 28; F. Mussner, *Die Auferstehung Jesu* (München: Kösel, 1969), p. 69; G. O'Collins, *The Resurrection of Jesus Christ* (Valley Forge: Judson, 1973), p. 93.

(5) It is difficult to understand why a Jewish polemic against the empty tomb would have arisen if the account of the empty tomb had developed as late as the critics claim. Later there would have been no point in arguing against this 'legend' since so many things could have happened in the intervening years to nullify its validity. The development of such a polemic and the fact that it admitted the emptiness of the tomb indicates that the account of the empty tomb had from the very beginning an important place in the early Church's proclamation of the resurrection.[13]

(6) The reference to Joseph of Arimathea indicates that the tomb in which Jesus was buried was well known, for the name of Joseph of Arimathea is firmly fixed to the traditions of both how and where Jesus was buried (cf. Mark 15: 43–46; Matt. 27: 57–60; Luke 23: 50–53; Jn. 19: 38–42). The historicity of the empty tomb is supported by the fact that a specific tomb, which was known in Jerusalem as Joseph of Arimathea's tomb, was associated with the burial of Jesus. The fact that Joseph of Arimathea did not hold any particular position of authority or fame in the early Church also argues in favour of the historicity of this tradition.[14]

(7) The traditions of the empty tomb all place the incident as occurring on the first day of the week. What major event took place on this day that would cause so momentous a change in the religious life of the early Church as to explain why the day of worship was transferred from the Sabbath to Sunday? The only event (in the NT) associated with the first day of the week is the discovery of the empty tomb. The resurrection appearances, on the other hand, were associated with the 'third day' (cf. Mark 8: 31; 9: 31; 10: 34; 14: 58; 15: 29; Matt. 12: 40; 27: 63–64; Luke 13: 32; 24: 7, 21; Jn. 2: 19; 1 Cor. 15: 4). The empty tomb tradition, however, is dated on the first day of the week, and the practice of the early Church in worshipping on Sunday (cf. Acts 20: 7; 1 Cor. 16: 2; Rev. 1: 10) is best explained by the tradition that on the first day of the week the followers of Jesus discovered the empty tomb. It is also clear that while a resurrection on the first day of the week could take place on the 'third day', since by Jewish reckoning any part of a day equaled one day, it is not so certain that, given a resurrection on the third day, the resurrection would have been dated on a Sunday apart from the existence of a first-day empty tomb tradition.[15]

(8) The earliest tradition we possess that speaks of the resurrection is probably 1 Corinthians 15: 3–4. It is a common consensus today among scholars that Paul here is quoting a confession of the early Church. This confession, which should probably be dated before A.D. 40,[16] specifically states that Christ died and that he was buried. But what does 'being buried' refer to? Some have argued that 'he died' and 'was buried' go together and that the latter phrase simply emphasizes the conclusive reality of Jesus' death.[17] Yet is this all that the tradition is saying? The words 'died', 'buried', and 'was raised' are unintelligible unless what 'died and was buried' was in fact 'raised'. While Paul does not anywhere specifically state that the tomb was empty, it would appear that in 1 Corinthians 15: 3–4 this is clearly implied. For Paul as a Pharisee, and no doubt for the Jerusalem Church also (which had a strong Pharisaic element; cf. Acts 15: 5), the death-burial-resurrection of Jesus would have demanded an empty tomb.

In Romans 6: 4 and Colossians 2: 12 Paul uses the same expressions ('buried' and 'raised') that we find in 1 Corinthians 15: 4. There is good reason to believe that the idea of being 'buried' and 'raised' with Christ in baptism as it is found in these two verses is traditional, for Paul introduces his discussion of this theme in Romans 6: 3 with 'Do you not know . . .,' implying that what he is saying is established doctrine not only in his own churches but also in a church that he did not found —the church in Rome.[18] It was traditional, therefore, to understand the baptism of the believer as in some way reflecting or re-enacting the resurrec-

[13] Bode, *First Easter*, p. 163.
[14] So P. Benoit, *The Passion and Resurrection of Jesus* (New York: Herder, 1970), pp. 228-229; Bode, *First Easter*, p. 160. It is interesting to note that some scholars who believe that the story of the empty tomb is a late apologetical addition to the resurrection accounts maintain that Joseph of Arimathea is nevertheless somehow connected historically to the story of the burial. See Pesch, 'Entstehung,' p. 206.
[15] Bode, *First Easter*, argues this point in a most persuasive and convincing manner. For a summary of his argument see pp. 179-182.
[16] See R. H. Fuller, *The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), p. 10, and Bode, *First Easter*, pp. 91-93, for a discussion of the date of this tradition.
[17] So H. Conzelmann, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), p. 255; Fuller, *Formation*, pp. 15-16. For the opposing view see U. Wilckens, *Auferstehung* (Berlin: Kreuz, 1970), pp. 20-22; A. Oepke, 'egeiro,' *TDNT* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964) II, p. 335. R. E. Brown, *The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus* (New York: Paulist, 1973), while denying on pp. 83-84 that the term 'buried' implies that the tomb was empty, believes that the expression 'raised on the third day' probably implies this. See p. 124.
[18] In Colossians 2: 6 we should also note that the passage is introduced by 'As therefore you *received* Christ Jesus the Lord' (italics mine), which is the same term that introduces the tradition found in 1 Corinthians 15: 3-4.

tion of Jesus.[19] If the believer was reminded in his baptism of the burial of his Lord, it seems most likely that he would compare his burial and resurrection with Jesus' burial and resurrection. Furthermore, the burial of the believer while related to his 'death' to sin is nevertheless distinct from that death (cf. Rom. 6: 4). As a result it would be likely that the analogy the 'burial' of Christ would be considered not simply as a synonym for the death of Christ but as in some way distinct from, although of course related to, his death. Yet in the burial of the believer what was buried did not remain buried but was transformed and raised. The death-burial-resurrection of the Christian in baptism, therefore, while not proving that early Christians would of necessity believe that the tomb of Jesus must have been empty, would likely have been compared to the death-burial-resurrection of Jesus, so that with Jesus, as with the believer, that which was buried rose transformed, leaving nothing behind.

Two other arguments can be listed to support the view that 'dead, buried, raised' would at least imply that the tomb was empty. The first involves the terms used to describe the resurrection of Jesus. One of those terms is 'raised' (*egeirō*).[20] He who died and was buried was raised. This would imply, at least to most, that 'what' was buried was raised and that the tomb as a result was empty.

A second argument that can be mentioned is found in Acts 2: 29–31, where Peter contrasts the experience of David who died, was buried, and saw

corruption with Jesus who was crucified and killed (v. 23) but whose flesh, unlike David's, saw no corruption because God raised him up. The difference between David and Jesus lies in the fact that the tomb of David was still occupied by the bones of David, for he saw corruption. The tomb of Jesus, on the other hand, was empty, for he saw no corruption. It is true that we have here *Luke's* account of Peter's pentecostal address, but it would appear that Luke has either used early tradition to formulate Peter's sermon or at least witnesses to an early tradition in which the tomb of Jesus was acknowledged as empty. This same comparison between David and Jesus is also found on the lips of Paul in Acts 13: 29–37.[21]

It may be that the lack of a specific reference to the empty tomb by Paul stems from an apologetic motive rather than from ignorance. When it came to the resurrection appearances, the apostle could argue on equal terms with the other disciples. He, too, had seen the Lord! He could not, however, say the same about the empty tomb. Perhaps this is the reason why he does not refer to it specifically in his letters.

If the empty tomb tradition arose from the experience of the early followers of Jesus on that first Easter morning and was from the beginning part and parcel of early Christian preaching, the question remains, 'What caused the tomb to be empty on that first Easter morning?' What 'cause' brought about this 'effect'? Evangelicals still find the simplest and easiest explanation the testimony of the NT writers. Christ has risen from the dead! The tomb could not hold him, for 'in fact Christ has been raised from the dead, the first fruits of those who have fallen asleep" (1 Cor. 15: 20).

[19] The author is well aware of the difficulty involved in knowing what 'likeness' in Romans 6: 5 means and with what is associated, but it is clear, at least to him, that regardless of how these questions are answered the baptism of the believer in some way recalls the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus. See R. C. Tannehill, *Dying and Rising with Christ* (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1966), pp. 30-39, for an excellent discussion of the various ways 'likeness' has been interpreted.

[20] Matthew 16: 21; 17: 9, 23; 20: 19; Mark 14: 28; 16: 6; John 21: 14; Acts 3: 15; etc.

[21] For a more detailed discussion of the implications of these passages see J. Manek, 'The Apostle Paul and the Empty Tomb,' *NovT* 2 (1957), pp. 276-280.

The psychology of incarnation

Robert R Cook

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Concerning Freud's concept of the unconscious mind Dean Matthews wrote: 'I cannot help thinking that it is a reproach to modern theology that so little reflection seems to have been given to the bearing of this discovery on the doctrine of Incarnation.'[1] Although written nearly thirty years ago, this judgement is still applicable for, with the one important expectation of W. Sanday whose ideas will be examined later, this concept remains unexploited by theologians. However, the same is not true of psychology generally. For centuries scholars have been fascinated with the issue of Christ's subjective experience. This may be traced back to the Enlightenment and the beginnings of the Romantic period when theologians as well as artists became preoccupied with the experiential, so that one finds Schleiermacher, for example, rejecting the traditional, static, metaphysical Christology of Chalcedon in favour of a Christ whose uniqueness lay in His perfect consciousness of God. There followed the whole edifice of Liberal theology including repeated attempts to lay bare the mind of Jesus. Of course much harm was done, and the deity of the Lord was often obscured, but this movement did manage to re-establish His full humanity, which had been all but forgotten over the centuries. The Church was reminded that Jesus had been subject to a normal human development, for as a boy He '. . . increased in wisdom and in stature' (Luke 2: 52, RSV), and as the writer of Hebrews tells us '. . . he learned obedience through what he suffered' (Heb. 5: 8). It seemed now to scholars that Christ's relationship with His Father was not ready-made or static but as Luke's Gospel especially emphasizes, He needed to maintain a vital prayer life. The traditional view had been that Jesus performed miracles in His own power through His divine nature, but now scholars began to face the implications of the need for Him to receive the Spirit at baptism and to pray to His Father before doing supernatural works. Further,

they noted for example that Christ has not been tempted to jump off the pinnacle of the Temple and levitate upwards using His own power, but rather to jump and rely on the angels to catch Him. Such insights as these cannot be ignored by any modern attempt to formulate an adequate Christology, and in fact most recent constructions face squarely such questions as: 'What must it have been like to have been Jesus?', 'What motivated Him?', and 'What was the nature of His self-consciousness?'

It is here that the problem begins for the modern Evangelical. We can appreciate the work done by nineteenth century scholarship in rehabilitating the humanity of Christ and we share with our contemporaries a fascination with the issue of His psychology, but unfortunately we can only admire the ingenuity of most modern attempts to produce a fresh Christology, we cannot accept them. Pannenberg's widely acclaimed Christological model will provide an example. In *Jesus God and Man*, he portrays Jesus of Nazareth as an apocalyptic prophet with a unique sense of mission and as the herald of the imminent inbreaking of the Kingdom of God. Although He was aware of having unusual authority, Jesus only saw Himself as a human being. His ministry was tragically terminated by His early arrest and crucifixion when it seemed that the credibility of His teaching was in complete jeopardy, but then the awesome miracle of His resurrection occurred which affirmed that in fact He had been God incarnate throughout His earthly life and that, unbeknown to the man Jesus, His death had been accepted as a sin offering for humanity. Undoubtedly, Pannenberg's functional approach is very clever, as is the way he shifts the focus of the discussion from the conception of Jesus in the womb to His resurrection. Rather as from one point of view, a page of *Hamlet* is nothing but paper and ink, and yet from another it is sublime poetry, so Pannenberg seems to be saying that from an earthly and psychological perspective Jesus was nothing but a unique man, but that from the divine viewpoint He had been God all the time. Or, in Pannenberg's own words: 'His humanity is not synthesized with a divine essence, but it involves two complementary total aspects of his existence.'[2]

[1] W. R. Matthews, *The Problem of Christ in the Twentieth Century* (OUP, 1949), p. 44.

[2] W. Pannenberg, *Jesus God and Man* (SCM, 1968), p. 337.

At this point, the reader might want to question Pannenberg concerning the adequacy of his view of Jesus' sense of mission. Did not Jesus see himself, not so much as an apocalyptic prophet, but as Messiah, Son of God and the one who was to be sacrificed for the forgiveness of sins and subsequently raised from the dead? Pannenberg would answer this question emphatically in the negative, contending that the gospel passages which suggest such things are post-Easter interpolations of the early Church. In other words, Pannenberg rejects the inspiration and full historicity of the gospels and blatantly wields the hatchet of Higher Criticism, excising many key passages. Unfortunately then, as Evangelical Christians we must reject Pannenberg's proffered model along with many other contemporary suggestions. The tragedy is that so few Evangelical scholars are prepared to speculate for themselves, whilst retaining a reverence for God and fidelity to the Scriptures, and using the conceptual tools of our age construct yet more adequate Christological models. This article will provide some suggestions, employing one or two recent insights from the realm of psychology.

After centuries of controversy, the Council of Chalcedon affirmed in A.D. 451 that Jesus Christ was one person having two natures, one human and one divine. This definition is, of course, still Catholic orthodoxy, and the Reformers found the doctrine unexceptionable in the light of the Biblical data. But many today feel that the grave limitations of Chalcedon become apparent as soon as one asks not ontological but psychological questions. In a sense this was done as early as the seventh century during the Monothelite controversy, when the question of whether Christ had one or two centres of will was at issue. The Council of Constantinople subsequently decided that each of Christ's natures involved a separate will, although the human was always subject to the divine will. It also taught that His life was made up of two sets of actions, some human and others divine. Many now feel that this extrapolation of Chalcedon uncovers its intrinsic weakness: a model of Christ which implies a kind of schizophrenia. To quote Pannenberg again: 'If divinity and humanity as two substances are supposed to be united in the individuality of Jesus, then either the two will be mixed to form a third or the individuality, Jesus' concrete living unity, will be ruptured.'[3] Eutyches had proposed Pannenberg's first alternative and had been explicitly condemned at Chalcedon.

Further problems with the traditional view become manifest when one tries to marry it with the New Testament teaching concerning Christ's real human development. Exponents of Chalcedon have either had to contend that the Logos in heaven progressively revealed knowledge to the incarnated Logos so that His divine nature developed in parallel with His human nature, or that in His divine nature Jesus was omniscient even from the cradle. The former contention suffers from a kind of divine schizophrenia of the Logos, while the latter implies such unacceptable corollaries as that of a day old baby who could propound Quantum theory if He chose! In fact, this second alternative, whilst escaping the charge of divine schizophrenia, opens itself to the charge of Docetism, since the qualities of His divine nature would effectively engulf those of His human nature. For instance, what must it have been like for Jesus to face Satan's temptations in the wilderness? The answer would be that as man the choice was real and the outcome uncertain, but as God Jesus knew all things including the result of this confrontation. When the two natures are put together one is left with a person whose human ignorance was negated by His divine omniscience. But this Docetic picture will not square with the New Testament data which presents Jesus as limited in knowledge; for example, He admits ignorance regarding the exact time of His return (Matt. 24: 36). It is no coincidence that throughout the early Middle Ages, the dominant artistic portrayal of Christ was of a fearsome God in human form; a kind of theophany driving men to Mary and the Saints, for only there could they find empathy with their human predicament.

Besides individuals like Pannenberg and Sanday, who have suggested their own particular alternatives to Chalcedon, there have been two main dissenting schools. As far as Evangelical Christianity is concerned, the first can be dismissed summarily. *The Myth of God Incarnate*[4] is but one recent attempt to resurrect the ancient spectre of Adoptionism, which manages to preserve the true humanity of Jesus, but only at the unacceptable cost of rejecting the Incarnation altogether.

Kenosis is a more attractive alternative, particularly in its modified and more subtle form. Scholars like Forsyth, Mackintosh and more recently Vincent Taylor present a Logos who vacated heaven and 'emptied' Himself into a purely human psychology, having decreed that such divine attributes as omniscience and omnipotence should become latent or potential while He was on earth. Taylor feels that the New Testament evidence suggests that sometimes Jesus enjoyed a degree of

[3] Ibid., p. 287.

[4] Ed. J. Hick (SCM, 1977).

divine self-consciousness, while at others He accepted His unique Sonship merely as an article of faith. Crudely speaking, the Kenotic model is of a divine person with only a human nature, and it thus escapes the tendency towards a schizophrenic model found in Chalcedon as interpreted by Constantinople. It also avoids the Docetic tendencies of the traditional view. Nevertheless, Kenosis has been heavily attacked in this century and although many of the criticisms have been ill-founded, based as they are on a Hellenistic rather than a Biblical view of God,[5] there remain two areas where this model is decidedly weak.

The first area of weakness has been termed 'cosmic absenteeism'. In *Colossians* we read of the Logos: 'He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together' (Col. 1: 17), but this being so, how was the cosmos 'held together' during the few decades that its sustainer was absent from heaven during the Incarnation? Whereas Mackintosh and others refuse to speculate about this, some, like the earlier German Kenoticists, hold that the Father took over the Son's functions for the duration. However, at the least this is an awkward aspect of the Kenotic view, and some will even agree with Temple that it postulates a divisible Godhead and thus a form of tritheism. Needless to say, this weakness is not shared by traditional Christology which teaches simply that: 'The Incarnation is an episode in the Life or Being of God the Son';[6] in other words, that the Son never left heaven but merely extended His consciousness to include that of Jesus. In fact, it has been suggested that there is Biblical warrant for this traditional view and John 3: 13 is cited, which reads in the Authorized Version: 'And no man hath ascended up to heaven, but He that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man which is in heaven'; notice the present tense of the final verb. But although found in the Textus Receptus, this crucial clause is omitted in the most trustworthy manuscripts, and it is likely that it is an early interpolation introduced by advocates of a two-nature Christology.

The second, and more serious, area of weakness concerns the nature of the ascended Lord. If the Logos devoid of certain attributes becomes a man, surely once these attributes are regained He becomes just God again, yet Scripture clearly teaches that it is the man Jesus who ascended into heaven (e.g. Heb. 6: 19f, Acts 5: 30ff). This is to say that the Godhead added humanity to itself.

Again, the two-nature Christology of Chalcedon is not embarrassed by this, but alternative views tend to be. For example, Pannenberg agrees with Schleiermacher that human and divine natures are so qualitatively distinct that it is fatuous to suppose that both could be brought together in the one person of Jesus of Nazareth. Yet if one accepts that in principle the two natures are incompatible, what can one's view be of the exalted Christ?

Having outlined the various limitations and strengths of past Christological models, let us now attempt a new formulation which avoids on the one hand any tendency towards Docetism or schizophrenia in the consciousness of Jesus, and on the other the problems of 'cosmic absenteeism' and the nature of the ascended Lord.

With the last point in mind, we may state as an initial assertion that since the ascended Christ has two natures, there is no *prima facie* reason why Jesus of Nazareth could not have had two also. Further, a simple reading of key verses like: 'For in him all the fulness of God was pleased to dwell' (Col. 1: 19) seems to imply that Jesus was not only human but also fully divine. The proposed Christology is only superficially like Chalcedon, however, for while the latter is concerned with ontological categories, we are also concerned with the psychological. By 'person' the Fathers meant something like 'unifying reality', while for the purpose of this model we shall define it as 'experiencing self'; that is, we are saying that He who experienced His thoughts, emotions etc. was none other than the Logos. By 'nature' we mean something like 'psyche'. At this point it is important to emphasize that the present Christology in no way purports to be a restatement of Chalcedon in modern conceptual terms. It is incorrect to suppose that the architects of Chalcedon would have used the word 'psychology' instead of 'nature' or 'person', and on this issue Mascall should be respected when he writes:

> 'That the doctrine of Incarnation may have consequences in the psychological sphere we need not deny . . . but the doctrine itself is not a matter of psychology, and thus any attempt to identify, for example, 'person' with 'consciousness' or with 'personality' (in the commonly accepted modern sense of that term) can lead to nothing but confusion.'[7]

However, Mascall is a little too conservative, wishing to retain Chalcedon as the definitive Christology.

Although we find it impossible to make psycholo-

[5] E.g. the view that Kenosis is impossible in the light of the doctrine of the immutability of God, cf. L. Berkhof, *Systematic Theology* (Banner of Truth, 1958), p. 328.
[6] W. Temple, *Christus Veritas* (Macmillan, 1925), p. 144.

[7] E. L. Mascall, *Christ, the Christian and the Church* (Longmans, 1946), p. 41.

gical sense out of the idea that Christ has two wills and therefore have to reject that deduction of Constantinople, we are suggesting that He had two natures and now we must question whether such a hypothesis is a coherent one. Can any analogy be found for this unique state of affairs? G. E. Bray offers the interesting one of someone with a dual nationality:

'. . . where a man might have two distinct identities and yet remain in the same person. When he is with us, we may assimilate him to ourselves, even to the point where we are surprised if we discover that the same person speaks a different language and carries within him a completely different set of cultural references. Such a man, of course, is neither a schizophrenic nor an impossibility; it is merely that we have failed to grasp the complete situation.'[8]

As has been mentioned, Constantinople asserted that Christ's life was made up of two sets of actions, some human and some divine, and in fact this view is to be found much earlier in Church history; Leo wrote in his Tome (A.D. 449) for example: 'To hunger, to thirst, to be weary and to sleep, is obviously human; but with five loaves to satisfy five thousand people . . . is without question divine.'[9] One might use Bray's analogy to illustrate such a position by simply saying that sometimes the man speaks in English and at others he speaks in, say, French. But the same analogy may be employed to make sense of the alternative view which is in many ways more preferable and that is that there was a personal union of the two natures such that the resultant being was a unit, who thought and acted as a unit. To return to the analogy, one might ask our subject to give us his impressions of London and Paris; he would then, as it were, utilize both 'natures' ('sets of cultural references') and give an integrated reply.

Yet even if it can be agreed that the idea of a person with two natures is a coherent one, there is still the problem of Christ's limited powers and that of His development. Here we might learn from the Kenoticists with their notion of a Christ 'emptied' of certain divine functions and introduce into our proposed model the idea of 'divine amnesia'; that is, prior to Incarnation the Logos decided that as the infant Jesus He would remember nothing of His divine nature and then gradually and perhaps intermittently He would recall, and have access to, His second nature. To return to our

analogy, imagine the subject concussed in hospital and unable to remember that his childhood was spent in France; it is only when he is offered a *Paris Match* that a few words of French nudge into his mind. . . .

We must now introduce the concept of the unconscious into our model of a divine experiencing self with two natures, one of which is partially inaccessible. In order to escape the problem of 'divine absenteeism' we are suggesting that Jesus had not only a human but also a divine unconscious. Following Tillich's advice that God is not to be found so much spatially above us as in the depths of our being, we are positing that just as the human unconscious of Jesus must have maintained such involuntary processes as His heart beat, so His divine unconscious maintained the 'heart beat' of the cosmos. Indeed, recent research has indicated that much poltergeist activity seems to be caused by psycho-kinesis, that is by energies emanating from the unconscious mind of a person nearby which result in objects being hurled about.[10] Such people are psychologically disturbed and they bring chaos to their surroundings. Christ, in contrast, was supremely sane and brought harmony to the universe He maintained. If this view is entertained, one is left with such amazing corollaries as that while on the cross He was keeping in being the very nails that were killing Him.

The only issue left to discuss concerns Christ's exalted state. Using the suggested model, in heaven He would have total recource to both natures and to all the functions which had hitherto been unconscious, since by definition an omniscient person must be conscious of everything. The practice of extending the conscious mind to include 'involuntary processes' is experienced by advanced yogis who claim to be able to alter their blood pressure etc. at will, and it is conceivable that in our resurrection bodies, we, like Christ, may have no unconscious minds but will be able to control directly all our psychic and physiological processes.

Admittedly, the foregoing suggestions are mere speculations and while some will find them outrageously bold, others will find them too vague and the analogies too approximate. But what is clear is that psychology is providing us with some exciting concepts which we must not be shy in using as we seek to provide our generation with Christological models that answer, where possible, the kind of questions that are being asked.

A brief examination of Sanday's unorthodox Christology will serve as a post-script. Published in

[8] G. E. Bray, *Can We Dispense with Chalcedon?* (*Themelios* Vol. 3 No. 2).
[9] Ed. J. Stevenson, *Creeds, Councils and Controversies* (SPCK, 1975), p. 319.
[10] See for example: A. Doublas, *Extra Sensory Power* (Victor Gollancz, 1976), ch. 19.

1910 during the heyday of psychology as a nascent science, Sanday's *Christologies Ancient and Modern* capitalized on the new concept of the unconscious, where he supposed Christ's humanity and divinity were blended only to come to full expression in His completely human consciousness:

'That which was divine in Christ was not nakedly exposed to the public gaze; neither was it so entirely withdrawn from outward view as to be wholly sunk and submerged in the darkness of the unconscious; but there was a sort of Jacob's ladder by which the divine forces stored up below found an outlet, as it were, to the upper air and common theatre in which the life of mankind is enacted.'[11]

Attending especially to the testimony of the mystics, Sanday assumed that the locus of God's activity in the human personality was the unconscious or the 'subliminal consciousness' as he sometimes called it. In parallel, Christ's divinity was to be found primarily in this subliminal area. Sanday felt he had thus arrived at a model of the Incarnation which escaped the dualism of consciousness which bedevilled traditional two nature Christologies. But his theory was badly received and in the following year he wrote a pamplet retracting and modifying some of the more extreme aspects of his case.

Sanday's Christology may indeed be open to criticism but those opponents who have gone into print have failed to demolish his position. Take, for example, the attack of Mackintosh, who assumed that the unconscious was an unfit receptacle for deity:

'Why should we take this half-lit region of psychic life, regarding which we can only speak hypothetically or at secondhand—since it cannot of course be *known* directly—and say that it offers a truer and more worthy dwelling-place or medium of Godhead than is provided by the full intensity of consciousness?'[12]

Writing this in 1912, Mackintosh was evidently under the monumental influence of Freudian psychology, and indeed Mackintosh echoes Freud when he asserts that the unconscious only has affinities with sleep, with infant life and with instinct. But in this same year, Jung was breaking with the Freudian circle and was about to develop his own view of the unconscious as not only the receptacle of mental debris, but also the region from which emerges the deep wisdom of humanity and even divinity. Those for whom Jung's views are more persuasive than Freud's will find Mackintosh's criticism thin.

More recently, Vincent Taylor[13] has berated Sanday on the grounds that the prophets came to know God through conscious fellowship and divine revelation rather than via their unconscious minds, but this is surely too simplistic a picture. For example, it is an open question as to whether Isaiah's inaugural vision in the Temple was an objective one or some kind of valid hallucination triggered by divine activity in his unconscious mind. Certainly God can communicate directly with one's conscious mind, but Sanday was correct in affirming that some of God's most important work is done at the subliminal level of our personalities. It may be time, therefore, to rethink exactly why Sanday's hypothesis must be rejected.

[11] W. Sanday, *Christologies Ancient and Modern* (Oxford and Clarendon Press, 1910), p. 166.
[12] H. R. Mackintosh, *The Person of Jesus Christ* (T & T Clark, 1912), p. 488.
[13] V. Taylor, *The Person of Christ in New Testament Teaching* (Macmillan, 1958).

God the mad scientist: process theology on God and evil

Stephen T. Davis

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An interesting facet of the American religious scene in the past few decades is the development and growth of the movement known as Process Theology. An outgrowth of the philosophical and theological work of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, Process Theology seems to be growing in influence. Unless signs mislead, it threatens to swallow up liberal Protestant thinking about God, at least in America. One perhaps unfortunate aspect of the movement is that it appears to the outsider at least to be something of a cultic orthodoxy. It has its own technical jargon, its own doctrines, its own periodical, its own academic centres, its own semi-official spokesmen, its own cadre of overly-zealous students.[1]

Evangelical Christians have not paid much attention to Process Theology, and reasons for this are not difficult to find. For one thing, there is a fairly formidable technical vocabulary that must be mastered before crucial works by Whitehead, Hartshorne, and their followers can be understood. Second, much of what passes for Process Theology seems to Evangelicals only vaguely Christian. Nevertheless, Process thinking is a major presence in the contemporary theological world, and Evangelicals ought to assess it.

Scholars who are exposed to Process thought often react that it seems in deep trouble on the traditional problem of evil. Indeed, this charge has been seriously developed by Peter Hare and Edward Madden in their book, *Evil and the Concept of God* (Charles C. Thomas, Publishers, 1968).[2] So

it is not surprising that Process thinkers—in keeping with the growing application of Process thought to more and more fields of inquiry—should begin to address themselves to the problem of evil. Two recent studies should be mentioned. First, *Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition* by John Cobb and David Griffin[3] contains a chapter entitled 'Why So Much Evil in the World?' Second, Griffin himself has now produced a full-blown work on the problem of evil entitled *God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy*.[4] In what follows I will concentrate primarily on the latter work. Page references in the text are to this book.

Griffin's book has two main aims—first, to expose the failure of traditional theists to solve the problem of evil, and, second, to solve the problem from a Process perspective. Accordingly, Parts I and II of the book are primarily devoted to a historical survey of various theodicies. All the chapters are written from a Process perspective (as Griffin admits); hence the reader can grasp the outlines of the author's own theodicy from the comments he makes about others. Of particular importance are his discussions of Augustine, Aquinas, and John Hick. The general moral is that traditional theodicists all fail to solve the problem of evil because they have a defective view of God's power. In Part III of the book, which is entitled 'A Nontraditional Theodicy,' Griffin argues for his own view of God and for the theodicy it entails.

Before proceeding to the heart of Griffin's theodicy, which is what I want to analyze in this paper, let me make three preliminary points. The first concerns the term 'traditional theist', a term which appears often in the book. This term for Griffin seems basically to mean 'non-Process theist', and as such is a perfectly acceptable way of referring to those Catholic and Protestant theists in the Augustine-Aquinas-Luther-Calvin-Barth tradition against whom he wishes to argue. However, Griffin appears to me to use the term too loosely. For

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[1] I can attest to the fact that some of these students apparently believe that the whole history of philosophy and theology was sheer chaos till Whitehead came along and straightened it out. And I was amused the other day to see a bumper sticker that read, 'Another Family For Whitehead.'

[2] Although Hare, at least, seems to have softened his critical stance somewhat. See his review of *God, Power, and Evil* in *Process Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring, 1977), pp. 44-51.

[3] John B. Cobb and David R. Griffin, *Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), pp. 69-75.

[4] David R. Griffin, *God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976).

example, the following opinions are all attributed by Griffin to all or most traditional theists:

- that divine immutability, impassibility, and simplicity are essential to theism (pp. 94-95);
- that God is to be defined as infinite substance (p. 96);
- that the distinction between primary and secondary causation makes human freedom compatible with divine causation (p. 206); and
- that all causality is explicitly or implicitly to be attributed to God (p. 218).

Now I consider myself a traditional theist and I do not hold *any* of these views. Nor, in my opinion, is this due to mere eccentricity on my part. I believe I am in company with many traditional, i.e. non-Process, theists here. Thus, Griffin might have used the term 'traditional theist' more carefully. Traditional theists are not so theologically homogeneous as he implies.

One aspect of this general point merits specific comment, for it is relevant to one of Griffin's key criticisms of traditional theism. He often makes the point that according to traditional theism God either actually or potentially controls all things. I believe he is quite correct here; traditional theists *do* hold this view. Some traditional theists hold that certain contingent events occur because of free human decisions, but even they will admit that God *potentially* controls all events; it is just that he has limited his causal power precisely to allow for human freedom in the case of some events. However, Griffin strongly criticizes the way certain traditional theists develop this point, either in terms of the distinction between primary and secondary causation or between God's antecedent and consequent will or hidden and revealed will. And in the light of his rejection of these notions Griffin attributes to traditional theists the much stronger view that God *actually* controls all events. He argues that traditional omnipotence logically entails God's actual control of every event (i.e. that whatever occurs is God's will), whether traditional theists admit it or not. He says:

> As long as deity is defined as omnipotent in the traditional sense, God is equally responsible for all murders, rapes, and earthquakes, whether one says that God works by means of secondary causes or that all such phenomena are directly implanted upon our experience by God (p. 237).

But, again, there are traditional theists whose view of omnipotence in no way entails that God causes every event or that everything that happens is God's will. I would say, for example, that many events (e.g. sins) occur that are not caused by God *at all* and are not his will *at all*. Of course sins are *permitted* to happen by God; but permitting is not the same as causing. God can permit, sustain, and (in my opinion) even foreknow[5] human actions without providing sufficient conditions for them.

The second point concerns Griffin's concept of necessity. Griffin often claims that eternal things are necessary: 'The eternal and the necessary are equatable,' he says (p. 113; cf. also pp. 77, 297). Now it is notorious that both the terms 'eternal' and 'necessary' can be defined in a variety of ways. 'Eternal' might mean 'timeless' or it might mean 'unending in duration'. 'Necessary' might mean 'logically true', 'ontologically independent,' 'unavoidable,' or many other things. The claim that 'the eternal and the necessary are equatable' at the very least needs explication; to me it seems simply false. The piece of paper I am now writing on *might* have unending duration (it is logically possible, although undoubtedly false, that due to an eternal choice on the part of God it is eternal). But even if it *is* eternal why must it be necessary? It can still depend for its existence on God, for example. (To borrow an example from Richard Taylor, if the sun and the moon were eternal then moonlight would be eternal but still contingent—for it would still depend for its existence on sunlight.)

Griffin's notion of necessity also seems garbled at another point. Having summarized Spinoza's argument for the conclusion that all things flow necessarily from God's nature, he says: 'And from this it is difficult to see how one can resist the further conclusion that all things are parts or "modes" of God. If God's necessary existence does not distinguish God from all worldly beings, what basis is there for insisting upon a distinction?' (p. 98; cf. also p. 113). This argument can be summarized as follows:

(1) God is a necessary being
(2) The world flows necessarily from God's nature
(3) The world is a necessary being
(4) Therefore, the world=God.

I will simply point out that the argument is invalid: even if we grant premises (2) and (3) (as I am unwilling to do), what is to prevent God and the world being distinguished from each other in other ways than by necessity?

Third, I believe there is a problem related to Griffin's repeated charge against traditional theists that they solve the problem of evil by denying the

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[5] Griffin also assumes that human freedom and divine foreknowledge are logically incompatible, but I disagree. See my 'Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom,' forthcoming in *Religious Studies*.

reality of genuine evil. Now at first glance this seems an absurd charge, but in the light of Griffin's definition of the term 'genuine evil', he is quite correct. What he says is that a 'genuine evil' is 'anything, all things considered, without which the universe would have been better. Put otherwise, some event is genuinely evil if its occurrence prevents the occurrence of some other event which would have made the world better, all things considered' (p. 22; cf. also pp. 48, 179-180, 324n). It follows from this that any *prima facie* evil is not genuinely evil if it is necessary to a greater good or if it in fact leads to a greater good. And since it is quite true that traditional theists typically argue that all evil will eventually be overcome by a greater good that it leads to, it follows that traditional theists do indeed deny the reality of genuine evil (as Griffin defines this term). This much is fairly straightforward. Many theists would prefer to define 'genuine evil' in some other way, i.e. so that genuine evil remains genuine evil even if it is instrumentally good. I, for one, am quite prepared to admit that there are certain events which, all things considered, should not have happened, e.g. the Nazi holocaust. Still, Griffin is free to define the term in any consistent way he chooses.

The problem, however, is that in places Griffin seems to turn this valid terminological point into an unfair substantive criticism of traditional theists. That is, he in effect argues: we all know that genuine evil exists, so traditional theists are wrong. He refers to 'the virtually universal intuition that not everything is as good as it could have been' (p. 71; cf. also pp. 250, 254). He says: 'The whole of Biblical religion is undercut if the reality of . . . real evil is finally denied' (p. 222). Again: 'One cannot talk about "God" in our context, decisively molded as it is by the Biblical tradition, without affirming . . . the reality of human freedom and of genuine evil' (p. 230). Traditional theists, Griffin says, 'fail to see that any "solution" with any possible relevance to contemporary experience will have to be one that . . . holds that genuine evil exists' (p. 256).

But all this has not been shown at all. As *Griffin* defines the term 'genuine evil', we do *not* in fact know that genuine evil exists. It may well be—as Christians often claim—that in the end God ensures that all *prima facie* evil leads to a greater good. So Griffin's argument appears unfair. He first defines 'genuine evil' in such a way that many traditional theists are made to deny the reality of genuine evil (something they would not do on their own definition of the term, incidentally), and he then turns around and criticizes them precisely because they

deny the reality of genuine evil, contrary, Griffin says, both to biblical religion and to the intuitions of nearly everyone (as if their beliefs were of a piece with those, say, of Mary Baker Eddy).

But let us now turn to the theodicy Griffin presents in Part III of his book. As the title of the book reveals, this theodicy revolves around the notion of God's power. Griffin first argues that the traditional view of divine omnipotence must be given up because it is incoherent. It is incoherent for two reasons—first, because there logically can be no sin (the reality of which is affirmed by traditional theists) in a world controlled by a good God who is omnipotent, as this term is defined by traditional theists (p. 211). The will of such a God simply could not be transgressed. Second, it is incoherent because it reduces to the claim that God has all the power that there is, but this is impossible. All actual worlds logically must have power of their own over against God (see pp. 49-50, 148, 250-251, 265-268, 270-271, 273, 276-279, 281). Furthermore, there logically must be an actual world (pp. 277, 279, 297), so the traditional theistic picture of God controlling every event cannot be true.

This makes it possible for Griffin to deny that premise of the problem of evil which says, 'An omnipotent being could unilaterally [i.e. intentionally, not by luck or accident] bring about an actual world without any genuine evil.' Given any actual world—and, again, there must be an actual world in Process thought, since for it there was no creation *ex nihilo*—it is logically impossible for God unilaterally to prevent evil. Griffin says: 'Any actual world will, by metaphysical necessity, be composed of beings with some power of self-determination, even vis-a-vis God, so that it is logically impossible for God unilaterally to prevent all evil' (pp. 201-202). Of course, an actual world without genuine evil is logically possible—it is up to the self-determining members of any actual world whether or not there is evil in it (not up to God), and they *might* choose not to do evil. What is logically impossible is for God to *cause* there to be or *guarantee* such a world (p. 270).

God is perfectly good, Griffin believes, so given the metaphysical necessities described above, what God does is try to *persuade* people to follow his ideal aims for them. There are two kinds of evil, according to Cobb and Griffin: discord and triviality. Discord is mental or physical suffering and is evil per se; triviality, or lack of intensity, is not evil per se—only *unnecessary* triviality is evil per se. Both are evil because they prevent the occurrence of *enjoyment*, which is the one intrinsic

good.[6] God is responsible for evil only in the sense that his persuasive activity originally brought the world from chaos into a cosmos in which free creatures can do evil deeds (pp. 300, 308). But the main point is that God is not indictable—both because he could not have prevented evil no matter what he did (had he not stimulated the existence of the cosmos, evil in the sense of unnecessary triviality would still have existed) and because even now he is doing his very best. He is continually seeking to overcome our resistance to his purpose and our tendency toward moral evil (pp. 280, 305). He can even be said to be overcoming evil with good by transforming it into ideal aims for the next state of the world (pp. 303-304). Thus the problem of evil is solved—no longer is there any logical difficulty in believing that genuine evil exists, that God is perfectly good, and that God is perfectly powerful (i.e. has all the power a being logically can have (pp. 142, 268)).

Is this a good theodicy? Does Griffin solve the problem of evil? I do not believe so, and for two main reasons. The first has to do with Griffin's analysis of omnipotence. God cannot have a monopoly on power, he says; any actual world must have power of its own over against God. Now I believe that *prima facie* this is a strange claim. Some Christians have in fact espoused doctrines which amount to the claim that God is the efficient cause of everything that occurs. I had always considered this claim false but logically possible. But to Griffin the claim is logically impossible. Let us call the statement we are talking about

(5) Any possible world, if it were actualized, would contain self-determining entities with power over against God.

Now Griffin considers (5) a 'metaphysical principle', which for him means that it is not just true but necessarily true (pp. 271, 279).[7] He first introduces it in the Preface to his book (p. 12), and it figures prominently throughout. Surprised by it, I confess I read the book impatiently looking for an argument for it. Unfortunately it is not to be found. The reader is told again and again that (5) is necessarily true—and this claim is undoubtedly

crucial to Griffin's theodicy—but he is never told why.

Griffin does make it clear that (5) is a principle of Whiteheadian metaphysics (pp. 274, 276-282), but that surely by itself is not enough to establish it—Whitehead might be wrong. What is needed is an argument. The only thing in the book that even approaches the level of an argument is this: if (5) were false it would be logically possible for there to exist entities whose states are completely determinable by other entities. But, says Griffin:

> It has been increasingly accepted, since Berkeley, that the meaningful use of terms requires an experiential grounding for those terms. What reality could one point to that would supply an experiential basis for the meaning of 'a powerless actuality'? This thing would have to be directly experienced, and directly *experienced as being devoid of power*. I do not experience anything meeting these criteria which I would term an actuality. . . . The idea that there are some actualities devoid of power is a pure inference . . . . The person who assumes the existence of powerless actualities does not even have any direct knowledge that such entities are possible. On this point Berkeley is absolutely right. Talk of powerless actual entities is finally meaningless, since it cannot be given an experiential basis (pp. 266-267).

But this simply will not do. In the first place, Griffin is arguing from a surprisingly unsophisticated version of the empiricist criterion of meaning, one which not even he himself can consistently hold. It is one thing to make the general point that utterances have meaning only if they have some sort of empirical grounding. I accept this principle. But why say that terms have meaning only if the things they refer to have been *directly* experienced? Not even Berkely believed that—nor, evidently, does Griffin. For he obviously believes that talk about God is meaningful, and yet no one directly perceives God.

In the second place, 'x is totally causally determined by y' does indeed entail 'x is causally impotent', but 'x is totally causally determin*able* by y' does not. It may be that y can fully control x if y wants to do so but y has chosen not to do so, thus leaving x with some self-determining power. So all talk about whether or not we experience causally impotent actual entities is irrelevant. God might have a power (i.e. power totally to determine all actual entities) which he does not use. It may even be that *every* being we experience (including ourselves) is causally impotent, i.e. totally determined by God, though we don't know it. It may be

[6] *Process Theology*, p. 70.
[7] It is not clear exactly how Griffin wants us to understand his use of the word 'necessary'. Perhaps he only wants (5) to be taken as a sort of metaphysical hypothesis or assumption. Or perhaps he means not that it is logically true per se but rather than it is necessarily true if certain other Whiteheadian metaphysical assumptions are true. This much is unclear. He does in places, however, seem to say that (5) is of itself necessarily or logically true, and I will interpret him in this way.

that every effect that we observe in the world that is apparently caused by some x is really caused by some unobserved y (God, for example).

In the third place, while it may or may not be true, as Griffin claims (p. 270), that the only experience we have of completely determinable entities is of ideal entities (i.e. things that exist in our minds), it does not follow from this that if the world is completely determinable by God the world is a mere divine idea. For the argument:

(6) All the x's I experience are y
(7) Therefore, all x's are y

is obviously invalid.

I take it, then, that Griffin has not established the truth of (5), and therefore that his theodicy (assuming the rest of it is sound) will be acceptable only to those who already believe (5). Committed Whiteheadians presumably believe (5), but I do not. Accordingly, Griffin's theodicy will not be convincing to me and others like me who see no good reason to affirm (5).

The other reason I do not believe Griffin solves the problem of evil has to do with the future. Unlike John Hick's theodicy, Griffin's theodicy is not strongly eschatological. While I do not always agree with Hick, I believe his eschatological emphasis is correct. For a Christian, the problem of evil cannot be solved without crucial reference to the future. Thus in response to Griffin's repeated statements that God *aims, intends, seeks, works,* and *tries* to overcome evil (pp. 305, 310), we must ask: Does God have the power, influence, or persuasive ability to make his intention succeed? If he does, we are entitled to wonder why he didn't overcome evil long ago. If he does not (and I believe this is what Process thinkers must say; they cannot be sure but can only *hope* that God will emerge victorious), then, in my opinion, God is not worth worshipping. He is a good being who tries his best: we can certainly sympathize with him and perhaps even pity him. Some of us will choose to fight on his side in the battle against evil, and we can all *hope* he will win in the end. But I see no reason to worship him.

Let me add an additional comment here, lest I be interpreted as recommending the worship of power per se. I do not recommend this, though I believe the criteria that must be met before a given being is 'worthy of worship' *include* power. In fact, I would hold that *goodness* and *power* are two of the principle criteria that must be met. This can be seen as follows. Suppose there existed a malevolent demon who was omnipotent in the traditional theistic sense. Would we be inclined to worship this being? Of course not: we might fear

him, but we would not worship him. Now suppose there existed a morally perfect paragon (many times more saintly than, say, St. Francis of Assisi) who was no more powerful than a typical human being. Would we be inclined to worship him? Of course not: we might respect and even love him, but we would not worship him. Thus, I conclude, both goodness and power are criteria of 'worthiness of worship'. Given the failure of Griffin's argument for the incoherence of the traditional notion of omnipotence, the God of Process Theology, in my opinion, fails to meet the second criterion.

God obviously ran a great risk in creating this sort of world—on that, Griffin and I can agree (although we mean different things by 'create'). But was the risk worth taking? Evangelical Christians believe it was. They believe God foresees the future of the world, i.e. the coming Kingdom of God, and they believe he has revealed that the risk was worth taking. In the end, they believe, we will be able to see how evil is overcome by God. As Paul says, 'The sufferings of this present life are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come' (Rom. 8: 18). But on Process Thought we do *not* know whether the risk was worth taking, for we do not know how the world turns out, and neither does God.

As noted earlier, there are two intrinsic evils, according to Griffin, discord and unnecessary triviality. In stimulating the world away from the latter, God created the possibility of the former. God's aim was to overcome unnecessary triviality while avoiding as much discord as he could. As Cobb and Griffin say:

> God's loving purpose must not be thought of as merely the avoidance of discord. To have left the finite realm in chaos, when it could have been stimulated to become a world, would have been to acquiesce in unnecessary triviality. To be loving or moral, God's aim must be to overcome unnecessary triviality while avoiding as much discord as possible.[9]

But did God succeed in achieving his aim? The sad answer in Process Theology must be that we do not know. There are two reasons for this. First, no one—not even God—can see far enough into the future to tell. Second, even if foreknowledge were possible, Griffin provides us with no calculus for weighing intrinsic goods and evils against each other. Which is more important—avoiding unnecessary triviality or avoiding discord? It is surprising that we are never presented with an argument on this point, since the success of the Process theodicy depends on our agreeing that avoiding unnecessary

[9] *Process Theology*, p. 71.

triviality is at least as important as avoiding discord.

In an interesting Appendix to his book, Griffin argues that personal immortality (or resurrection, as Evangelical Christians would prefer) is possible but not required on Process thought. Accordingly, Griffin considers belief in survival of death an optional aspect of Christian theology. In his closing paragraph he says:

I do not consider faith that there actually will be a happy future for humanity in this world to be essential for theodicy. No matter how bad the future actually turns out to be, it will not cancel out the worthwhileness of the human goodness enjoyed during the previous thousands of years (p. 313).

These statements both show the non-eschatological basis of Griffin's theodicy and reveal its weakness. It seems almost an exercize in pollyanna optimism to claim, as Griffin does, that the intrinsic values that now exist are so great that they outweigh *any* evil events that might occur in the future. Suppose ten years from now all human beings die, cursing God, after years of horrible physical and mental suffering. Will God's great adventure have turned out worthwhile? I hardly think so. At this point

orthodox Christianity seems far more sober and realistic. Good events do indeed occur, Evangelicals want to say, but the power of evil is pervasive in the world; the world is *not* worthwhile *as it stands*: it needs to be redeemed.

This is where the mad scientist metaphor comes in. Even if we grant Griffin his view of omnipotence (as I am not willing to do), it still follows that God is indictable for creating the sort of world he created if in the end evil outweighs good. God will be something like a mad scientist who creates a monster he hopes will behave but whom he cannot control: if the monster does more evil than good the scientist's decision to create the monster will turn out to have been terribly wrong. The scientist will be indictable.

It does not seem, then, that the theodicy offered by Process Theologians is successful. The problem of evil is a thorny problem for all theists. There are no easy answers available. But it is clear that no solution to the problem is to be found here, let alone a solution acceptable to orthodox Christians. Those who agree with me that the suggested theodicy fails utterly will draw the moral that Process Theology is not therefore a tenable theological option.