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Editorial: Of Making Books

David Kingdon and Stephen Williams

In 1995, IVP brought out its *New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology*. Thereby hangs a long tale. The idea had been officially mooted for 14 years before publication—about the time it took Jacob, whose ethics could be shaky in his earlier years, to acquire Leah and Rachel at the hands of Laban, whose ethics were shakier still. It was originally planned as a dictionary of Christian Ethics, but it became clear that the lines between Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology were becoming increasingly blurred and that a wider group would profit from a dictionary that combined the disciplines. With changes on the staff of IVP in the early 1980s and with the publication of the *New Dictionary of Theology* in 1988, it took time for idea to become reality.

Its format contains a feature of special interest. For it is in two parts, the first of which consists of 18 4,000-word articles, ordered according to a principle of theological arrangement. This part was designed, as the Preface states, to 'give a basic introduction to the main themes of Christian ethics and pastoral theology'. The articles in it can be used 'as a text book, offering the reader a broad survey of the field'. The second part consists of articles ranging from 250 to 1,000 words in length. Widely diverse subjects come under consideration: cannibalism and picketing are treated alongside media ethics, reproductive technologies, Third World aid and the theory of double-effect. It was no small job devising a reference system that makes it easy to move from the first to the second part and *vice versa*; not all typesetting firms have the technology to implement it.

From the outset, the idea was to make the *Dictionary* accessible to Christians in the professions, in commerce and in industry, who had no formal theological training. It therefore tries to avoid or to explain technicalities. But, of course, it is the work of experts: it is a great encouragement that international evangelical scholarship in these areas is of a standard that enabled this production. Within the parameters of evangelicalism, there has been no attempt to conceal differences. For example, no uniform line is taken on the vexed issues of divorce and remarriage. No doubt some will wish there were a firmer line taken, others, a more flexible approach. Be that as it may, early indications are that the *Dictionary* is proving its worth. Nor is its use limited to adults: there are reports of teenagers using it. It should certainly be of help to theological students and, as a major publishing event, it is appropriate to bring it to the attention of readers of *Themelios*.

'Of making many books there is no end', said the Teacher, 'and much study wearies the body' (Ecc. 12:12). This verse is surrounded with reference to the things that mattered to the Teacher: knowledge, uprightness, truth, wisdom. The Teacher of Ecclesiastes

certainly studied—to find the right words, the right proverbs, the right sayings. And a book was certainly made out of them. For he wanted to impress on his hearers one thing, at the last: ‘Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man. For God will bring every deed into judgment, including every hidden thing, whether it is good or evil.’ The study and the writing that have gone into the *New Dictionary* have been spiritually framed, it is hoped, by such considerations as these.

The *Dictionary* unites theology and ethics but, as we have noted, it is separate from the earlier *New Dictionary of Theology*. Perhaps a later generation will look back on us and say that, in those days, ‘theology’ and ‘ethics’ were often treated separately. Probably, evangelicalism is associated more with a ‘theology’ than an ‘ethics’. What are the distinctives of ‘evangelicalism’, we are asked, when people want to know exactly what the word means. Often, the answer is given in terms of doctrinal convictions. And perhaps this can mislead ‘evangelicals’ into one-sidedness. For we believe in the centrality of the love of God and of neighbour in Christianity, yet we never define evangelicalism in terms of these, for they are not distinguishing characteristics. Because doctrinal characteristics are frequently *distinguishing* characteristics, we make them the *defining* characteristics of our Christianity, in a way that associates our Christianity with doctrine and not with ethics, or with ethics only over a very restricted area.

We need to give to reflection on ethics the time we give to reflection in theology: to account pastoral theology as important as dogmatic theology. (We use the distinctions not because they are recommended, but because they are operative.) Once we do, our conception of the shape of the theological task will probably begin to change.

Theologians often feel free to ‘do’ their theology independently of non-theologians. They will not get far or be maximally fruitful if they proceed in that way in tackling questions in ethics. How can pressing questions in medical ethics, for example, that desperately need deep theological attention, be better approached than when the nurse, the doctor, the lawyer, the health care administrator and the theologian try somehow to work together? The mind of Christ is conveyed to the body of Christ. Christ can sovereignly convey this in many ways. But it is clearly an appropriate expression of the body of Christ that members of the body co-operate in Christian reflection on issues in ethics. Wherever possible, the more our ‘inter-disciplinary’ work can be done at local, congregational level, the better. Out of a community bound together in love, led by sensitive pastors engaged in theological exploration, can come insight into ethical questions that stalk our social life. Surely Christian witness today can be effective not least by its articulation of a coherent social ethic. We hope that the *Dictionary* contributes worthily to that end.

Rhetorical Criticism: An Introduction

Steve Walton

Steve Walton is Lecturer in New Testament at St John's College, Nottingham, England. We draw attention to a supplementary publication of his, 'What Does Aristotle Have to Do with Paul? Rhetorical Criticism and 1 Thessalonians', Tyndale Bulletin 46.2 (1995).

Since Muilenburg's paper on rhetorical criticism of the OT,¹ which may justly be said to have launched the rediscovery of this discipline in biblical studies, numerous studies have appeared using the tools provided by rhetoric, both ancient and modern, to analyse and understand the biblical documents. In NT studies, Betz's work on Galatians launched this new era,² followed by the highly influential work of Kennedy,³ who has provided a classicist's perspective to the development of the discipline.

What these modern scholars are doing is not, of course, a new procedure. In a recent article, Fairweather draws attention to Chrysostom's use of rhetorical categories in his commentary on Galatians,⁴ as does Kennedy to Augustine working in similar manner (in *On Christian Doctrine*),⁵ and Classen to Philip Melancthon's use of rhetoric in his works on biblical studies.⁶

This paper aims to introduce the discipline of rhetorical criticism as currently practised by examining the use of models from classical rhetoric in studying the NT documents, and by considering the legitimacy (or otherwise) of such an enterprise.

What is rhetorical criticism?

So what are the characteristics of this approach? We shall first consider the classical statement of the 'art' of rhetoric by Aristotle, as a founding father of the classical discipline, before outlining the method Kennedy has built upon this foundation. We shall then consider the validity of Kennedy's approach in the light of criticisms of it which have been offered.

Aristotle's The 'Art' of Rhetoric

Aristotle was teaching in the fourth century BC, in which the growth of Greek democracy, combined with the lack of professional advocates, meant that everyone had to be able to speak in the courts, either in self-defence or in prosecuting another, or in the assembly where matters of future policy were debated and decided. The focus of rhetoric, for Aristotle, is discovering the available means of persuasion in relation to any subject whatsoever.⁷ This locates the subject-matter of rhetoric in the realm of the probable, whether probable past events or the probable consequences of a decision being discussed.

Rhetoric in the Aristotelian tradition has five major components: invention, arrangement, style, memory and delivery. In *The 'Art' of Rhetoric* Aristotle writes most fully about the first three, partly because he was in a tradition of philosophical rhetoric, which was less concerned with the speaker himself, rather than in a sophistic tradition, which placed a greater emphasis on the speaker.⁸

Invention encompasses three areas. First, *the question of proofs*, that is, the methods open to the speaker to persuade the audience. These divide into two sorts. External (or inartificial) proofs include such things as laws, witnesses, documents and miracles: they are 'external' to the speaker in the sense of not having been created by the speaker.⁹ Internal (or artificial)

proofs are devised by the speaker himself and fall into three main groups: pathos, ethos and logos. *Pathos* appeals to the emotions and seeks to persuade by swinging the emotions of the audience behind the proposition which the speaker supports.¹⁰ *Ethos* focuses on the moral character of the speaker and seeks to impart confidence in his judgment to the audience.¹¹ Aristotle believed this to be the most effective means of persuasion.¹² *Logos* centres on presenting a logical case for the proposition which the speaker supports.¹³ This can be deductive logic, by the use of enthymemes, which are statements with a supporting reason or reasons, a kind of abbreviated syllogism.¹⁴ It can also be inductive logic, using examples and then arguing from the particular to the general.¹⁵ Aristotle regarded enthymemes as superior to examples, stating that enthymemes should first be stated in establishing a point and only then examples.¹⁶ The three forms of internal proof were later linked by Cicero to the three duties of an orator: to move (pathos), to please (ethos) and to teach (logos).¹⁷

Also under the heading of 'invention' is *the question of the various species or genres of rhetoric*. Aristotle's division into three classes has been highly influential throughout the history of rhetoric down to the present day. This division results from asking two questions about the speech.¹⁸ First, what kind of audience is being addressed? Are the audience there as judges or spectators? Second, if audiences are judges, are they being asked to make a decision about the past or the future?

Judicial (or *forensic*) rhetoric belongs to a context where the audiences are judges making a judgment about past events. Its normal context is the law court and the question it addresses is the just or the unjust.¹⁹ The positive form of judicial rhetoric is prosecution, and its negative counterpart, defence. *Deliberative* rhetoric also treats the audience as judging, but this time about a future course of action. This means its context is the assembly and the question upon which it focuses, the expedient or the harmful.²⁰ Its positive form is exhortation and the negative counterpart, dissuasion. *Epideictic* rhetoric, by contrast with the others, treats the audience as a spectator: it is not explicitly required to make a judgment about past or future actions.²¹ Its context is often ceremonial and its end is praise or blame, such as in a funeral oration. The question upon which epideictic focuses, in Aristotle's system, is the honourable and the disgraceful, but usually with the hidden agenda of persuading the audience to hold or reaffirm the values being approved in the speech. The positive form of epideictic is encomium and its negative expression is invective.

There is, naturally, some overlap of these categories. Aristotle was teaching students, and, in teaching, a certain amount of oversimplification is almost inevitable. This is evidenced by Aristotle's observation that praise and blame, the key characteristics of epideictic, may be used in judicial and deliberative discourse too.²² Aristotle also allows that there are 'proofs common to all branches of rhetoric',²³ again demonstrating that the categories overlap.

Finally, under the heading of 'invention' also come the various 'topics' (often called *topoi*). These are the 'headings' that will be used in arguing a case. Aristotle believed that there were *topoi* peculiar to the three rhetorical genres, as well as those common to all three species.²⁴ *Topoi* are lined to the *stasis*, or question at issue, whether a question of fact, of definition, of quality, or of jurisdiction. Aristotle includes a considerable discussion of the various *topoi* that might be utilized in a speech, and wrote another treatise, *Topics*, on this subject.

Aristotle's second component of rhetoric, *arrangement*, is the composition of the parts of a discourse into an effective (that is, persuasive) whole. By contrast with more elaborate schemes developed later, Aristotle argues that a speech needs no more than four parts.²⁵ The most important are the central two, the statement of the case and the proof (which includes any refutation of another view). Before the statement of case comes the exordium, which seeks to obtain the goodwill and the ear of the audience. After the proof comes the epilogue, which seeks to dispose the audience favourably towards oneself and unfavourably towards the adversary, amplifies and depreciates, recapitulates, and appeals to the emotions of the audience. Aristotle favoured brief conclusions, offering a four-word one of his own: *εἰρήκα, ἀκῆκοατε, ἐχete, κρίνατε* (= 'I have spoken; you have heard; you have [the facts]; now decide').²⁶

Aristotle's third division of rhetoric is *style*, which concerns the choice of words and their arrangement into sentences. This subdivides into two areas: diction, the choice of words (including the use of metaphor), and synthesis, the study of composition. Aristotle gives much of Book 3 of *The 'Art' of Rhetoric* to style, arguing that the key virtues to be sought in style are propriety (that is, matching the style to the content) and perspicuity.²⁷ Later writers were to analyse three styles, each linked to one of the three aims of rhetoric: the plain, used to teach; the grand, characterized by abruptness, used to move; and the middle, characterized by smoothness, used to please.²⁸

The key to preparation for delivery was *memorization*, Aristotle's fourth component of rhetoric, for orators in antiquity spoke without a written text. In this sphere Aristotle has little to say and it was left to later writers to develop systems for memorization, such as in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (3.28-40).²⁹

Delivery formed the final part of classical rhetoric and Aristotle's words on this topic indicate that he believed it to be neglected.³⁰ Aristotle saw the need for variation of volume, pitch and rhythm and argued that the proper use of these was highly influential and persuasive. He evidences some distaste for such devices, but states that 'it is of great importance owing to the corruption of the hearer'.³¹

Kennedy's model of rhetorical criticism

Kennedy takes the credit for being the first in the modern period to have systematized rhetorical criticism, his system often being cited as the method a particular scholar adopts for analysing a text.³² This approach involves five steps.

The first step involves a process parallel to that of form criticism, namely *identifying the rhetorical unit* or delimiting the unit for study.³³ A rhetorical unit is a persuasive or convincing unit and has a beginning, a middle and an end. Therefore, identifying a rhetorical unit is not the same process as form criticism, because rhetorical units can be larger or smaller. The smallest rhetorical units include parables and metaphors, simple sayings, blessings, hymns and brief commandments. The next size grouping are combinations of smaller units, such as (from the NT) the Sermon on the Mount (Mt. 5-7), the 'Little Apocalypse' (Mk. 13), and Paul's 'Fool's Speech' (2 Cor. 11). Finally, there is the largest rhetorical unit, the text as a whole, both a given document or a collection of documents, such as the letters of Paul or the whole NT canon.

The second step is to *define the rhetorical situation of the unit*. Kennedy refers to Bitzer's seminal article on 'rhetorical situation', which defines this idea.³⁴ Bitzer understands the rhetorical situation to be the 'specific condition or situation which invites utterance'.³⁵ He argues that rhetoric is a method of altering reality through discourse and its results. Within such a line of thought, scholars speak of an 'exigence', by which they mean that situation or condition which calls forth discourse in order to affect it. The exigence(s) of a discourse may include people, events, objects and the interrelationships they all have. Aristotle regarded the audience as very important to the nature of the speech delivered, offering advice on how to speak to different age groups and people from different wealth and power brackets.³⁶ The speaker may face hostility from the audience and need to overcome it, especially in the exordium and the epilogue. Equally, there may be a central *stasis* or point at issue. The shaping of the discourse will clearly be influenced by the response that is being sought from the audience,

according to which of the three rhetorical genres is being employed.

Thirdly, the rhetorical critic must *analyse the arrangement of the discourse*.³⁷ This step involves identifying the anatomy of the rhetorical unit under discussion, seeking the sub-divisions which exist. Often this process utilizes the classical division into exordium, statement, proof and epilogue, sometimes to the degree of identifying sub-sections of the four major parts.³⁸

Fourthly, it is important to *consider invention and style in each part of the discourse*.³⁹ This stage of rhetorical criticism involves line-by-line analysis of the rhetorical unit, seeking to unravel the argument and the devices used in developing that argument. Examination of the kinds of proofs offered will be important and the relative proportions of the three types of internal proofs, ethos, pathos and logos. Also vital will be a grasp of the figures of thought and speech used, as well as the specific lexical choices made by the author.

Having taken the unit apart, the final stage seeks to put it back together, in *reviewing the whole rhetorical unit's effectiveness*. This part of the process looks for its power in achieving its persuasive object. How far has the discourse met its rhetorical exigence appropriately? What implications does the discourse have for the speaker and the audience? At this final stage, Kennedy believes, the rhetorical whole will be seen as greater than the sum of its rhetorical parts.⁴⁰

Key marks of rhetorical criticism

At this point we may review five key marks of this discipline, having first noted that Kennedy's is not the only approach available. For example, Jewett and Johanson both use rhetorical approaches less indebted to the classical rhetorical handbooks and more informed by the 'New Rhetoric' in their work on 1 Thessalonians.⁴¹ Nevertheless, the marks to be enunciated seem to be common to a wide range of scholars working under the banner of 'rhetorical criticism'.

First, rhetorical criticism is a holistic approach to texts. It treats the form of the text as we have it as its subject, rather than some reconstructed earlier form of the text or part of the text. Thus, even when a part of a Pauline letter is analysed, as can be profitably done, the concerns are not so much *archaeological*, as we might say, focusing on the pre-history of the text and how it got into its present form, but rather *teleological*, focusing on the communicative and persuasive power of the text as we have it towards its end, and the contribution which the particular section being considered makes to that power.

Second, rhetorical criticism focuses on argumentation and persuasion. It works with the assumption that the reason for speaking or writing is to persuade. This can be persuasion to continue in a particular direction, to alter the direction, or to remain static: persuasion takes many forms. Rhetorical criticism utilizes technical discussions of rhetoric as being relevant to the process of communication and persuasion in which the NT documents engage. This need not imply that Paul (for example) had a formal rhetorical training, but simply that the world in which he lived was so imbued with rhetoric that it would be inescapable. (We shall discuss this point further in responding to criticisms of using ancient rhetorical handbooks in analysing the Pauline corpus.)

Third, rhetorical criticism treats the author's perspective as important, for it seeks the persuasive effect that the author was trying to achieve. There has been considerable discussion in recent years of the 'intentional fallacy', noticing that the only access we have to the mind of an author is through the text we read. Rhetorical criticism seeks to use the conventions of rhetoric to provide a certain objectivity in accessing the author's mind as accurately as it is possible to do at 2,000 years' distance.

Fourth, rhetorical criticism is a parallel, but not identical, discipline to form criticism. It is interesting that some of the roots of the modern discipline are in form criticism, notably in OT studies.⁴² The growth of rhetorical criticism stemmed, at least in part, from the attempt to provide more culturally relevant 'forms' by considering how argumentation happened in the ancient world. Equally, it stepped beyond form criticism in asking what the author was trying to *achieve* through the text,

rather than simply asking how the text was put together. Form criticism can tend to universalize the sections of texts which it isolates, notably in study of the Gospels, whereas rhetorical criticism particularizes them: it asks what purpose a unit has in *this particular* act of communication.

Fifth, the view of the majority of practitioners of rhetorical criticism is that it provides *an* interpretative key to texts, but not *the* interpretative key. In other words, it yields its most useful results when used in conjunction with other approaches, as is evidenced by the work of Jewett and Johanson on 1 Thessalonians, both of whom use rhetorical criticism in combination with another approach, Jewett using social-scientific perspectives and Johanson linguistic ones.⁴³

The legitimacy of rhetorical criticism

Since the advent of Betz and Kennedy's work there have been considerable criticisms offered of the use of ancient rhetorical categories as tools for analysing NT texts. In what follows, we shall confine our discussion to the Pauline letters and notice, first, arguments in favour of such an approach and then arguments to the contrary.

Arguments in favour

Quite often scholars propounding a rhetorical critical approach simply state that Paul's world was a world in which rhetorical training formed higher education, a world which was pervaded by knowledge of the conventions of rhetoric. Accordingly, it is argued, Paul had to use rhetorical conventions, at least to some extent, in order to communicate at all.⁴⁴ Thus Judge points to the Talmud's statement that half of Gamaliel's 1,000 pupils were trained in the wisdom of the Greeks.⁴⁵ Further, Judge observes, Paul held the Alexandrian rhetorician Apollos in high regard – a man described as *aner logios* (Acts 18:24), using the same phrase as is found in the tribute of Augustus to Cicero as an orator.⁴⁶ Paul did not disdain Apollos's oratorical powers, but valued his ministry. Judge concludes:

Whatever the circumstances of his upbringing and education, it is beyond doubt that Paul was, in practice at least, familiar with the rhetorical fashions of the time.⁴⁷

The pervasiveness of Hellenism by the first century AD is further noted by Mack and Fairweather as relevant to this discussion, for it was an important part of Hellenism to teach rhetoric.⁴⁸ Fairweather points to the books of Maccabees to illustrate the breadth of Hellenistic influence on Jewish literature. She goes on to point to the use of technical terms from rhetoric in the Pauline corpus, listing *makarismos* (Gal. 4:15; Rom. 4:6,9), *allegoroumena* (Gal. 4:24) and *metaschemetizein* (1 Cor. 4:6).⁴⁹ She suggests that the use of the latter, in particular, implies that Paul's grasp of classical rhetorical techniques was both extensive and advanced.

Classen, on the other hand, argues that Paul's Jewish background suggests a knowledge of rhetorical techniques, on the basis that the OT displays 'rhetorical qualities'.⁵⁰

A number of scholars comment on the danger of an over-sharp distinction between written and oral delivery. One criticism that is often cited (and which we will note below) of the application of classical rhetorical theory to the biblical documents is that the conventions of classical rhetoric were for speeches, not for written letters. Two significant points are noteworthy in this connection.

First, there is a considerable overlap of speech and letter as means of communication. Aune observes that *epistole* first referred to an oral communication sent through a messenger.⁵¹ In both oral and written messages, the etiquette was to have an opening greeting and a closing. Accordingly, on the basis of the pervasiveness of rhetoric in antiquity, Aune concludes that the conventions of rhetoric are important for understanding ancient letters.

Second, we need to observe that written communications had a quality of orality because reading aloud was the norm in antiquity.⁵² This observation is made the more important by the very nature of Paul's letters which were designed precisely to be read aloud to the Christian community when that body met together. Botha cites Hester on Paul's style, which he regards as being 'as much oral as it is written. *It is as though Paul wrote*

speeches'.⁵³ Three further points made by Botha develop this idea.

Because the letter was designed to be read aloud, and because literacy was not highly prized in ancient education (one could be considered to be highly educated but barely able to read), the likelihood is that very few of the recipients of Paul's letters ever read the text themselves. Botha comments:

They did not experience it [the letter] as knowledge that could be arranged, ordered and easily represented in diagrammatic or tabular form.⁵⁴

Further, Paul's letters functioned in place of his physical presence. He was not able, for one reason or another, to visit personally, and therefore he wrote letters. They were a major means of exercising his apostolic authority within the communities.⁵⁵

Finally, Botha draws attention to the mail system of the first century. Paul's method of sending a letter required the sending of a messenger to bear the letter:

[Paul] sent a hand-written, corrected, but not without errors, ambiguous, damaged, travel-worn manuscript with someone he trusted, to have that one, or someone else, present his intentions and symbols verbally and bodily to others. What we are looking for is the 'objective' argument, the 'line of thought', the 'flow' of the argument, which can be represented in spatial lines, diagrammatically on paper. What we *should* be looking for is an emotional, subjective, playing-up-to-the-audience human being, making meaning present and evoking authority.⁵⁶

Botha proposes that Paul would have 'coached' the bearer of the letter, who would likely be the reader of the letter also. Even if not, the high likelihood is that the bearer of the letter would be questioned about Paul's meaning, both of what he had written in the letter and filling in the gaps in the letter. Botha therefore suggests that Paul would have prepared the bearer of the letter for this either as he dictated the letter or before sending the bearer off.⁵⁷ This briefing might well have included explanation by Paul of the major points to emphasize in delivery, and some anticipation of questions that might be asked.

These points add up to a substantial case for utilizing the categories of classical rhetoric as at least influential on Paul's composition of his letters. What criticisms have been offered of such a process?

Arguments against

Some scholars suggest that it is mistaken to analyse the Pauline letters using the categories of classical rhetoric regarding speeches, but rather that handbooks on letter-writing should be used.⁵⁸ Classen claims that rhetoric and epistolography were distinct disciplines in ancient times.

However, this needs considerable qualification. We have already suggested that this distinction is by no means as hard and fast as such scholars propose. Moreover, Aristotle discusses written communication in *The 'Art' of Rhetoric* (3.5), which again suggests that the boundary between written and oral communication was seen as porous. This observation applies to Porter's caricature of Kennedy, whom he characterizes as believing that the Pauline letters are 'essentially speeches, almost incidentally with epistolary openings and closings attached'.⁵⁹ Porter goes on to argue that there is a lack of evidence that the rhetorical handbooks were written with the intention of teaching the analysis of speeches or written documents.⁶⁰ Accordingly, he argues, the only legitimate use of rhetorical criticism is in the analysis of style.⁶¹ But this seems to overlook the fact that the handbooks were designed to teach students of rhetoric. When analysis was done, the tools used would be those which the students had been taught as the basis of rhetoric, that is, those found in the handbooks. The handbooks, in other words, were elementary documents, not advanced (we might say, postgraduate) works.

A considerable danger, identified by Aune, Johanson and Reed, is that of treating the three rhetorical genres as exclusive.⁶² Aune points to the 'mixed' genre of letter in Pseudo-Libanius. Johanson and Reed criticize Kennedy for the assumption that a letter must have one and only one rhetorical genre. Equally, Johanson criticizes Kennedy's assumption (used by Wanamaker

in his analysis of the Thessalonian letters)⁶³ that the three rhetorical genres are universalizable, that is, that all speech and writing can be categorized into one or other of the three genres.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of classical rhetoric in the first century suggests that it is to the three classical rhetorical genres that we ought first to look in analysing a document, whilst maintaining an openness to the possibility that we may meet something which has a 'mixed' form or which does not fit any of the three classical genres exactly.

Some scholars criticize rhetorical critics for an assumption which none seem to hold, namely that Paul must have had formal rhetorical training.⁶⁵ As Classen observes, there are four possible sources for elements or features known to us from the classical handbooks: conscious use of rhetorical theory; conscious imitation of written or spoken practice; unconscious borrowing from the practice of others; and a natural gift for effective speaking or writing.⁶⁶ But this does not preclude the use of the handbooks as means for analysing ancient material, for the handbooks show us the accepted conventions of the time.

The most significant criticism of rhetorical criticism's approach is to observe that Paul himself seems to disavow the use of rhetoric in 1 Corinthians 1–3. Interestingly, Kennedy himself appears to accept this criticism and draws a distinction in his later work between 'radical Christian rhetoric', which simply proclaims the word of the Lord with no use of argumentation, in the manner of the OT prophets, and the use of classical rhetorical techniques by early Christian writers.⁶⁷ However, as Levison points out, this distinction is unclear or at least not clearly defined by Kennedy. Levison goes on to point out the tradition in Judaism of the Spirit as 'artificer', that is, the Spirit as equipping the wise person to be persuasive in speech, as well as the existence of the 'radical' tradition of the Spirit simply 'overcoming' the speaker.⁶⁸ He also observes the irony that Paul, in appearing to disparage rhetoric, uses rhetorical devices in 1 Corinthians 1–2.⁶⁹ Paul, he argues, offers 'a studied and prepared display of rhetorical ability'.⁷⁰ The truth emerges more fully, Levison argues, in 1 Thessalonians 1:5, where 'eloquence and the Spirit complement each other'.⁷¹ In this less polemical context Paul's view is that his preaching is a combination of rhetoric and the Spirit, similar to the 'Spirit as artificer' view found in Judaism. 1 Corinthians 1–3 should be seen as in part ironical, in that Paul rejects rhetoric whilst showing himself to be capable of using the skills of a rhetor.

Finally on 1 Corinthians 1–3, we may note Winter's argument that what Paul is rejecting in 1 Corinthians 1–3 is *sophistic* rhetoric, the rhetoric of the *virtuoso rhetors*.⁷² This opens the way for a reading of 1 Corinthians 1–3 which allows for Paul's use of rhetorical techniques and structures, whilst acknowledging that he wanted the *content* of his message to be determinative for its *presentation*.

Conclusion

Rhetorical criticism is back to stay, and will certainly continue to be of importance in NT studies. The contribution already made by rhetorical criticism suggests that it needs to be recognized as a further tool in the tool-box of NT scholars, not least because it seeks to interpret the documents against a pervasive perspective of antiquity: the art of rhetoric.⁷⁴

⁶³James Muilenburg, 'Form Criticism and Beyond', *Journal of Biblical Literature* 88 (1969), 1–18.

⁶⁴Hans Dieter Betz, 'The Literary Composition and Function of Paul's Letters to the Galatians', *New Testament Studies* XXI (1975), 353–379; *idem*, *Galatians: A commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979).

⁶⁵George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); *idem*, *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984).

⁶⁶Janet Fairweather, 'The Epistle to the Galatians and Classical Rhetoric: Parts 1 & 2', *Tyndale Bulletin* 45 (1994), 1–38 (the discussion of Chrysostom is 2–22).

⁶⁷Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, p. 11.

⁶⁸C. Joachim Classen, 'St Paul's Epistles and Ancient Greek and Roman Rhetoric', in Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht (eds), *Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), pp. 265–291.

⁶⁹Aristotle, *The 'Art' of Rhetoric*, 1.2.1. References to *The 'Art' of Rhetoric* are to the Loeb Classical Library edition, edited by J. H. Freese (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard UP/Heinemann, 1926).

⁷⁰For this distinction, see Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric*, pp. 16–17.

⁷¹Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.2.4.

⁷²Johanson cites 1 Thes. 1:6 as a Pauline example, in which Paul seeks to strengthen the authors–addressees relationship by linking the imitation of the Lord with the imitation of the authors, in Bruce C. Johanson, *To All the Brethren: A Text-Linguistic and Rhetorical Approach to 1 Thessalonians* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), p. 84; cf. Thomas H. Olbricht, 'An Aristotelian Rhetorical Analysis of 1 Thessalonians', in David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson and Wayne A. Meeks (eds.), *Greeks, Romans and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), p. 230.

⁷³Johanson offers 1 Thes. 1:4–5 as an example, in which the testimony of the Spirit alongside that of the authors indicates that their ethos is approved by God, thus reinforcing their genuineness (*To All the Brethren*, p. 84; cf. Olbricht, 'An Aristotelian Rhetorical Analysis', pp. 228–230).

⁷⁴Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.2.4.

⁷⁵Johanson sees 1 Thes. 3:3–4 as a 'quasi-logical' appeal to the fulfilment of the authors' prophecy of suffering (*To All the Brethren*, p. 105; cf. Olbricht, 'An Aristotelian Rhetorical Analysis'), pp. 230–232).

⁷⁶Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.22.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 2.20.2–9.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 2.20.9.

⁷⁹Cicero, *Orator* 69, cited by Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, p. 18.

⁸⁰Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.3.1–3.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, 1.3.5; 1.10–14.

⁸²*Ibid.*, 1.3.5; 1.4–8.

⁸³*Ibid.*, 1.9. See J. Richard Chase, 'The Classical Conception of Epideictic', *Quarterly Journal of Speech* XLVII (1961), 293–300, and Theodore Chalon Burgess, *Epideictic Literature* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902) for a fuller account of epideictic in antiquity, and Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* (Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), pp. 47–51, for a contemporary perspective from within an Aristotelian tradition.

⁸⁴Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.9.40–41.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, 2.20.1.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 2.19.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 3.13.4.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 3.19.6.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 3.2.1–2.

⁹⁰Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, p. 25, cites Cicero, *Orator*, and Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, Book 4, as examples of such categorization.

⁹¹Discussed in Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric*, p. 98.

⁹²Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.1.3–7.

⁹³*Ibid.*, 3.1.5.

⁹⁴E.g. C. Clifton Black II, 'Rhetorical Criticism and Biblical Interpretation', *Expository Times* C (1988–89), 252–258; Wilhelm Wuellner, 'Where is Rhetorical Criticism Taking Us?', *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 49 (1987), 455–459.

⁹⁵Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, pp. 33–34; cf. Wuellner, 'Where is Rhetorical Criticism Taking Us?', 455.

⁹⁶Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, pp. 34–37; Lloyd F. Bitzer, 'The Rhetorical Situation', in Walter R. Fisher (ed.), *Rhetoric: A Tradition in Transition. In Honor of Donald C. Bryant* (Ann Arbor: Michigan State University Press, 1974), pp. 247–260.

⁹⁷Bitzer, 'The Rhetorical Situation', p. 250.

⁹⁸Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.12–17.

⁹⁹Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, pp. 23–25.

¹⁰⁰See, e.g., the sub-divisions of 1 Thessalonians produced by various rhetorical analyses in the chart in Robert Jewett, *The Thessalonian Correspondence: Pauline Rhetoric and Millenarian Piety* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), p. 221.

¹⁰¹Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, pp. 25–30, 37–38.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹⁰³Jewett, *The Thessalonian Correspondence*; Johanson, *To All the Brethren*.

¹⁰⁴E.g. Muilenburg, 'Form Criticism and Beyond'.

¹⁰⁵Jewett, *The Thessalonian Correspondence*; Johanson, *To All the Brethren*.

¹⁰⁶For this argument, see Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, pp. 9–10.

¹⁰⁷Edwin A. Judge, 'Paul's Boasting in Relation to Contemporary Professional Practice', *Australian Biblical Review* XVI (1968), 40.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, 40, citing Plutarch, *Cicero* 49.5, in which Caesar says to one of his daughter's sons, regarding Cicero: *Logios anēr, ō pai, logios kai philopatris* (= 'A learned man, my child, a learned man and a lover of his country').

¹⁰⁹Judge, 'Paul's Boasting', 41.

¹¹⁰Burton L. Mack, *Rhetoric and the New Testament* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), p. 31; Fairweather, 'The Epistle to the Galatians', 24–25.

¹¹¹Fairweather, 'The Epistle to the Galatians', 33–36.

¹¹²Classen, 'St Paul's Epistles', p. 269. He also draws attention to Paul's writing Greek 'effectively', which, he suggests, means that Paul must have read a great deal in Greek and therefore assimilated rhetoric from others, albeit at second hand.

¹¹³He cites Herodotus 4.10.1 and Thucydides 7.11.1 in David E. Aune, *The New Testament in its Literary Environment* (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1988), p. 158.

⁵³We may think, in the NT, of the Ethiopian eunuch as an example (Acts 8:28–30). Bruce observes, 'Readers in antiquity almost invariably read aloud; the reason is apparent to anyone who tries to read an ancient MS, where the writing has to be spelled out syllable by syllable' (F.F. Bruce, *The Acts of the Apostles*, Leicester: Apollos, 1990, p. 226); cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.5.6: 'Generally speaking, that which is written should be easy to read or easy to utter, *which is the same thing [esti de to auto]*' (italics mine). This question has been debated at length this century. J. Balogh, '“Voces Paginarum”: Beiträge zur Geschichte des lauten Lesens und Schreibens', *Philologus* 82 (1927), 84–109, 202–240; G.L. Hendrickson, 'Ancient Reading', *Classical Journal* 25 (1929), 182–196; and W.P. Clark, 'Ancient Reading', *Classical Journal* 26 (1931), 698–700, argued that silent reading was virtually unknown in antiquity. Subsequently evidence that silent reading, although unusual, was known, was presented by Bernard M.W. Knox, 'Silent Reading in Antiquity', *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 9 (1968), 421–435; and Frank D. Gilliard, 'More Silent Reading in Antiquity: *Non Omne Verbum Sonabat*', *Journal of Biblical Literature* 112 (1993), 689–696. The consensus view, that silent reading, though occasionally known, was unusual, is represented by Paul J. Achtemeier, 'Omne Verbum Sonat: The New Testament and the Oral Environment of Late Western Antiquity', *Journal of Biblical Literature* 109 (1990), 3–27; Paul Saenger, 'Silent Reading: Its Impact on Late Medieval Script and Society', *Viator* 13 (1982), 367–414; Michael Slusser, 'Reading Silently in Antiquity', *Journal of Biblical Literature* 111 (1992), 499; W.B. Stanford, *The Sound of Greek: Studies in the Greek Theory and Practice of Euphony* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Jesper Svenbro, *Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); *idem*, 'The "Interior" Voice: On the Invention of Silent Reading', in John J. Winkler and Froma I. Zeitlin (eds), *Nothing to Do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in its Social Context* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 366–384. Achtemeier, in particular, draws attention to the implications of the oral environment of late western antiquity for the way that the NT documents are read, along similar lines to those argued in this paper.

⁵⁴Hester, quoted in Pieter J.J. Botha, 'The Verbal Art of the Pauline Letters: Rhetoric, Performance and Presence', in Porter and Olbricht (eds), *Rhetoric and the New Testament*, p. 409 (italics mine).

⁵⁵Botha, 'The Verbal Art', p. 413.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 420.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 413.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 417, 418, 419.

⁵⁹Abraham J. Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988); Classen, 'St Paul's Epistles', p. 288.

⁶⁰Stanley E. Porter, 'The Theoretical Justification for Application of Rhetorical Categories to Pauline Epistolary Literature', in Porter and Olbricht (eds), *Rhetoric and the New Testament*, pp. 101–102.

⁶¹Porter, 'The Theoretical Justification', p. 105.

⁶²*Ibid.*, pp. 111–116.

⁶³Aune, *The New Testament in its Literary Environment*, p. 203; Johanson, *To All the Brethren*, p. 39; Jeffrey T. Reed, 'Using Ancient Rhetorical Categories to Interpret Paul's Letters: A Question of Genre', in Porter and Olbricht (eds), *Rhetoric and the New Testament*, pp. 292–324 (esp. 299–309, 314, 322).

⁶⁴Charles A. Wanamaker, *The Epistles to the Thessalonians* (Grand Rapids/Exeter: Eerdmans/Pattemoster, 1990), p. 46.

⁶⁵There are three species of rhetoric . . . judicial, deliberative, and epideictic. Although these categories specifically refer to the circumstances of classical civic oratory, they are in fact applicable to all discourse.' (Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, p. 19, italics mine).

⁶⁶Porter, 'The Theoretical Justification', p. 105.

⁶⁷Classen, 'St Paul's Epistles', pp. 268–269.

⁶⁸See the helpful analysis of this development in Kennedy's thought in John R. Levison, 'Did the Spirit Inspire Rhetoric? An Exploration of George Kennedy's Definition of Early Christian Rhetoric', in Duane F. Watson (ed.), *Persuasive Artistry: Studies in New Testament Rhetoric in Honor of George A. Kennedy* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), pp. 25–40 (esp. 25–28).

⁶⁹Levison, 'Did the Spirit Inspire Rhetoric?', pp. 28–34.

⁷⁰He lists antithesis (1:17), anaphora and litotes (1:26), antistrophe (1:26–28), accumulation (2:1–5), the use of enthymemes (2:10), and the use of an ethos appeal, since Paul's authority is here at stake (*ibid.*, p. 36).

⁷¹*Ibid.*, p. 37 (italics his).

⁷²*Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁷³Bruce W. Winter, 'Entries and Ethics of the Orators and Paul (1 Thessalonians 2:1–12)', *Tyndale Bulletin* 44 (1993), 55–74 (esp. 68–70).

⁷⁴I have applied some of the insights of rhetorical criticism to 1 Thessalonians in my article 'What Does Aristotle Have to Do with Paul? Rhetorical Criticism and 1 Thessalonians', *Tyndale Bulletin* 46.2 (1995).

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Why We Need the Puritans

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Professor Packer has just retired from his Chair at Regent College, Vancouver. This article, which we could have retitled 'Why Theological Students Need the Puritans', is taken, practically without revision, from Among God's Giants, copyright © J.I. Packer 1991. Used by permission of Kingsway Communications Ltd, Lottbridge Drove, Eastbourne BN23 6NT.

Introducing the Puritans

Horse racing is said to be the sport of kings. The sport of slinging mud has, however, a wider following. Pillorying the Puritans, in particular, has long been a popular pastime both sides of the Atlantic, and most people's image of Puritanism still has on it much disfiguring dirt that needs to be scraped off.

'Puritan' as a name was, in fact, mud from the start. Coined in the early 1560s, it was always a satirical smear word implying peevishness, censoriousness, conceit, and a measure of hypocrisy, over and above its basic implication of religiously motivated discontent with what was seen as Elizabeth's Laodicean and compromising Church of England. Later, the word gained the further, political connotation of being against the Stuart monarchy and for some sort of republicanism; its primary reference, however, was still to what was seen as an odd, furious, and ugly form of Protestant religion.

In England, anti-Puritan feeling was let loose at the time of the Restoration and has flowed freely ever since. In North America it built up slowly after the days of Jonathan Edwards to reach its zenith a hundred years ago in post-Puritan New England. For the past half-century, however, scholars have been meticulously wiping away the mud, and as Michelangelo's frescoes in the Sistine Chapel have unfamiliar colours today now that restorers have removed the dark varnish, so the conventional image of the Puritans has been radically revamped, at least for those in the know. (Knowledge, alas, travels slowly in some quarters.) Taught by Perry Miller, William Haller, Marshall Knappen, Percy Scholes, Edmund Morgan, and a host of more recent researchers, informed folk now acknowledge that the typical Puritans were not wild men, fierce and freaky, religious fanatics and social extremists, but sober, conscientious, and cultured citizens: persons of principle, devoted, determined, and disciplined, excelling in the domestic virtues, and with no obvious shortcomings save a tendency to run to words when saying anything important, whether to God or to man. At last the record has been put straight.

But even so, the suggestion that we need the Puritans – we late twentieth-century Westerners, with all our sophistication and mastery of technique in both secular and sacred fields – may prompt some lifting of eyebrows. The belief that the Puritans, even if they were in fact responsible citizens, were comic and pathetic in equal degree, being naive and superstitious, primitive and gullible, superserious, overscrupulous, majoring in minors, and unable or unwilling to relax, dies hard. What could these zealots give us that we need, it is asked.

The answer, in one word, is maturity. Maturity is a compound of wisdom, goodwill, resilience, and creativity. The Puritans exemplified maturity; we don't. We are spiritual dwarfs. A much-travelled leader, a Native American (be it said), has declared that he finds North American Protestantism, man-centred, manipulative, success-oriented, self-indulgent and sentimental, as it blatantly is, to be 3,000 miles wide and half an inch deep. The Puritans, by contrast, as a body were giants. They were great souls serving a great God. In them clear-headed passion and warm-hearted compassion combined. Visionary and practical, idealistic and realistic too, goal-oriented and methodical, they were great believers, great hoppers, great doers, and great sufferers. But their sufferings, both sides of the ocean (in old England from the authorities and in New England from the elements), seasoned and ripened them till they gained a stature that was nothing short of heroic. Ease and luxury, such as our affluence brings us today, do not make for maturity; hardship and struggle however do, and the Puritans' battles against the evangelical and climatic wilderness in which God set them produced a virility of character, undaunted and unsinkable, rising above discouragement and fears, for which the true precedents and models are men like Moses, and Nehemiah, and Peter after Pentecost, and the apostle Paul.

Spiritual warfare made the Puritans what they were. They accepted conflict as their calling, seeing themselves as their Lord's soldier-pilgrims, just as in Bunyan's allegory, and not expecting to be able to advance a single step without opposition of one sort or another. Wrote John Geree, in his tract *The Character of an Old English Puritane or Nonconformist* (1646): 'His whole life he accounted a warfare, wherein Christ was his captain, his arms, prayers and tears. The Crosse his Banner and his word [motto] *Vincit qui patitur* [he who suffers conquers].'

The Puritans lost, more or less, every public battle that they fought. Those who stayed in England did not change the

Church of England as they hoped to do, nor did they revive more than a minority of its adherents, and eventually they were driven out of Anglicanism by calculated pressure on their consciences. Those who crossed the Atlantic failed to establish new Jerusalem in New England; for the first 50 years their little colonies barely survived. They hung on by the skin of their teeth. But the moral and spiritual victories that the Puritans won by keeping sweet, peaceful, patient, obedient, and hopeful under sustained and seemingly intolerable pressures and frustrations give them a place of high honour in the believers' hall of fame, where Hebrews 11 is the first gallery. It was out of this constant furnace-experience that their maturity was wrought and their wisdom concerning discipleship was refined. George Whitefield, the evangelist, wrote of them as follows:

Ministers never write or preach so well as when under the cross; the Spirit of Christ and of glory then rests upon them. It was this, no doubt, that made the Puritans . . . such burning and shining lights. When cast out by the black Bartholomew-act [the 1662 Act of Uniformity] and driven from their respective charges to preach in barns and fields, in the highways and hedges, they in an especial manner wrote and preached as men having authority. Though dead, by their writings they yet speak; a peculiar unction attends them to this very hour. . . .²

Those words come from a preface to a reprint of Bunyan's works that appeared in 1767; but the unction continues, the authority is still felt, and the mature wisdom still remains breathtaking, as all modern Puritan-readers soon discover for themselves. Through the legacy of this literature the Puritans can help us today towards the maturity that they knew, and that we need.

Six lessons

In what ways can they do this? Let me suggest some specifics. First, there are lessons for us in *the integration of their daily lives*. As their Christianity was all-embracing, so their living was all of a piece. Nowadays we would call their lifestyle holistic: all awareness, activity, and enjoyment, all 'use of the creatures' and development of personal powers and creativity, was integrated in the single purpose of honouring God by appreciating all his gifts and making everything 'holiness to the Lord'. There was for them no disjunction between sacred and secular; all creation, so far as they were concerned, was sacred, and all activities, of whatever kind, must be sanctified, that is, done to the glory of God. So, in their heavenly-minded ardour, the Puritans became men and women of order, matter-of-fact and down-to-earth, prayerful, purposeful, practical. Seeing life whole, they integrated contemplation with action, worship with work, labour with rest, love of God with love of neighbour and of self, personal with social identity, and the wide spectrum of relational responsibilities with each other, in a thoroughly conscientious and thought-out way. In this thoroughness they were extreme, that is to say far more thorough than we are, but in their blending of the whole wide range of Christian duties set forth in Scripture they were eminently balanced. They lived by 'method' (we would say, by a rule of life), planning and proportioning their time with care, not so much to keep bad things out as to make sure that they got all good and important things in – necessary wisdom, then as now, for busy people! We today, who tend to live unplanned lives at random in a series of non-communicating compartments and who hence feel swamped and distracted most of the time, could learn much from the Puritans at this point.

Second, there are lessons for us in *the quality of their spiritual experience*. In the Puritans' communion with God, as Jesus Christ was central, so Holy Scripture was supreme. By Scripture, as God's word of instruction about divine-human relationships, they sought to live, and here, too, they were conscientiously methodical. Knowing themselves to be creatures of thought, affection, and will, and knowing that God's way to the human heart (the will) is via the human head (the mind), the Puritans practised meditation, discursive and systematic, on the whole range of biblical truth as they saw it applying to themselves. Puritan meditation on Scripture was modelled on the Puritan sermon; in meditation the Puritan would seek to search and challenge his heart, stir his affections to hate sin and love righteousness, and encourage himself with God's promises, just as Puritan preachers would do from the pulpit. This rational, resolute, passionate piety was conscientious without becoming

obsessive, law-oriented without lapsing into legalism, and expressive of Christian liberty without any shameful lurches into licence. The Puritans knew that Scripture is the unalterable rule of holiness, and never allowed themselves to forget it. Knowing also the dishonesty and deceitfulness of fallen human hearts, they cultivated humility and self-suspicion as abiding attitudes, and examined themselves regularly for spiritual blind spots and lurking inward evils. They may not be called morbid or introspective on this account, however; on the contrary, they found the discipline of self-examination by Scripture (not the same thing as introspection, let us note), followed by the discipline of confessing and forsaking sin and renewing one's gratitude to Christ for his pardoning mercy, to be a source of great inner peace and joy. We today, who know to our cost that we have unclear minds, uncontrolled affections, and unstable wills when it comes to serving God, and who again and again find ourselves being imposed on by irrational, emotional romanticism disguised as super-spirituality, could profit much from the Puritans' example at this point too.

Third, there are lessons for us in *their passion for effective action*. Though the Puritans, like the rest of the human race, had their dreams of what could and should be, they were decidedly not the kind of people that we would call 'dreamy'! They had no time for the idleness of the lazy or passive person who leaves it to others to change the world. They were men of action in the pure Reformed mould – crusading activists without a jot of self-reliance; workers for God who depended utterly on God to work in and through them, and who always gave God the praise for anything they did that in retrospect seemed to them to have been right; gifted men who prayed earnestly that God would enable them to use their powers, not for self-display, but for his praise. None of them wanted to be revolutionaries in church or state, though some of them reluctantly became such; all of them, however, longed to be effective change agents for God wherever shifts from sin to sanctity were called for. So Cromwell and his army made long, strong prayers before each battle, and preachers made long, strong prayers privately before ever venturing into the pulpit, and laymen made long, strong prayers before tackling any matter of importance (marriage, business deals, major purchases, or whatever). Today, however, Christians in the West are found to be on the whole passionless, passive, and, one fears, prayerless; cultivating an ethos which encloses personal piety in a pietistic cocoon, they leave public affairs to go their own way and neither expect nor for the most part seek influence beyond their own Christian circle. Where the Puritans prayed and laboured for a holy England and New England, sensing that where privilege is neglected and unfaithfulness reigns national judgment threatens, modern Christians gladly settle for conventional social respectability and, having done so, look no further. Surely it is obvious that at this point also the Puritans have a great deal to teach us.

Fourth, there are lessons for us in *their programme for family stability*. It is hardly too much to say that the Puritans created the Christian family in the English-speaking world. The Puritan ethic of marriage was to look not for a partner whom you *do* love passionately at this moment, but rather for one whom you *can* love steadily as your best friend for life, and then to proceed with God's help to do just that. The Puritan ethic of nurture was to train up children in the way they should go, to care for their bodies and souls together, and to educate them for sober, godly, socially useful adult living. The Puritan ethic of home life was based on maintaining order, courtesy, and family worship. Goodwill, patience, consistency, and an encouraging attitude were seen as the essential domestic virtues. In an age of routine discomforts, rudimentary medicine without pain-killers, frequent bereavements (most families lost at least as many children as they reared), an average life expectancy of just under 30 years, and economic hardship for almost all save merchant princes and landed gentry, family life was a school for character in every sense, and the fortitude with which Puritans resisted the all-too-familiar temptation to relieve pressure from the world by brutality at home, and laboured to honour God in their families despite all, merits supreme praise. At home the Puritans showed themselves (to use an overworked term) mature, accepting hardships and disappointments realistically as from God and refusing to be daunted or soured by any of them. Also, it was at home in the first instance that the Puritan layman practised evangelism and ministry. 'His family he endeavoured to make a Church,' wrote Geree, ' . . . labouring that those that were born in it, might be born again to God.'³ In

an era in which family life has become brittle even among Christians, with chicken-hearted spouses taking the easy course of separation rather than working at their relationship, and narcissistic parents spoiling their children materially while neglecting them spiritually, there is once more much to be learned from the Puritans' very different ways.

Fifth, there are lessons to be learned from their *sense of human worth*. Through believing in a great God (the God of Scripture, undiminished and undomesticated), they gained a vivid awareness of the greatness of moral issues, of eternity, and of the human soul. Hamlet's 'What a piece of work is man!' is a very Puritan sentiment; the wonder of human individuality was something that they felt keenly. Though, under the influence of their medieval heritage, which told them that error has no rights, they did not in every case manage to respect those who differed publicly from them, their appreciation of man's dignity as the creature made to be God's friend was strong, and so in particular was their sense of the beauty and nobility of human holiness. In the collectivized urban anthill where most of us live nowadays the sense of each individual's eternal significance is much eroded, and the Puritan spirit is at this point a corrective from which we can profit greatly.

Sixth, there are lessons to be learned from the Puritans' *ideal of church renewal*. To be sure, 'renewal' was not a word that they used; they spoke only of 'reformation' and 'reform', which words suggest to our twentieth-century minds a concern that is limited to the externals of the church's orthodoxy, order, worship forms and disciplinary code. But when the Puritans preached, published, and prayed for 'reformation' they had in mind, not indeed less than this, but far more. On the title page of the original edition of Richard Baxter's *The Reformed Pastor*, the word 'reformed' was printed in much larger type than any other, and one does not have to read far before discovering that for Baxter a 'reformed' pastor was not one who campaigned for Calvinism but one whose ministry to his people as preacher, teacher, catechist and role-model showed him to be, as we would say, 'revived' or 'renewed'. The essence of this kind of 'reformation' was enrichment of understanding of God's truth, arousal of affections God-ward, increase of ardour in one's devotions, and more love, joy, and firmness of Christian purpose in one's calling and personal life. In line with this, the ideal for the church was that through 'reformed' clergy all the members of each congregation should be 'reformed' – brought, that is, by God's grace without disorder into a state of what we would call revival, so as to be truly and thoroughly converted, theologically orthodox and sound, spiritually alert and expectant, in character terms wise and mature, ethically enterprising and obedient, and humbly but joyously sure of their salvation. This was the goal at which Puritan pastoral ministry aimed throughout, both in English parishes and in the 'gathered' churches of congregational type that multiplied in the mid-seventeenth century.

The Puritans' concern for spiritual awakening in communities is to some extent hidden from us by their institutionalism; recalling the upheavals of English Methodism and the Great Awakening, we think of revival ardour as always putting a strain on established order, whereas the Puritans envisaged 'reform' at congregational level coming in disciplined style through faithful preaching, catechising, and spiritual service on the pastor's part. Clericalism, with its damming up of lay initiative, was doubtless a Puritan limitation, and one which boomeranged when lay zeal finally boiled over in Cromwell's army, in Quakerism, and in the vast sectarian underworld of Commonwealth times; but the other side of that coin was the nobility of the pastor's profile that the Puritans evolved – gospel preacher and Bible teacher, shepherd and physician of souls, catechist and counsellor, trainer and disciplinarian, all in one. From the Puritans' ideals and goals for church life, which were unquestionably and abidingly right, and from their standards for clergy, which were challengingly and searchingly high, there is yet again a great deal that modern Christians can and should take to heart.

These are just a few of the most obvious areas in which the Puritans can help us in these days.

The Puritan dream

The foregoing celebration of Puritan greatness may leave some readers sceptical. It is, however, as was hinted earlier, wholly in line with the major reassessment of Puritanism that has taken place in historical scholarship. Fifty years ago the academic study of Puritanism went over a watershed with the discovery that there was such a thing as Puritan culture, and a rich culture at that, over and above Puritan reactions against certain facets of medieval and Renaissance culture. The common assumption of earlier days, that Puritans both sides of the Atlantic were characteristically morbid, obsessive, uncouth and unintelligent, was left behind. Satirical aloofness towards Puritan thought-life gave way to sympathetic attentiveness, and the exploring of Puritan beliefs and ideals became an academic cottage industry of impressive vigour, as it still is. North America led the way with four books published over two years which between them ensured that Puritan studies could never be the same again. These were: William Haller, *The Rise of Puritanism* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1938); A.S.P. Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty* (Macmillan, London, 1938); Woodhouse taught at Toronto); M.M. Knappen, *Tudor Puritanism* (Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1939); and Perry Miller, *The New England Mind Vol. I: The Seventeenth Century* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1939). Many books from the thirties and later have confirmed the view of Puritanism which these four volumes yielded, and the overall picture that has emerged is as follows.

Puritanism was at heart a spiritual movement, passionately concerned with God and godliness. It began in England with William Tyndale the Bible translator, Luther's contemporary, a generation before the word 'Puritan' was coined, and it continued till the latter years of the seventeenth century, some decades after 'Puritan' had fallen out of use. Into its making went Tyndale's reforming biblicism; John Bradford's piety of the heart and conscience; John Knox's zeal for God's honour in national churches; the passion for evangelical pastoral competence that is seen in John Hooper, Edward Dering and Richard Greenham; the view of Holy Scripture as the 'regulative principle' of church worship and order that fired Thomas Cartwright; the anti-Roman, anti-Arminian, anti-Socinian, anti-Antinomian Calvinism that John Owen and the Westminster standards set forth; the comprehensive ethical interest that reached its apogee in Richard Baxter's monumental *Christian Directory*; and the purpose of popularizing and making practical the teaching of the Bible that gripped Perkins and Bunyan, with many more. Puritanism was essentially a movement for church reform, pastoral renewal and evangelism, and spiritual revival; and in addition – indeed, as a direct expression of its zeal for God's honour – it was a world-view, a total Christian philosophy, in intellectual terms a Protestantized and updated medievalism, and in terms of spirituality a reformed monasticism outside the cloister and away from monkish vows.

The Puritan goal was to complete what England's Reformation began: to finish reshaping Anglican worship, to introduce effective church discipline into Anglican parishes, to establish righteousness in the political, domestic, and socio-economic fields, and to convert all Englishmen to a vigorous evangelical faith. Through the preaching and teaching of the gospel, and the sanctifying of all arts, sciences, and skills, England was to become a land of saints, a model and paragon of corporate godliness, and as such a means of blessing to the world.

Such was the Puritan dream as it developed under Elizabeth, James, and Charles, and blossomed in the Interregnum, before it withered in the dark tunnel of persecution between 1660 (Restoration) and 1689 (Toleration). This dream bred giants.

Neglect at your peril

What I present here is, I confess, advocacy, barefaced and unashamed. I am seeking to make good the claim that the Puritans can teach us lessons that we badly need to learn. Let me pursue my line of argument a little further.

It must by now be apparent that the great Puritan pastor-theologians – Owen, Baxter, Goodwin, Howe, Perkins, Sibbes, Brooks, Watson, Gurnall, Flavel, Bunyan, Manton, and others

like them – were men of outstanding intellectual power, as well as spiritual insight. In them mental habits fostered by sober scholarship were linked with a flaming zeal for God and a minute acquaintance with the human heart. All their work displays this unique fusion of gifts and graces. In thought and outlook they were radically God-centred. Their appreciation of God's sovereign majesty was profound, and their reverence in handling his written word was deep and constant. They were patient, thorough, and methodical in searching the Scriptures, and their grasp of the various threads and linkages in the web of revealed truth was firm and clear. They understood most richly the ways of God with men, the glory of Christ the Mediator, and the work of the Spirit in the believer and the church.

And their knowledge was no mere theoretical orthodoxy. They sought to 'reduce to practice' (their own phrase) all that God taught them. They yoked their consciences to his Word, disciplining themselves to bring all activities under the scrutiny of Scripture, and to demand a theological, as distinct from a merely pragmatic, justification for everything that they did. They applied their understanding of the mind of God to every branch of life, seeing the church, the family, the state, the arts and sciences, the world of commerce and industry, no less than the devotions of the individual, as so many spheres in which God must be served and honoured. They saw life whole, for they saw its Creator as Lord of each department of it, and their purpose was that 'holiness to the Lord' might be written over it in its entirety.

Nor was this all. Knowing God, the Puritans also knew man. They saw him as in origin a noble being, made in God's image to rule God's earth, but now tragically brutified and brutalized by sin. They viewed sin in the triple light of God's law, lordship, and holiness, and so saw it as transgression and guilt, as rebellion and usurpation, and as uncleanness, corruption, and inability for good. Seeing this, and knowing the ways whereby the Spirit brings sinners to faith and new life in Christ, and leads saints, on the one hand, to grow into their Saviour's image, and, on the other, to learn their total dependence on grace, the great Puritans became superb pastors. The depth and unction of their 'practical and experimental' expositions in the pulpit was no more outstanding than was their skill in the study in applying spiritual physic to sick souls. From Scripture they mapped the often bewildering terrain of the life of faith and fellowship with God with great thoroughness (see *Pilgrim's Progress* for a pictorial gazetteer), and their acuteness and wisdom in diagnosing spiritual malaise and setting out the appropriate biblical remedies was outstanding. They remain the classic pastors of Protestantism, just as men like Whitefield and Spurgeon stand as its classic evangelists.

Now it is here, on the pastoral front, that today's evangelical Christians most need help. Our numbers, it seems, have increased in recent years, and a new interest in the old paths of evangelical theology has grown. For this we should thank God. But not all evangelical zeal is according to knowledge, nor do the virtues and values of the biblical Christian life always come together as they should, and three groups in particular in today's evangelical world seem very obviously to need help of a kind that the Puritans, as we meet them in their writings, are uniquely qualified to give. These I call *restless experientialists*, *entrenched intellectualists*, and *disaffected deviationists*. They are not, of course, organized bodies of opinion, but individual persons with characteristic mentalities that one meets over and over again. Take them, now, in order.

Those whom I call *restless experientialists* are a familiar breed, so much so that observers are sometimes tempted to define evangelicalism in terms of them. Their outlook is one of casual haphazardness and fretful impatience, of grasping after novelties, entertainments, and 'highs', and of valuing strong feelings above deep thoughts. They have little taste for solid study, humble self-examination, disciplined meditation, and unspectacular hard work in their callings and their prayers. They conceive the Christian life as one of exciting extraordinary experiences rather than of resolute rational righteousness. They dwell continually on the themes of joy, peace, happiness, satisfaction and rest of soul with no balancing reference to the divine discontent of Romans 7, the fight of faith of Psalm 73, or the 'lows' of Psalms 42, 88 and 102. Through their influence the spontaneous jollity of the simple extravert comes to be equated

with healthy Christian living, while saints of less sanguine and more complex temperament get driven almost to distraction because they cannot bubble over in the prescribed manner. In their restlessness these exuberant ones become uncritically credulous, reasoning that the more odd and striking an experience the more divine, supernatural, and spiritual it must be, and they scarcely give the scriptural virtue of steadiness a thought.

It is no counter to these defects to appeal to the specialized counselling techniques that extravert evangelicals have developed for pastoral purposes in recent years; for spiritual life is fostered, and spiritual maturity engendered, not by techniques but by truth, and if our techniques have been formed in terms of a defective notion of the truth to be conveyed and the goal to be aimed at, they cannot make us better pastors or better believers than we were before. The reason why the restless experientialists are lopsided is that they have fallen victim to a form of worldliness, a man-centred, anti-rational individualism, which turns Christian life into a thrill-seeking ego-trip. Such saints need the sort of maturing ministry in which the Puritan tradition has specialized.

What Puritan emphases can establish and settle restless experientialists? These, to start with. First, the stress on God-centredness as a divine requirement that is central to the discipline of self-denial. Second, the insistence on the primacy of the mind, and on the impossibility of obeying biblical truth that one has not yet understood. Third, the demand for humility, patience, and steadiness at all times, and for an acknowledgment that the Holy Spirit's main ministry is not to give thrills but to create in us Christlike character. Fourth, the recognition that feelings go up and down, and that God frequently tries us by leading us through wastes of emotional flatness. Fifth, the singling out of worship as life's primary activity. Sixth, the stress on our need of regular self-examination by Scripture, in terms set by Psalm 139:23-24. Seventh, the realization that sanctified suffering bulks large in God's plan for his children's growth in grace. No Christian tradition of teaching administrators this purging and strengthening medicine with more masterful authority than does that of the Puritans, whose own dispensing of it nurtured a marvellously strong and resilient type of Christian for a century and more, as we have seen.

Think now of *entrenched intellectualists* in the evangelical world: a second familiar breed, though not so common as the previous type. Some of them seem to be victims of an insecure temperament and inferiority feelings, others to be reacting out of pride or pain against the zaniness of experientialism as they have perceived it, but whatever the source of their syndrome the behaviour-pattern in which they express it is distinctive and characteristic. Constantly they present themselves as rigid, argumentative, critical Christians, champions of God's truth for whom orthodoxy is all. Upholding and defending their own view of that truth, whether Calvinist or Arminian, dispensational or Pentecostal, national church reformist or Free Church separatist, or whatever it might be, is their leading interest, and they invest themselves unstintingly in this task. There is little warmth about them; relationally they are remote; experiences do not mean much to them; winning the battle for mental correctness is their one great purpose. They see, truly enough, that in our anti-rational, feeling-oriented, instant-gratification culture conceptual knowledge of divine things is undervalued, and they seek with passion to right the balance at this point. They understand the priority of the intellect well; the trouble is that intellectualism, expressing itself in endless campaigns for their own brand of right thinking, is almost if not quite all that they can offer, for it is almost if not quite all that they have. They too, so I urge, need exposure to the Puritan heritage for their maturing.

That last statement might sound paradoxical, since it will not have escaped the reader that the above profile corresponds to what many still suppose the typical Puritan to have been. But when we ask what emphases Puritan tradition contains to counter arid intellectualism, a whole series of points springs to view. First, true religion claims the affections as well as the intellect; it is essentially, in Richard Baxter's phrase, 'heart-work'. Second, theological truth is for practice. William Perkins defined theology as the science of living blessedly for ever; William Ames called it the science of living to God. Third, conceptual knowledge kills if one does not move from knowing notions to knowing the realities to which they refer – in this

case, from knowing about God to a relational acquaintance with God himself. Fourth, faith and repentance, issuing in a life of love and holiness, that is, of gratitude expressed in goodwill and good works, are explicitly called for in the gospel. Fifth, the Spirit is given to lead us into close companionship with others in Christ. Sixth, the discipline of discursive meditation is meant to keep us ardent and adoring in our love affair with God. Seventh, it is ungodly and scandalous to become a firebrand and cause division in the church, and it is ordinarily nothing more reputable than spiritual pride in its intellectual form that leads men to create parties and splits. The great Puritans were as humble-minded and warm-hearted as they were clear-headed, as fully oriented to people as they were to Scripture, and as passionate for peace as they were for truth. They would certainly have diagnosed today's fixated Christian intellectualists as spiritually stunted, not in their zeal for the form of sound words but in their lack of zeal for anything else; and the thrust of Puritan teaching about God's truth in man's life is still potent to ripen such souls into whole and mature human beings.

I turn finally to those whom I call *disaffected deviationists*, the casualties and dropouts of the modern evangelical movement, many of whom have now turned against it to denounce it as a neurotic perversion of Christianity. Here, too, is a breed that we know all too well. It is distressing to think of these folk, both because their experience to date discredits our evangelicalism so deeply and also because there are so many of them. Who are they? They are people who once saw themselves as evangelicals, either from being evangelically nurtured or from coming to profess conversion within the evangelical sphere of influence, but who have become disillusioned about the evangelical point of view and have turned their back on it, feeling that it let them down. Some leave it for intellectual reasons, judging that what was taught them was so simplistic as to stifle their minds and so unrealistic and out of touch with facts as to be really if unintentionally dishonest. Others leave because they were led to expect that as Christians they would enjoy health, wealth, trouble-free circumstances, immunity from relational hurts, betrayals, and failures, and from making mistakes and bad decisions; in short, a flowery bed of ease on which they would be carried happily to heaven – and these great expectations were in due course refuted by events. Hurt and angry, feeling themselves victims of a confidence trick, they now accuse the evangelicalism they knew of having failed and fooled them, and resentfully give it up; it is a mercy if they do not therewith similarly accuse and abandon God himself. Modern evangelicalism has much to answer for in the number of casualties of this sort that it has caused in recent years by its naivety of mind and unrealism of expectation. But here again the soberer, profounder, wiser evangelicalism of the Puritan giants can fulfil a corrective and therapeutic function in our midst, if only we will listen to its message.

What have the Puritans to say to us that might serve to heal the disaffected casualties of modern evangelical goofiness? Anyone who reads the writings of Puritan authors will find in them much that helps in this way. Puritan authors regularly tell us, first, of the *mystery* of God: that our God is too small, that the real God cannot be put without remainder into a man-made conceptual box so as to be fully understood; and that he was, is,

and always will be bewilderingly inscrutable in his dealing with those who trust and love him, so that 'losses and crosses', that is, bafflement and disappointment in relation to particular hopes one has entertained, must be accepted as a recurring element in one's life of fellowship with him. Then they tell us, second, of the *love* of God: that it is a love that redeems, converts, sanctifies, and ultimately glorifies sinners, and that Calvary was the one place in human history where it was fully and unambiguously revealed, and that in relation to our own situation we may know for certain that nothing can separate us from that love (Rom. 8:38f.), although no situation in this world will ever be free from flies in the ointment and thorns in the bed. Developing the theme of divine love, the Puritans tell us, third, of the *salvation* of God: that the Christ who put away our sins and brought us God's pardon is leading us through this world to a glory for which we are even now being prepared by the instilling of desire for it and capacity to enjoy it, and that holiness here, in the form of consecrated service and loving obedience through thick and thin, is the high road to happiness hereafter. Following this they tell us, fourth, about *spiritual conflict*, the many ways in which the world, the flesh and the devil seek to lay us low; fifth, about the *protection* of God, whereby he overrules and sanctifies the conflict, often allowing one evil to touch our lives in order thereby to shield us from greater evils; and, sixth, about the *glory* of God, which it becomes our privilege to further by our celebrating of his grace, by our proving of his power under perplexity and pressure, by totally resigning ourselves to his good pleasure, and by making him our joy and delight at all times.

By ministering to us these precious biblical truths the Puritans give us the resources we need to cope with 'the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune', and offer the casualties an insight into what has happened to them that can raise them above self-pitying resentment and reaction and restore their spiritual health completely. Puritan sermons show that problems about providence are in no way new; the seventeenth century had its own share of spiritual casualties, saints who had thought simplistically and hoped unrealistically and were now disappointed, disaffected, despondent and despairing, and the Puritans' ministry to us at this point is simply the spin-off of what they were constantly saying to raise up and encourage wounded spirits among their own people.

I think the answer to the question, why we need the Puritans, is now pretty clear, and I conclude my argument at this point. I, who owe more to the Puritans than to any other theologians I have ever read, and who know that I need them still, have been trying to persuade you that perhaps you need them too. Theological voices abound: I urge all theological students to give special heed to those of the Puritans.

¹Cited from Gordon S. Wakefield, *Puritan Devotion* (Epworth Press: London, 1957), p. x.

²George Whitefield, *Works* (London, 1771), IV: pp. 306f.

³Wakefield, *loc. cit.* One cannot help thinking of the married lady who came to tell D.L. Moody that she thought she was called to be a preacher. 'Have you got any children at home?' Moody asked. 'Yes, six.' 'There's your congregation; off you go!'

Destroyed For Ever: An Examination of the Debates Concerning Annihilation and Conditional Immortality

Tony Gray

Tony Gray, who has now completed his doctoral studies at Oxford, is the new RTSF secretary. This is his first article for Themelios.

There is no doctrine I would more willingly remove from Christianity than [hell], if it lay in my power . . . I would pay any price to be able to say truthfully: 'All will be saved.'¹

C.S. Lewis states clearly what is probably true for most modern Christians. Hell may well be unique amongst Christian doctrines, if not for the lack of attention that it has received in the past decades, then for the unwillingness with which many orthodox Christians believe in it. Fundamentalists may preach vividly about the fires of hell, and liberals have long heralded the downfall of eternal damnation, but what can we say about a doctrine which leaves many people highly embarrassed? More recently, the doctrine has received the renewed interest of a specific debate amongst evangelicals concerning whether hell is eternal conscious torment or whether the wicked are annihilated after judgment.

This article will attempt to outline the nature of these recent debates. The main aim will be to present the various arguments and highlight certain themes that need further attention. If the arguments for conditionalism (which I shall define later) appear at times to be stronger than the others, then this is not due to a hidden assumption that conditionalism is the correct interpretation, but rather to a desire that the arguments should at least be heard. It is my belief that traditionalists have often not listened to the arguments themselves. I hope that in this article conditionalism is given a fair hearing at least.

One note of caution. Theology is always close to home when we have a vested interest in the subject, and this is even more the case when it comes to the doctrine of hell. It concerns our future destiny, and more pointedly, the future of those whom we love. Discussion of the matter often becomes extremely emotional, and no excuse should have to be made for this. People dissenting from more traditional views are accused of doing so for 'emotional' reasons, whatever they may actually be. However, it seems right that we should never be afraid of feeling the force of our emotions, as long as they are never allowed to be the overriding force. Truth remains the same, whatever our reactions to it or feelings about it may be. I may often feel that God is far away, but the experience of my feeling does not alter the truth that God is closer than I can ever imagine. It is when I make my decisions on those feelings alone, and ignore the witness of Scripture, that danger comes. So, be warned: hell is an emotional subject, but we must let the Scriptures be the final arbiter on the truth of the matter.

Definitions

Conditional immortality is the name given to the doctrine that states that human beings are not inherently immortal, but rather have immortality conferred upon them as part of the experience of salvation. In the debates, immortality is usually taken to mean the inability of the person to perish. Therefore, all the

redeemed will be immortal, and life in heaven will be everlasting and consist of a perfect and glorious existence. It is often said that this heaven will be eternal both quantitatively and qualitatively, the former referring to duration, the latter referring to the type of eternal existence. *Annihilationism*, which is usually associated with conditional immortality, states that the wicked will not suffer conscious torment for ever, but that after death and judgment they will be destroyed, ceasing to exist. Annihilationism is thus virtually a corollary of conditional immortality, for if immortality were inherent, then it follows that annihilation would not be a satisfactory explanation of hell.

However, several comments must be made at this point. Annihilationism is to be distinguished from the humanist belief that there is no life after death, and thus all persons cease to exist once life in this world has stopped. Evangelicals believing in annihilation wish to distance themselves from this belief, and generally accept that destruction occurs after judgment and appropriate punishment. Secondly, although conditionalism makes an important point concerning anthropology (which will be explored later), both sides of the annihilation/traditional debate tend to agree that whether immortality is inherent or not, God alone has the power to give and take away life in all its forms. Thus a traditionalist will argue that inherent immortality exists due to God's grace, and that God in principle does have the ability to annihilate; yet, because of the way he has fashioned creation, annihilation is not a possible interpretation of hell.²

Recent history

Conditional immortality and universalism are often viewed as the two main challenges to traditional views about hell. However, universalism's pedigree extends right back to the early church and Origen's theory of *apokatastasis*, the idea that everything, perhaps even the devil, will eventually be restored to God. Condemnation of universalism has been widespread, and it is a doctrine which has never been accepted by evangelicals. In contrast, conditional immortality has a much shorter history, and the suspicion that this is a 'new' idea has caused evangelicals, whichever position they take on the debate, to be hesitant when discussing the matter. The assumption is that if this is a biblical doctrine, then why did it not appear until recently? Some attempts have been made to trace the history of the doctrine.³

Conditionalism, in its various forms, received the most attention it has ever had during the debates of the nineteenth century, and this is well documented by various scholars. Geoffrey Rowell's work, *Hell And The Victorians*, is the most comprehensive, and together with the essay by David Powys on the nineteenth- and twentieth-century debates, it is well worth consulting.⁴

More recently, conditionalism and annihilationism have been given a wider public airing as a result of two important works. The first was by John Wenham, in *The Goodness Of God*,⁵ where, in a chapter dealing with the moral difficulties of

believing in hell, he presented conditionalism as a possible option. Then, fourteen years later, John Stott advocated a well-argued, yet tentative, case for the annihilationist position, when questioned by David Edwards in *Essentials: A Liberal-Evangelical Dialogue*.⁶ The fact that one of the most respected leaders of modern evangelicalism supported the doctrine made people listen, and hence brought the debate to the attention of a wider Christian public.⁷ Since then, a range of books on both sides of the Atlantic has been published, most of them attacking the conditionalist position. In the States the attack has been focused on Clark Pinnock, who over recent years has taught conditional immortality, along with other perhaps less traditional doctrines with which some evangelicals do not agree.⁸ However, others (such as Stott) develop conditionalism without going this extra step, and so conditionalism must never be seen as part of a package of beliefs. It seems that many of its advocates can quite rightly be labelled as pillars of conservative orthodoxy.

The debate between conditionalists and those believing in the traditional model of hell has largely taken place on two levels. The first concerns the biblical texts, and how these should be interpreted. The second concerns more theological arguments, but necessarily feeds off (and informs) the first. Without a doubt, one of the key issues thrown up by the whole debate is that of hermeneutics. Caution must be exercised when using the biblical texts, as in all debates. Only when we have considered context, setting and other variables can we make a fully informed decision. There is not room here to provide this whole structure, only to indicate the form of the debate. Suffice it to say that any weighing of the cases must be done carefully and with prayer!

The biblical case

For this section I depend largely on two of Stott's four main arguments as they are presented in a helpful summary fashion (the other two, concerning justice and universalism, come under our heading of 'the theological case'). I will supplement some of this with material from other conditionalists, and then consider the responses made by a number of traditionalists.

Stott's first argument is from *language*. He maintains that much of the biblical wording points towards ultimate destruction. The use of *apollumi* (to destroy), when employed in an active form, points towards extinction (as when Herod plotted to kill Jesus: Mt. 2:13). The same meaning has more particular reference when Jesus warns his disciples to 'fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell'. However, the verb can be in a middle form, and then has the connotation of perishing (e.g. 2 Pet. 2:9). Nevertheless, this does not discourage Stott, as he maintains that

it would seem strange . . . if people who are said to suffer destruction are in fact not destroyed; and . . . it is 'difficult to imagine a perpetually inconclusive process of perishing'.⁹

Traditionalists may agree that the word can have different meanings, yet assert that in the context of references to hell it denotes something perishing or being ruined – the object remains in existence.¹⁰

Stott's second argument concerns the biblical imagery of *fire*. He argues that the main purpose of fire is not to inflict sensory pain, but to destroy. Although we associate conscious torment with fire, annihilation would be the outcome, and thus an appropriate interpretation of the texts.

Objections to this interpretation are numerous, and Stott himself attempts to deal with some of them, albeit briefly. What about the undying worm and unquenching fire of Mark 9:48? Stott points out that Jesus does not mention everlasting pain when he uses the imagery of Isaiah 66:24 here, whereas Judith 16:17 does use such language. Conversely, Fernando replies that this use in Judith shows that the natural interpretation of fire in the Jewish mind was concerned with pain, not destruction.¹¹ Stott maintains that it is reasonable to assume that although both the worm and the fire are everlasting, the consequence may still be destruction. Blanchard emphasizes the use of 'their' worm, suggesting that the 'worm' refers to the sinner's conscience.¹² Fudge acknowledges this position, but argues that this cannot be so, as the imagery from Isaiah refers to a devouring worm that eats what is already dead.¹³

Matthew 25:26 appears to parallel eternal life with fire. Or

does it? Stott's case is that our preconceptions force us to read it in this manner, whereas the passage never actually defines the nature of those eternal states. Thus, the parable contrasts life with punishment rather than equating their duration. The punishment of this verse could then be destruction – punishment all the same. Travis states that a better translation would be 'the punishment of the age to come' and 'the life of the age to come'.¹⁴ The traditionalist response has been to wonder whether the word 'eternal' could change meaning so quickly in such close proximity.

What of the rich man and Lazarus? Throughout the literature, opinions abound as to how this text should be interpreted – is it a parable; does it refer to the intermediate state; can we lift details from such a text, etc? There are therefore numerous hermeneutical questions that must be answered, and until we work through them, we should build our case on what is undoubtedly contained in the teaching, not on what is disputable. Stott assumes that this passage does refer to the interim state, but that an alternative interpretation need not preclude the idea of annihilation subsequent to punishment. The two main thrusts of the story are the reversal of fortunes and the irreversibility of the two states.¹⁵ Traditionalists emphasize the physical aspects to this story. For instance, the rich man in the story refers to his physical body by begging Abraham to send Lazarus to dip water onto his tongue. Traditionalists therefore believe that the parable must be referring to the final state, when all are reunited with physical bodies. A note of caution must be inserted here – some argue from the physical pains to conclude that this must refer to the final state. Others, convinced that this refers to the final state, then argue that physical pain must be in mind! Here is a clear indication of the difficulty in knowing how this text should be handled and where we should start from in its interpretation. Perhaps Travis's advice concerning the interpretation of this story is to be welcomed: 'Jesus is here making use of a popular Jewish tale, and so we would be rash to press the details of the story'.¹⁶

Revelation 14:10 is interpreted by Stott and others to refer to the moment of judgment, rather than to everlasting conscious torment. The smoke, not the torment, ascends for ever and ever. Pawson, however, wonders why this should be so, once the fire has finished its job of destroying. Blanchard emphasizes the personal pronoun – the smoke is of 'their' torment, and thus the suffering must be everlasting. How can hell have an end, when there is explicitly 'no rest day or night' (Rev. 14:11)?

The last objection that Stott tackles is the declaration in Revelation 20:10 that the wicked 'will be tormented day and night for ever and ever'. He notes that this refers to the devil, the beast, and the false prophet – plausibly interpreted as powers of evil in the world, rather than as individual persons, and thus offering the interpretation that all evil and resistance to God will ultimately be destroyed. It follows, then, that these personifications cannot suffer everlasting torment, as suffering cannot be experienced by symbols. Michael Green follows a similar explanation, maintaining that this isolated verse is not enough on which to build what he refers to as the savage doctrine of eternal suffering.¹⁷ Traditionalists reply in two ways. Pawson, turning the argument on its head, believes that the devil and his henchmen are persons – otherwise, how could they be tormented?¹⁸ Cotterell then adds that 'it really will not do to dismiss this statement on the grounds that this is so stated only once'.¹⁹

In conclusion to this study of the biblical material, and having attempted to reply to the objections against his position, Stott concludes that

the most natural way to understand the reality behind the imagery is that ultimately all enmity and resistance to God will be destroyed. So both the language of destruction and the imagery of fire seem to point to annihilation.²⁰

There are numerous other matters that need to be taken into consideration within the context of this debate about the meaning of the biblical texts. One is the use and meaning of *aiōnios*, the word generally translated as 'eternal'. It is now recognized that this word may have both a qualitative and a quantitative aspect – thus 'the age to come' is a possible phrase to describe the concept, and this would cohere with some annihilationist apologetic. However, it is also possible that Jesus and his contemporaries thought in terms of an 'age to come', yet this

age was, in their minds, totally without end, especially when linked with the phrases 'for ever and ever' or 'to the ends of the ages'.

There are other uses of the term 'fire' that could be examined (for example, God as a consuming fire, the use of fire in Jude 7, and the lake of fire in Rev. 20:10). We could also investigate the use of 'darkness' (Jude 13); the use of separation (2 Thes. 1:9); the meaning of the second death (Rev. 20:14). Thus, any biblical investigation into this topic requires the examination of a large amount of material. For the moment we will leave these directly biblical considerations, and turn to the arguments that are generally theological in nature.

The theological case

The main theological arguments can be broken down into four categories: immortality, love and justice, victory, and the blessedness of the redeemed.

Immortality

We have described the position of conditionalism, which attacks one of the premises of the traditional understanding of hell on the grounds that the wicked will not be given immortality and hence shall not suffer in torment for ever. The accusation is that most theologians interpret hell in the traditional manner for two reasons: (a) because their tradition has always done so, and their tradition precedes their interpretation of Scripture; (b) because the force behind that tradition has been the *false* assumption that men and women are created immortal, and so those who reject Christ endure for ever, suffering the consequences of their rejection. Travis summarizes the conditionalist argument thus:

However, the claim of the conditionalist is that the 'traditional orthodoxy' of eternal torment arose in the early church precisely because biblical teaching was (illegitimately) interpreted in the light of Platonic philosophy, which involved belief in the immortality of the soul and in everlasting punishment.²¹

There are several difficulties with these arguments, applying both to traditionalists and conditionalists. The first arises from the need to construct a rigorous and proper biblical anthropology. Many evangelicals have recoiled from notions of soul and body dualism, to speak of a 'holistic identity', which can refer to a variety of concepts and ideas, but basically means that soul and body are two inseparable aspects of the person, not two distinct substances where the soul is identified with the real person. Some work therefore needs to be done in reconstructing anthropological doctrine and its history, in order to evaluate whether it actually has been developed and interpreted in the light of Platonic philosophy.²² On the other hand, many traditionalists are prepared to acknowledge the influence that Platonism may have had, yet still maintain that the anthropology which they have reached remains biblical – that is, an anthropology consisting of an immortal soul. Thus, the conditionalist may challenge received notions of anthropology, but if Scripture teaches eternal suffering to be the case, then they have not got far in connection with the doctrine of hell.

Therefore, any consideration of this argument must look at the biblical grounds for immortality. Conditionalists base their argument on 1 Timothy 1:17, 1 Timothy 6:16 and 2 Timothy 1:10. Thus, Stott states that: 'According to Scripture only God possesses immortality in himself (1 Tim. 1:17; 6:16); he reveals it and gives it to us through the gospel.'²³ Helm admits 'that Scripture does not teach the immortality of the soul in so many words'.²⁴ However, sufficient teaching on hell exists to make the case irrelevant. Pawson and Fernando take a similar line, whereas Davies and Blanchard argue that immortality is assumed throughout Scripture (as is the Trinity, of which there are also no explicit statements). Hints exist in the creation account (man and woman made in the image of God, made for life and not mortality, made for communion with God, and so possessing something of God's immortality) and in Ecclesiastes 3:11: 'He has put a sense of past and future into their minds.' It is argued that not only does this passage indicate that humans are created with a capacity to appreciate the eternal importance of the world, but also have a 'desire for eternal things which in turn implies a spiritual dimension and nature in men'.²⁵ The implication of this argument is that, as human immortality is assumed in Scripture, those passages which speak of God

having immortality alone are referring to a quality of life that God possesses and subsequently gives to the redeemed, rather than to an expression of duration of existence.

On the annihilation side, Fudge believes that even if conditional immortality were true according to Scripture, the existence of positive teaching on eternal conscious torment would convince him otherwise – if it existed. The motive behind Fudge's belief, which must be applauded, is that whatever he finds in Scripture, he will follow. Unfortunately, if he is convinced that immortality is a gift of salvation, then eternal punishment (the punishment of something which would be immortal) could not follow from conditional immortality thus stated.

Therefore, is the issue of immortality irrelevant in the face of positive teaching about eternal torment, as Fudge implies? Not necessarily. The argument does cause us to re-evaluate our reasons for believing in the specific structure of certain doctrines. Conditionalism sits on a scale involving other judgments that need to be made, and if not used as the decisive argument in the debate, it may then tip the balance one way or the other. If conditionalism has had a small hearing historically due to misplaced Platonic influence, then we should not be so scared of discussing the idea today – there may then be a case for going against 2,000 years of thought. However, in contrast to this, the traditionalist may argue that conditionalism has had a small hearing due to positive biblical teaching to the contrary. If this is the case, then the arguments concerning conditional immortality become less crucial.

Love and justice

Whenever and wherever hell is discussed, it always raises questions concerning God's love and justice which bring with them strong emotional feelings. However, even if we are prepared to accept the reality of an eschatological dualism, as all evangelicals are, what useful purpose does eternal suffering provide?

This vindictiveness is incompatible with the love of God in Christ.²⁶

Whatever anyone says, unending torment speaks to me of sadism, not justice.²⁷

The argument is forceful: where is the love and justice in *eternal* (i.e. *everlasting*) conscious torment? Is there not a grave level of disproportion between crimes committed in 70 years, and punishment administered for eternity?

Traditionalists respond in a number of ways. First, such argument inevitably leads to a diminishing of the seriousness of sin. However, most conditionalists do still wish to emphasize this – judgment and punishment still exist, yet justice for conditionalists seems to be administered fairly, as the punishment appears not to be out of proportion with the sin. Secondly, most traditionalists major on the glory of God. The punishment of the wicked serves to glorify the righteousness and justice of the divine judge. Gerald Bray provides the most explicit statement of this view:

... if the non-elect have no hope of salvation and God does not want them to suffer unduly, why were they ever created in the first place? Their existence must serve some purpose, and once that is admitted the view that their eternal punishment glorifies the justice of God seems perfectly logical.²⁸

God's justice is glorified in that sinners receive their due punishment. Perhaps sin against God requires infinite punishment, because God is an infinite being. Yet Christ's atonement was made by a finite event, his death on the cross – thus an infinite punishment would, according to the conditionalist argument, appear to be inappropriate.²⁹

Another popular response is to parallel annihilation with euthanasia in modern-day medical science. The apparent illusion of justice in the act of destroying the person hides the fact that annihilation takes away any dignity the person may have. However, the conditionalist replies: what dignity is there in eternal suffering – surely all dignity of those in hell has already been destroyed?

Perhaps the strongest argument used by traditionalists is the idea that those in hell are continually impenitent. Thus the wicked consistently refuse God, repeatedly sin, and therefore deserve eternal punishment.³⁰ Even if this is not the case, it is not

clear whether annihilation (eternal death) is any easier to justify than conscious hell (eternal suffering).

Victory

This line of argument parallels discussions of universalism in many ways. Again, Travis summarizes the point well: 'Eternal torment involves an eternal cosmological dualism, which is impossible to reconcile with the conviction that ultimately God will be "all in all".'³¹

Many people may feel the strong attraction of universalism, even if their theological convictions lead them to conclude otherwise. Conditionalists acknowledge this, yet resist the doctrine in order to preserve the biblical insistence on human freedom, judgment and division. However, does not the doctrine of annihilation allow the full force of the supposedly universalist verses (such as Rom. 5:18; 11:32; 1 Cor. 15:28) to come out? True, we must interpret them in their correct context, but even so, the victory of God becomes even more apparent when we believe that the wicked will eventually cease to exist. God is victorious in that he has wiped out all evil and resistance to his will for ever. No-one remains in some eternal prison, forever spoiling God's creation.

Understandably, traditionalists view this as an easy way out. Hell, in fact, is not incompatible with God's victory – hell glorifies God's justice, and all in hell are subject to God, even if they are rebellious. The existence of hell and heaven side by side presented no problem for the biblical authors, and so it should not for us. We need to exercise caution in this whole area, as it is all too easy to import contemporary ideas of victory and justice into a situation of which we know very little.

Blessedness of the redeemed

This issue is connected with the third: how can the redeemed in heaven be unaffected by the existence of the wicked in hell? For conditionalists, memories of the lost remain, but perhaps heaven contains healing and understanding. Some traditionalists argue that the redeemed will in fact agree with God's judgment and glorify him for it, even over the loss of our loved ones.³² Perhaps perfect joy and regret can co-exist in the light of God's glory, or maybe the life of heaven entails learning to live with the realization that not all wanted to embrace God's love.

Further considerations

Recent studies of the whole debate have raised a number of general considerations. Kendall Harmon has been critical of conditionalists for importing a timescale of events into biblical material which in itself provides no warrant for such detail.³³ Thus, conditionalists envisage death for the sinner, then subsequently resurrection, then punishment, and then destruction. Where in the biblical material do we find such an explicit scheme? Harmon has also criticized Fudge's inadequate use of the inter-testamental literature in interpreting the terms and words used in the NT. The work of David Powys³⁴ has attempted to demonstrate that taking the inter-testamental material into consideration can aid our understanding of the NT texts and thus lead to an annihilationist position. Powys's material may in fact be the most able defence of one specific form of annihilationism thus far. Nevertheless, even his extensive investigation leaves questions unanswered concerning the interpretation of specific texts (especially the use of Is. 66:24, and how best to understand Rev. 14:11 and 20:10).

Turning to a broader theological position, many philosophers of religion have recently been considering the doctrine of hell. Amongst those who have examined annihilationism, Jonathan Kvanvig has questioned whether this doctrine in fact masks the major problem of hell (see the discussion above under 'Love and justice'). The problem consists in being able to justify an eternal sentence for crimes committed in a finite amount of time. Although justifications may be provided for this apparent problem, it seems that they must be independent of the annihilationist debate. Kvanvig maintains that even if the fate of those in hell is extinction, hell remains morally problematic because the sentence of being eternally separated from God is still inflicted for a finite amount of sin. In effect, annihilationism masks the larger problems of hell.³⁵ It may be unfair to criticize annihilationists for believing such a doctrine because it appears to be the easier 'option'. On the other hand,

some may have chosen this option because of uncertainty concerning the biblical data and the assumption that annihilationism does solve the moral problems associated with hell. If this is the case, and if this misplaced assumption has become the determining presupposition, then such annihilationists will need to reconsider the case and return to the biblical material.

Once again, there are other issues that could have been discussed. The questions of hell as a moral deterrent and hell as an impetus for evangelism are important ones for anyone concerned with preaching the gospel, and it may be thought that such issues should be considered under the main areas of debate. However, it seems that these topics can all too easily distract from the biblical and theological discussion in hand. If hell is eternal torment, then we must preach it so. However, if annihilation is true, a gospel still remains to be taught, and it is a gospel that is just as desperately needed. If one wishes to use hell as a departure point for preaching the gospel (and that is a heavily disputed point), then the prospect of annihilation still engenders fear. Although some writers argue that this is not the case, others argue just as cogently that fear of a conscious judgment followed by 'nothingness' is just as real as fear of eternal pain.³⁶ As for hell as a moral deterrent, such a case arguably misses the Christian understanding of ethical action, and may lead to confusion in the doctrine of justification by faith. Do we perform good deeds to avoid hell? Even more so, do we turn to Christ to avoid hell? Is the true nature of repentance, and the true basis for good works, fear, or love? These are issues which we can only highlight here, but are important topics in themselves.

Conclusion

As indicated in the introduction, this survey of the issues may seem biased. If so, the main reason is that the torrent of books and articles against annihilationism may have left some of its arguments ignored or in the background.³⁷ Although the conclusion of this survey is that annihilation is at the very least an option which ought to be considered fairly and honestly, there remain major problems which proponents of the doctrine must tackle. Much work needs to be done (especially on hermeneutics, concepts of justice, and assumptions concerning immortality) and much is left for future discussion and debate. With John Stott we 'plead for frank dialogue among evangelicals on the basis of Scripture'.³⁸ In all this speculative debate, it is perhaps best to end with the wise words of John Wenham:

And let it be quite clear that these realities are awful indeed. Jesus and his disciples taught again and again in terrible terms that there is an irreversible judgment and punishment of the unrepentant. Warnings and loving invitations intermingle to encourage us to flee the wrath to come.³⁹

³¹C.S. Lewis, *The Problem of Pain* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1940), p. 94.

³²The varying uses of terminology are helpfully explored by Kendall S. Harmon in 'The Case Against Conditionalism: A Response to Edward William Fudge', in Nigel M. de S. Cameron (ed.), *Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell* (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1992), pp. 198–9.

³³See especially L. Froom, *The Conditionalist Faith of our Fathers* (Washington: Review & Heal Publishing Association, 2 vols, 1965, 1966), and E. Fudge, *The Fire That Consumes* (Texas: Providential Press, 1982) (revised and compressed edition – Carlisle: Paternoster, 1994, in which Fudge responds to his critics).

³⁴G. Rowell, *Hell and the Victorians* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974), pp. 181ff.; David Powys, 'The Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Debates About Hell and Universalism', in Nigel M. de S. Cameron (ed.), *Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell*, pp. 93ff.

³⁵J. Wenham, *The Goodness of God* (Leicester: IVP, 1974); the work also provides helpful warnings concerning decisions on the issue, and a brief history of how Wenham learnt of the doctrine; the chapter dealing with hell has been revised and stated less cautiously in *The Enigma of Evil* (Guildford: Eagle, 1993).

³⁶J. Stott and D. Edwards, *Essentials: A Liberal-Evangelical Dialogue* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988); Eryl Davies, *An Angry God?* (Bridgend: Evangelical Press of Wales, 1991), p. 14, notes that at least ten years earlier Stott expressed his agnosticism concerning the precise nature of hell.

³⁷An explanatory note must be made with reference to Stott's position. His explanation and use of definitions is likely to confuse, as he distances himself from the label of conditional immortality. He implicitly accuses conditionalists of believing that no-one survives death except the redeemed – thus the wicked are destroyed at death. However, most evangelical condi-

tionalists do believe in the resurrection of both the righteous and the wicked to judgment, and distance themselves from the materialist connotations of the term 'annihilation'. See Stott, *Essentials*, p. 316, for the confusion of terms.

⁸See especially Clark Pinnock, *A Wideness in God's Mercy: The Finality of Jesus Christ in a World of Religions* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), and 'The Destruction of the Finally Impenitent', *Criswell Theological Review* 4/2 (1990), 243–259.

⁹Stott, *Essentials*, p. 316.

¹⁰See A. Fernando, *Crucial Questions About Hell* (Eastbourne: Kingsway, 1991), p. 41.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹²J. Blanchard, *Whatever Happened to Hell?* (Darlington: Evangelical Press, 1993), pp. 148, 230.

¹³Fudge, *The Fire That Consumes*, p. 185.

¹⁴S. Travis, *I Believe in the Second Coming of Jesus* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988), p. 199.

¹⁵Note that David Powys has proposed a new interpretation of this material, which he believes was used to attack the Pharisees' understanding of the post-mortem state. The case is presented in his doctrinal thesis, 'The Hermeneutics of "Hell": The Fate of the Unrighteous in New Testament Thought', Australian College of Theology, 1993, forthcoming from Paternoster Press.

¹⁶Travis, *I Believe in the Second Coming of Jesus*, p. 197; see also Stott, *Essentials*, p. 316f.

¹⁷M. Green, *Evangelism in the Local Church* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), p. 70.

¹⁸D. Pawson, *The Road to Hell* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1992), pp. 42, 150f.

¹⁹P. Cotterell, *Mission and Meaninglessness* (London: SPCK, 1990), p. 73.

²⁰Stott, *Essentials*, p. 318.

²¹Stephen H. Travis, *Christian Hope and the Future of Man* (Leicester: IVP, 1980), p. 135.

²²On this whole area, see the work of J. Cooper, *Body, Soul and the Life Everlasting* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989); see also Powys, 'The Hermeneutics of "Hell" '.

²³Stott, *Essentials*, p. 316.

²⁴P. Helm, *The Last Things Now* (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1989), p. 118.

²⁵Davies, *An Angry God?*, p. 129.

²⁶Travis, *Christian Hope and the Future of Man*, p. 135.

²⁷Wenham, 'The Case for Conditional Immortality', in Nigel M. de S. Cameron (ed.), *Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell*, p. 187.

²⁸G. Bray, 'Hell: Eternal Punishment Or Total Annihilation', *Evangel* 10.2 (Summer 1992), p. 23.

²⁹Although this argument may not take into account the infinite nature of the one making the atonement offering.

³⁰See D. Carson, *How Long O Lord?: Reflections on Suffering and Evil* (Leicester: IVP, 1990), p. 103; see also L. Dixon, *The Other Side of the Good News* (Wheaton: Victor Books, 1992), p. 127.

³¹Travis, *Christian Hope and the Future of Man*, p. 135.

³²See Fernando, *Crucial Questions About Hell*, p. 69.

³³Kendall Harmon, 'The Case Against Conditionalism', in Nigel M. de S. Cameron (ed.), *Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell*, pp. 191–222.

³⁴See n. 15 above.

³⁵Jonathan Kvanvig, *The Problem of Hell* (Oxford: OUP, 1993), pp. 68–71.

³⁶See on one side, Pawson, *The Road to Hell*, p. 40; on the other, Wenham, *The Goodness of God*, p. 37, and Travis, *Christian Hope and the Future of Man*, p. 136.

³⁷It is a shame that Jim Packer, who usually writes at great depth and with much wisdom, gives conditionalism such a brief and summary treatment – see 'The Problem of Eternal Punishment', *Evangel* 10 (1992), 13–19.

³⁸Stott, *Essentials*, p. 320.


³⁹Wenham, *The Goodness of God*, p. 41.

The Relatives of Jesus

Richard Bauckham

Richard Bauckham is Professor of New Testament Studies at the University of St. Andrews. His more detailed treatments on this theme (for which, see notes) include Jude and the Relatives of Jesus in the Early Church (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1990).

Careful readers of the NT know that one of Jesus' relatives, his brother James, played a prominent part in the early history of the church. Not so well known is the fact that other members of the family were also important figures and continued to exercise leadership in Palestinian Jewish Christianity down to at least the early second century.¹



Genealogy of the family of Jesus

The family tree shows those members of the family whose names and relationship to Jesus are definitely known. The four brothers of Jesus are named in the Gospels (Mt. 13:55; Mk. 6:3). We can be sure that James was the eldest of the four, and Josef the next in age, but since Matthew and Mark differ in the order in which they list Simon and Judas, we cannot be sure which

was the youngest. The name Josef, which Mark gives to the second brother, was a common abbreviated form of Joseph (the form Matthew uses). No doubt Josef was commonly known by this short form in order to distinguish him from his father Joseph. In English usage Jesus' brother Judas has been conventionally known as Jude, and this form of the name is usually used for the NT letter attributed to this brother of Jesus. All four names are among the most common Jewish male names of the period. From the same passages of the Gospels which name four brothers we learn also that Jesus had sisters. Although Matthew refers to 'all his sisters', we cannot tell whether there were more than two, since Greek can use 'all' for only two. Later Christian literature² gives the names Mary and Salome to sisters of Jesus. These names were extremely common Jewish women's names within Palestine, but Salome seems not to have been used in the Jewish diaspora. There is therefore some probability that the tradition of these two names goes back to Palestinian Jewish Christian tradition, and so it may be a reliable tradition.

The brothers of Jesus were evidently known as 'the brothers of the Lord' in early Christian circles (Gal. 1:19; 1 Cor. 9:5), but since the term 'brother' by no means necessarily refers to a full blood-brother, the question of their precise relationship to Jesus, along with that of Jesus' sisters, arises. Since at least the fourth century this issue has been much debated, mainly because of its implications for the traditional doctrine of the perpetual virginity of Mary. The three major views have come to be known by the names of their fourth-century proponents: Helvidius, Epiphanius and Jerome. The Helvidian view, which probably most modern exegetes, even including some Roman Catholic scholars, hold, is that the brothers were sons of Joseph and Mary, born after Jesus.³ The Epiphanian view, which is the traditional view in the Eastern Orthodox churches, is that they were sons of Joseph by a marriage prior to his marriage to Mary,

and so were older than Jesus. The Hieronymian view, which through Jerome's influence became the traditional western Catholic view, is that they were first cousins of Jesus.

We cannot here enter this debate in any detail. Although the Hieronymian view still has its advocates, it must be said to be the least probable. The Greek word for 'brother' can be used for relationships more distant than the modern English 'brother'. However, the brothers of Jesus are invariably called his brothers in early Christian literature (both within and outside the NT). If they were actually cousins, we should expect that this relationship would be specified more exactly on at least some occasions. In fact, the second-century writer Hegesippus,¹ who calls James and Jude 'brothers of the Lord', calls Simeon the son of Clopas the 'cousin of the Lord', evidently distinguishing the two relationships. But if the Hieronymian view is improbable, it is not easy to decide between the other two views. On the Epiphonian view, the brothers of Jesus would have been his adoptive brothers (assuming the virginal conception of Jesus as historical fact). In that case, we should not expect them to be called anything except 'brothers'. No NT text offers any further real evidence on this point, but the idea that the brothers and sisters of Jesus were children of Joseph by a previous marriage is found in three second-century Christian works (the Protevangelium of James, the Infancy Gospel of Thomas and the Gospel of Peter),⁵ which probably all derive from Syria. It looks as though this was an early second-century Syrian Christian tradition. Reliable tradition about prominent early Christian leaders like the Lord's brothers could still have been available at this time and place. It is true that the Protevangelium of James implies the perpetual virginity of Mary, and so it is possible that reflection on the idea of the virginity of Mary led to the conclusion that Jesus' brothers and sisters could not be her children. On the other hand, it is also possible that the notion of the perpetual virginity arose only because Mary was already known not to have been the mother of Jesus' brothers and sisters. The historical evidence is not sufficient for a firm decision between the Helvidian and Epiphonian views (and so my version of the family tree leaves this open). In any case, we can be sure that the brothers and sisters of Jesus belonged, with him, to the family household of Joseph and Mary in Nazareth. The Gospel traditions regularly refer to Jesus' brothers in company with his mother.⁶

For help with identifying other relatives, we must turn to Hegesippus, who lived in Palestine in the mid-second century and recorded some local Jewish Christian traditions about relatives of Jesus. His work survives only in fragments, mostly quotations by the church historian Eusebius, but Eusebius probably extracted most of what he said about relatives of Jesus. The traditions in Hegesippus tend to be legendary, but the legends are attached to historical figures who were revered as Christian leaders and martyrs in the memory of the Jewish Christian communities of Palestine. That these persons existed and were related to Jesus in the way Hegesippus claims we can be sure.

According to Hegesippus,⁷ Jesus' putative father Joseph had a brother named Clopas. The name is extremely rare: only two other certain occurrences of it are known. One of these is in John 19:25.⁸ We can therefore be sure that the man to whom this verse of the Fourth Gospel refers is the same Clopas, Joseph's brother. He is mentioned in a list of women who stood by the cross when Jesus was dying: '[Jesus'] mother and his mother's sister, Mary of Clopas and Mary Magdalene.' Although this could be read as a list of four women, most likely there are only three. If 'Mary of Clopas' was Clopas's wife, then she was in fact Jesus' mother's husband's brother's wife – a relationship which, not surprisingly, the evangelist has preferred to state less precisely as: 'his mother's sister'. So it seems that an aunt of Jesus, as well as his mother, was among those Galilean women who accompanied him on his last journey to Jerusalem and were present at the cross.

Probably Clopas himself was also in Jerusalem at this time. Luke names one of the two disciples in his story of the walk to Emmaus as Cleopas (Lk. 24:18). This Greek name is not the same as the Semitic name Clopas, but it was common for Palestinian Jews at this period to be known by both a Semitic name and a Greek name which sounded similar. Thus, for example, the Greek name Simon was very commonly used as the equivalent of the Hebrew Simeon, and either name could be used for the

same individual. It is very plausible to suppose that Joseph's brother Clopas also used the Greek name Cleopas. Luke names him because he was a sufficiently significant person in the early church for some of Luke's readers to have heard of him. Perhaps his companion on the road to Emmaus was his wife Mary. In any case, John 19:25 and Luke 24:18 are an interesting case of two quite distinct Gospel traditions which corroborate each other. This uncle and this aunt of Jesus were among his loyal followers at the end of his ministry.

Perhaps Jesus' brothers, whom the Gospels indicate were less than enthusiastic about Jesus' activity at earlier points in his ministry,⁹ had also come round by the time of his death. Certainly they soon became prominent leaders in the early Christian movement. We know most about James, but since his role as leader of the Jerusalem church is quite well known, we will pass over him rather rapidly here.¹⁰ Already an important figure when Paul visited Jerusalem three years after his conversion (Gal. 1:19), he seems to have risen to a position of unique pre-eminence in the Jerusalem church after the Twelve were depleted and dispersed, so that they no longer formed the Christian leadership in Jerusalem, and especially after Peter ceased to be permanently resident in the city (see Acts 12:1-17). Later writers called him 'bishop' of Jerusalem, and although the term may be anachronistic, he seems to have been more like a later monarchical bishop than anyone else in the period of the first Christian generation. But his role was by no means confined to Jerusalem. Since the Jerusalem church was the mother church of all the churches, and was naturally accorded the same kind of central authority over the whole Christian movement that Jerusalem and the temple had long had for the Jewish people, James now occupied a position of unrivalled importance in the whole early Christian movement. A minor indication of this is the fact that, although the name James was common, this James could be identified simply as 'James', with no need for further explanation (1 Cor. 15:7; Gal. 2:12; Acts 12:17; 15:13; 21:18; Jas. 1:1; Jude 1). He also has the distinction of being the only Christian mentioned by name in a first-century source not written by a Christian. The Jewish historian Josephus records his martyrdom, in 62 CE.¹¹ The high priest Ananus II (son of Annas and brother-in-law to Caiaphas) had him executed by stoning, probably under the law which prescribed this penalty for someone who entices the people to apostasy (Dt. 13:6-11). The more legendary account in Hegesippus¹² agrees that he suffered death by stoning.

While James assumed pre-eminent leadership at the centre of the Christian movement, the other brothers of Jesus worked as travelling missionaries. We know this from an incidental, but revealing, reference to them by Paul. In 1 Corinthians 9 Paul maintains that, although he has waived his right as an apostle to be supported by his converts at Corinth, he has this right, just as much as the other apostles do. It was an accepted principle in the early Christian movement that travelling missionaries had a right to food and hospitality from the Christian communities among whom they worked. Evidently, wives who accompanied their husbands on missionary travels also had this right. Paul attributes both the right to support and the right to be accompanied by a wife to 'the other apostles and the brothers of the Lord and Cephas' (1 Cor. 9:5). In instancing, among the apostles, the brothers of the Lord and Cephas (Peter), Paul intends to associate himself with people whose claim to apostleship and its rights was unquestioned and unquestionable. The Lord's brothers must have been so well known as travelling missionaries that they, along with Peter, were the obvious examples for Paul to choose, even when speaking to the Christians in Corinth. And since it is unlikely that James was well-known for missionary travels, Paul must be thinking primarily of the other brothers: James, Simon and Jude.

Such a reference to people Paul assumes to be very well-known, but of whose role in the early church we know hardly anything, makes us aware how very fragmentary our knowledge of the early Christian mission is. We might compare it with Paul's tantalizing reference to Andronicus and Junia, 'prominent among the apostles' (Rom. 16:7), who must also have been members of the earliest Palestinian Jewish Christian movement and played an important missionary role, of which we know nothing. But in the case of the brothers of Jesus, Paul's information that they were famous as travelling missionaries correlates with one other piece of information about relatives of Jesus. This comes from Julius Africanus, who lived at Emmaus

in the early third century and reports, as coming from the relatives of Jesus, information which he probably took from a written source of Palestinian Jewish Christian origin. He says that the relatives of Jesus were known as the *desposynoi*, a term which means 'those who belong to the Master [or Sovereign: *despotes*]'. He explains how they were one of those Jewish families who had preserved their genealogy when Herod burned the public genealogical records. He then reports:

From the Jewish villages of Nazareth and Kokhaba they travelled around the rest of the land and interpreted the genealogy they had [from the family traditions] and from the Book of Days [i.e. Chronicles] as far as they could trace it.¹³

The meaning is probably that members of the family of Jesus, travelling around the land of Israel and preaching the gospel to their fellow-Jews, used a family genealogy, like that in Luke 3:23-38, as a way of explaining the Christian claim that Jesus was the messianic Son of David.¹⁴ Kokhaba is most likely the Galilean village of that name (modern Kaukab), about ten miles north of Nazareth. It may have been, like Nazareth, a traditional home of members of the family. But the significance of the two villages, as the centres from which the mission of the *desposynoi* operated, may also lie in their names. They may have been given special messianic significance because each can be related to one of the most popular texts of Davidic messianism. Nazareth could be connected with the messianic Branch (*neser*) from the roots of Jesse (Is. 11:1), while Kokhaba, meaning 'star', recalls the prophecy of the messianic Star from Jacob (Nu. 24:17).

This information from Julius Africanus is of great interest. It gives us a very rare glimpse of Christianity in Galilee, showing us that not only Jerusalem, where James was leader, but also Nazareth and Kokhaba, where other members of the family were based, were significant centres of early Christianity in Jewish Palestine. Moreover, it preserves the term *desposynoi*, not found in any other source. Julius Africanus has to explain what it means, and clearly it is not a term he would himself have used had he not found it in his source. It must be the term by which members of the family of Jesus were known in those Palestinian Jewish Christian circles in which they were revered leaders. It demonstrates that not only 'the brothers of the Lord', but also a wider circle of relatives – 'the Master's people' – played a prominent leadership role.

We already know who some of these other relatives were. Jesus' aunt and uncle, Mary and Clopas, may well have been a husband-and-wife team of travelling missionaries, as Andronicus and Junia (Rom. 16:7) evidently were, and as Paul implies the Lord's brothers and their wives were (1 Cor. 9:5). If, as we suggested, the names of sisters of Jesus – Mary and Salome – were correctly preserved in tradition, this would imply that they were also known figures in the early church. Probably there were other relatives active in Christian leadership of whom we know nothing.

Julius Africanus speaks only of travels of the *desposynoi* within Palestine, but it is worth asking whether their mission may not also have extended to parts of the Jewish diaspora. In particular, there is some reason to think of the eastern diaspora. From the NT we know almost exclusively about Christianity's spread westwards from Palestine, but it must have spread eastwards just as quickly. For Palestinian Jews, the eastern diaspora – in Mesopotamia and areas further east (see Acts 2:9) – was just as important as the western diaspora, and links with it just as close. Pilgrims returning home from Jerusalem, where they had heard the Jerusalem church's preaching about Jesus the Messiah, would have carried belief in Jesus to the Jewish communities in the east, just as they probably did to Rome and elsewhere in the west. But east was also an obvious direction for Jewish Christian missionaries from Palestine to go. Already by the time of Paul's conversion there was a Christian church in Damascus, easily reached from Galilee, and first stop on the routes north to Edessa and Nisibis, in northern Mesopotamia, and east to Babylonia.

We have one remarkable piece of evidence for James's connection with the mission to the eastern diaspora. The Gospel of Thomas, which reflects the Gospel traditions of Christianity in the north Mesopotamian area, contains this dialogue (logion 12):

The disciples said to Jesus, 'We know that you will depart from us. Who is to be great over us?' Jesus said to them, 'Wherever you shall have come, you are to go to James the Righteous, for whose sake heaven and earth came into being.'

The remarkable hyperbole of the last clause is a thoroughly Jewish form of expression, which shows that this is a tradition from the Jewish Christian origins of north Mesopotamian Christianity. Jesus' alleged saying presupposes the mission of the apostles and gives James the position of central authority to which they are to look from wherever their missionary travels take them. Though there is no probability that the saying is an authentic saying of Jesus, it most likely goes back to James's lifetime, in which it makes sense as an expression of the role attributed to James, as leader of the mother church which claimed central authority over the mission to the diaspora. Whereas in the Pauline mission field James's authority was played down, in the mission to the eastern diaspora it was highly respected.

Evidence that some of the *desposynoi* actually travelled east may be preserved in a list, given in medieval chronicles, of the early bishops of Ctesiphon-Seleucia on the Tigris, in central Mesopotamia. The three names following Mari, the late first-century founder of the church, are Abris, Abraham and Ya'qub (James). Abris is said to have been 'of the family and race of Joseph' the husband of Mary, while Abraham was 'of the kin of James called the brother of the Lord' and Ya'qub was Abraham's son. While it may seem hazardous to trust such late sources, the medieval chronicles had access to good older sources. The claim to descent from the family of Jesus should not be regarded as a mark of legend, since claims to descent from the family of Jesus are extremely rare in Christian literature and the very few other such alleged descendants who are to be found in the literature (all mentioned below) are entirely credible. Later Christian writers were not in the least prone to invent legendary descendants of this family or to ascribe such descent to historical persons without warrant. In favour of the historicity of these three relatives of Jesus is the implication that Christian leadership in Seleucia passed down among members of this family. As we shall see, the same thing happened in Palestine. At least it seems a reasonable possibility that some members of the *desposynoi* travelled as missionaries to the eastern diaspora, where their descendants were important Christian leaders in the early second century.

This excursion to the east has taken us beyond the lifetime of Jesus' brothers, and it is time to return to Palestine to trace developments there after the death of James. The second 'bishop' of Jerusalem, after James, was Simeon or Simon (both the Hebrew and the Greek versions of his name are found), the son of Clopas.¹⁵ Probably this was not a matter of strict dynastic succession, as though he was considered next in line to succeed. After all, James could never have been considered 'successor' to his brother Jesus. But a kind of dynastic feeling, which was natural for people of the time, who were used to associating authority with a family rather than a mere individual, must have had some weight in the appointment of Simeon. The model which perhaps best explains the role of Jesus' relatives in the leadership of the Palestinian church is not that of dynastic succession, but that of the association of a ruler's family with him in government. Just as it was normal practice in the ancient Near East for members of the royal family to hold high offices in government, so Palestinian Jewish Christians felt it appropriate that Jesus' brothers, cousins and other relatives should hold positions of authority in his church. Indeed, the term *desposynoi* ('those who belong to the Sovereign') could well have the sense, more or less, of 'members of the royal family'.

Simeon the son of Clopas was leader of the Jerusalem church – and doubtless the most important figure in Jewish Christianity – for at least 40 years, until his martyrdom in the reign of Trajan (either between 99 and 103 CE or between 108 and 117 CE). When Luke's first readers read of Cleopas (Lk. 24:18) and John's first readers of Mary of Clopas (Jn. 19:25), many of them would no doubt easily have recognized the parents of their famous contemporary. That we know so little about so significant a figure is another salutary reminder of the great gaps in our evidence for early Christianity. But the great reverence with which he was remembered in Jewish Christian tradition can be seen in Hegesippus's hagiographical account of his death.¹⁶ The historically reliable information in the account is that Simeon was arrested on a charge of political subversion, because he was of a Davidic family and supported the alleged Davidic king Jesus, and was put to death by crucifixion. This fits well into the period between the two great Jewish revolts, when

the Roman authorities in Palestine were highly sensitive to the dangers of Jewish political nationalism. More hagiographical is the statement that 'he bore witness through tortures of many days' duration, so that all, including the governor, marvelled exceedingly how an old man of a hundred and twenty years could thus endure'. A hundred and twenty years is the biblical limit on human life (Gn. 6:3), which no-one after Moses (Dt. 34:7) may exceed, but which someone as righteous as Moses might equal. No doubt Simeon was very old, but if Clopas was a younger brother of Joseph, he could easily have been a much more plausible age at his death. But the age Hegesippus attributes to him tells how Palestinian Jewish Christians regarded him in the years immediately after his death.

Evidently also important leaders in Palestinian Jewish Christianity in the late first century were two grandsons of the Lord's brother Jude, called Zoker and James.¹⁷ According to Hegesippus,¹⁸ they too came under suspicion, since they were descendants of David, and were brought before the emperor Domitian himself. When asked about their possessions,

they said that between the two of them they had only nine thousand denarii, half belonging to each of them; and this they asserted they had not as money, but only in thirty-nine plethra of land, so valued, from which by their own labour they both paid the taxes and supported themselves.

To prove that they were hard-working peasant farmers, they showed their tough bodies and the hardened skin of their hands. They also explained that the kingdom of Christ was not earthly (and so, Hegesippus implies, not a kingdom whose supporters would rebel against the empire) but coming at the end of history. Convinced they were harmless and despising them as mere peasants, Domitian released them, and ordered the persecution against Christians to cease.

Several features of Hegesippus's account, such as the trial before Domitian himself, are historically improbable, and the story has a strong apologetic thrust. It is concerned to show that Jewish Christianity was not a politically dangerous movement by representing the emperor Domitian as himself recognizing this. It is hard to tell what kernel of historical truth may lie behind the legend. But it is certainly a legend about real historical persons.

Apart from the information that members of the third generation of the family of Jesus were still active in Christian leadership, the most interesting aspect of the story is what it tells us about the farm which the two brothers held in partnership. The size and value given are so specific and precise that it is likely that they rest on accurate tradition. The size of the farm would have been remembered, not because an accurate report of what Zoker and James said to Domitian was preserved, but because the size of the family's smallholding in Nazareth was well-known in Palestinian Jewish Christian circles at this time. The farm was not divided between the brothers, but owned jointly, no doubt because this family continued the old Jewish tradition of keeping a smallholding undivided as the joint property of the 'father's house', rather than dividing it between heirs. So, two generations back, this farm would have belonged to Joseph and his brother Clopas. Unfortunately, because there are two possible sizes of the plethron, it seems impossible to be sure of the size of the farm: it may be either about 24 acres or about 12 acres. In either case, this is not much land to support two families, and Joseph had at least seven children to feed. So it is not surprising that he (and Jesus) supplemented the family income by working as a carpenter. As in the case of many village artisans, Joseph's trade was not an alternative to working the land, but a way of surviving when the family smallholding could no longer fully support the family. It did not necessarily put Jesus' family any

higher on the social ladder than most of the peasant farmers of Nazareth.

After Zoker, James and Simeon the son of Clopas the family of Jesus disappears into the obscurity that envelops the subsequent history of Jewish Christianity in Palestine. Only one more member of the family may be identifiable. During the persecution of Christians in 250–251 CE, under the emperor Decius, a certain Conon, a gardener on the imperial estate, was martyred at Magydos in Pamphylia in Asia Minor. According to the acts of his martyrdom, when questioned in court as to his place of origin and his ancestry, he replied: 'I am of the city of Nazareth in Galilee, I am of the family of Christ, whose worship I have inherited from my ancestors.'¹⁹ Perhaps this is a metaphorical reference to his spiritual origins as a Christian, but it seems more plausible to read it as a literal claim to natural family relationship with Jesus. If so, there may be an indirect link with archaeological evidence from Nazareth. At the entrance to one of the caves below the church of the Annunciation, a fourth-century mosaic bears the inscription: 'Gift of Conon deacon of Jerusalem'. Perhaps, as the Franciscan excavators thought, the cave was dedicated to the cult of Conon the martyr from Nazareth, and the later Gentile Christian from Jerusalem dedicated the mosaic out of reverence for his famous namesake who was commemorated there.

¹⁷This article is based on the much fuller discussion in R. Bauckham, *Jude and the Relatives of Jesus in the Early Church* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1990), especially chapters 1–2, where full documentation will be found. See also R. Bauckham, 'Salome the Sister of Jesus, Salome the Disciple of Jesus, and the Secret Gospel of Mark', *Novum Testamentum* 33 (1991), 246–254; and 'Mary of Clopas (John 19:25)', in G.J. Brooke (ed.), *Women in the Biblical Tradition* (Studies in Women and Religion 31; Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter, 1992), pp. 231–255.

¹⁸Protevangelium of James 19:3–20:4; Gospel of Philip 59:6–11; Epiphanius, *Pan.* 78.8.1; 78.9.6.

¹⁹For a recent argument, by a Roman Catholic NT scholar, that this is the most probable implication of the NT evidence, see J.P. Meier, *A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus*, vol. 1 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), pp. 316–332; and 'The Brothers and Sisters of Jesus in Ecumenical Perspective', *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 54 (1992), 1–28. For a critique of Meier's arguments, see R. Bauckham, 'The Brothers and Sisters of Jesus: An Epiphaniian Response to John P. Meier', *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 56 (1994), 686–700.

²⁰Quoted in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 2.23.4; 3.11; 3.20.1; 4.22.4.

²¹Protevangelium of James 9:2; 17:1–2; 18:1; Infancy Gospel of Thomas 16:1–2; Gospel of Peter, according to Origen, *In Matt.* 10.17.

²²Mt. 12:46–47; 13:55; Mk. 3:31–32; 6:3; Lk. 8:19–20; Jn. 2:12; Acts 1:14; Gospel of the Nazarenes frag. 2.

²³Quoted in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 3.11; 3.32.6; 4.22.4.

²⁴The other is in an Aramaic document from the early second century CE, found at Muraba 'at (Mur 33, line 5).

²⁵Mt. 13:57; Mk. 3:21, 31; 6:4; Jn. 7:5.

²⁶For a fuller account, see R. Bauckham, 'James and the Jerusalem Church', in R. Bauckham (ed.), *The Book of Acts in its Palestinian Setting* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans/Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995).

²⁷*Antiquities* 20.200.

²⁸Quoted in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 2.23.4–18. See also the Second Apocalypse of James 61:1–63:32.

²⁹Quoted in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 1.7.14.

³⁰In my *Jude and the Relatives of Jesus*, ch. 7, I argued in detail that the Lukan genealogy of Jesus derives from the circle of the brothers of Jesus, who adapted a traditional family genealogy to make it the vehicle of a quite sophisticated Christological message.

³¹Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 3.11; 4.22.4.

³²Quoted in *ibid.*, 3.32.3, 6.

³³Their names are not preserved in Eusebius's quotations from Hegesippus, but in another ancient summary of Hegesippus's account of them (Paris MS 1555A and Bodleian MS Barocc. 142).

³⁴Quoted in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 3.19.1–3.20.7; 3.32.5–6.

³⁵Martyrdom of Conon 4.2.