This collection, *Discourse Analysis and Other Topics in Biblical Greek*, brings together into one volume papers first delivered at the Society of Biblical Literature annual meetings in 1992 and 1993. These papers were all presented under the auspices of the Section on Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics. This is the second collection of essays to be produced by the Section. The first was published as *Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics: Open Questions in Current Research* (ed. Stanley E. Porter and D.A. Carson; JSNTSup, 80; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993).

In the first four years of its existence, first as a Consultation and now as a Section, we as the co-chairpersons of the Section (and editors of these two volumes) have been greatly encouraged and personally rewarded by the growing profile of those who assemble to discuss matters of Greek language and linguistics. The format of the two sessions of each Society of Biblical Literature annual meeting continues in the same way as it began. One session is devoted to a specific topic, with invited papers and responses, and the other session is open to papers proposed by individual scholars. The response to this idea continues to be positive, and several important topics are to be covered in the designated sessions in the years to come.

The designated session of 1992 in San Francisco, California, considered the degree and kind of Semitic influence upon the Greek of the New Testament. We would like to thank those who participated in that session, and contributed to its informative content. The designated session of 1993 in Washington, DC, considered the topic of discourse analysis. Whereas it was a difficult choice to decide which of these two sets of papers to include in this volume, it was finally thought that the newness and increasing interest in discourse analysis merited its being included here for wider consideration by New Testament scholars.

The open sessions of 1992 and 1993 again included a number of papers on a range of topics in current research. Some were more theoretical in orientation and some attended more to offering various

exegetical insights. The editors were faced with the difficult task of deciding which papers to include in this volume. As we stated in the preface to the first volume of essays, there are several important questions to ask when deciding which essays to include in a collection of disparate essays such as this. The question is not simply which papers are the best or worst, since virtually every one of the papers has at least something to commend it. Again, the papers included are those which give an accurate sampling of the kinds of papers presented at the conference, and which possess the greatest significance in the light of issues of interest to those concerned with Greek linguistics. We think that it is fair to say that these essays show that New Testament studies is continuing to show tangible results from attempts to employ sound linguistic method in the study of ancient Greek.

Because this volume divides into two sections, a separate introduction is provided to each part. Part I 'Discourse Analysis' includes an introductory survey of the field of discourse analysis, and the three presentations (edited for publication) and two responses (also edited) first read in Washington, DC, in 1993. This subject area was mentioned in the preface to the first collection of essays as a fundamental topic where there is room for serious discussion and debate, and those attending were not disappointed. Although the topic is a new one, there were many interested and enthusiastic attendees and questioners. This atmosphere was encouraged by the large amount of perceptible difference among the presenters, as well as the respondents. To say the least, the entire session was lively and lived up to most expectations. Part II 'Other Topics' includes a probing introduction and five papers selected from the ten presented in the two open sessions of 1992 and 1993. In the light of the editors' appeal in the preface to the first volume of essays for more papers dealing with the Greek found outside of the New Testament, including the Greek of the Septuagint (LXX), of the papyri and inscriptions, and of non-biblical writers, it is rewarding to find that several of the papers utilize such evidence. The constraints of time prevented the participants from being able to elucidate everything that they considered their subjects warranted, so the full papers are presented here, revised in the light of the informative questioning that followed each.

The editors wish to thank the many participants who made the two years of papers represented here a success, and we look forward to several more years of informative discussion in the Section on Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics.

ON THE OTHER TOPICS

D.A. Carson

In a book entitled *Discourse Analysis and Other Topics in Biblical Greek*, someone must introduce the other topics, and I have been elected. But before doing so it may be useful to sketch the shape not only of contemporary discussion on linguistics, but also of one of its stepchildren.

I

The Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics unit of the Society of Biblical Literature has had as its primary aim during its short life the fostering of competent linguistic study of the Greek Bible. But just as the field of biblical studies has exploded into a swarm of subdisciplines, so linguistics in its own right has spawned so many subdivisions that it is difficult if not impossible to keep up with them all, let alone master them. Moreover, because linguistics has often bred its own specialist terminology, breaking into the discipline can seem at least as daunting to biblical specialists as breaking into, say, sociological approaches to the New Testament, or the intricacies of the New Criticism and the subsequent reactions to it.

Fortunately, there are now several surveys that are eminently useful. For an introduction to linguistics characterized by brevity and accessibility, an article in the *Expository Times* is hard to beat.[1]

More generally, it is quite clear that developments in the study of literature have been mirrored, sometimes earlier and sometimes later, in biblical studies. A focus on the meaning the writer imposes on the text (tradition and redaction criticism) gave way to a focus on the text itself, in large measure divorced from the writer (some branches of linguistics, stylistics, structuralism). Gradually the hearer/reader was given more place (New Criticism, rhetorical analysis, some early forms of reader-response criticism). Today many scholars argue that one cannot usefully speak of meaning in texts at all (or, alternatively, one may speak of an excess of meaning in texts): readers are the ones who impose meaning on texts (post-structuralism, deconstruction).

Writing of linguistics as applied to the Hebrew Bible, van Wolde has recently summarized linguistic developments as no less revolutionary than (and sometimes as a contribution to) those that have taken place in the study of literature and in biblical studies. What she writes with reference to the Hebrew Bible is no less applicable to the relevance of linguistics for the Greek Bible:

> Two major shifts have taken place within three fields of linguistics—syntax, semantics, and pragmatics—which are reflected in linguistic Bible studies. Traditionally, the longest unit to be studied in linguistics was the sentence. In the past decades, however, certain branches of linguistics have begun to study the hierarchical relationships between sentences in a text. Thus, besides sentence syntax we now have text syntax; besides word semantics we now have text semantics; and besides the pragmatics of a sentence we now have the pragmatics of the text as a whole. The second shift that has taken place in linguistics is closely related to this: the relationship between elements of meaning is no longer studied independent of the language user: After all, linguistic conventions do not merely act as suppliers of elements to be selected. The language user makes concrete combinations in discourses and thus creates new relationships and meanings. The study of linguistics can no longer be restricted to linguistic conventions but will have to include actual realizations.[2]

My purpose in this short note, however, is to point out that some of the developments that have taken place are mutually contradictory—or, more precisely, that some of the more recent developments contradict the linguistic heritage from which they originally sprang.

I shall choose an example from Jacques Derrida, sometimes called the father of deconstruction. Toward the beginning of this century de Saussure, the father of modern linguistics, had argued that words, as linguistic signs, whether oral or written, are arbitrary. There is nothing that necessarily connects 'tree' in English or 'arbre' in French with any particular tree, or with the concept of treeness.[3] In his usage, *signifier*

1. S.E. Porter, 'Keeping up with Recent Studies: 17. Greek Language and Linguistics', *ExpTim* 103 (1992), pp. 202-208.

2. E. van Wolde, 'A Text-Semantic Study of the Hebrew Bible, Illustrated with Noah and Job', *JBL* 113 (1994), pp. 19-20.

3. F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (trans. R. Harris; LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1986), pp. 65-68.

referred to the sound pattern or written form of the word, *signified* referred to the concept itself, and *sign* to the combination of the two. The signifier, then, is arbitrary. What ensures that it has meaning are the *differences* between any one signifier and all other signifiers. For a competent English speaker, what gives 'tree' its meaning is nothing intrinsic to the word itself, but precisely what it is not, that is how it differs from all other words ('tea', 'three', 'thee', 'these', and so forth). In other words, 'two signs *a* and *b* are never grasped as such by our linguistic consciousness, but only the difference between *a* and *b*'.[4] This perspective generated his much-quoted claim,

> *In the language itself, there are only differences.* Even more important than that is the fact that, although in general a difference presupposes positive terms between which the difference holds, in a language there are only differences, *and no positive terms.*[5]

Part of this can be challenged, and de Saussure himself backs down a little. But Jacques Derrida begins at this point, and develops it in ways never foreseen by de Saussure. Derrida says that the rigid maintenance of the distinction between the signifier and the signified gives the impression that there exist signifieds quite apart from signifiers.[6] Such a concept Derrida calls a 'transcendental signified'. Western philosophy, he contends, has been shot through with the assumption that these transcendental signifieds—God, consciousness, truth, intentionality, meaning, self, being and so forth—have some genuine reassuring existence apart from signifiers, and are actually present with us.[7] In reality, there is no escape from language. And each word is able to signify only because of the differences it sustains with all other words. Each signifier functions only because of its relationships with what it is not, with that from which it is distinct. 'Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces.'[8] So tightly bound is everything and every concept to language that Derrida recognizes that his implicit overthrow of Western metaphysics is forced to use the

categories of metaphysics, since we have inherited no other. Moreover, if de Saussure could say that difference is what enables signifiers to have meaning, Derrida goes further and insists that meaning is present only as an effect of linguistic difference.

Indeed, he invents a new word at this juncture, the French neologism *différance*, that is *différence* spelled with an *a*. What Derrida means by this is complicated,[9] but nicely laid out by Moore, who comments that *différance* is 'Saussurean *différence* writ large'.[10] It is not a thing, a being, but is everything that makes concepts possible in linguistic expression. The play of differences means that no single element can be simply present or absent itself, for any element achieves meaning by playing off all the things it is not.

At this juncture Derrida takes two crucial steps. First, he elevates the written word above the oral word. Most of us accept that oral speech is in some respects prior to writing. This is so not least in Christianity. Before there is the Bible, God speaks. God makes himself present through speech. Even the Son of God is called the Word (Jn 1.1). This idea, which links speech and presence, Derrida labels 'logocentrism' and condemns it as 'an ethnocentric metaphysics. It is related to the history of the West.'[11] If I understand him correctly, Derrida labels the hurly-burly of linguistic elements playing off one another to achieve meaning *writing*, and insists that this writing is necessarily antecedent to speech. Such writing is thus not the fossilization of speech, or a container for speech; rather, it is the necessary presupposition of speech. And secondly, Derrida (and some other deconstructionists, for that matter) thinks that all language refers only to other language; it is incapable of referring to entities other than language.

Such is one small part of the complex thought of the thinker who is usually thought of as the world's leading deconstructionist. My purpose in setting out these elements of his thinking is simply to provide an example of development that completely overturns the heritage of thought from which in part it has sprung.

Let us begin with the claim that texts can only refer to other texts. Even R. Rorty, who by analogy with the ancient cosmology of elephants

---

4.   De Saussure, *Course*, p. 116.
5.   De Saussure, *Course*, p. 118 (emphasis his).
6.   J. Derrida, *Positions* (trans. A. Bass; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 19.
7.   This theme constantly recurs in Derrida. See, for example, *Of Grammatology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 49.
8.   Derrida, *Positions*, p. 26.

9.   J. Derrida, 'Difference', in *Margins of Philosophy* (trans. A. Bass; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 1-27.
10.   S.D. Moore, *Poststructuralism and the New Testament: Derrida and Foucault at the Foot of the Cross* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), pp. 21-25, esp. p. 21.
11.   Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, p. 20.

'all the way down' has concluded, in a much-quoted saying, 'It's all words, all the way down',[12] offers these trenchant comments:

> As usual with pithy little formulae, the Derridean claim that 'There is nothing outside the text' is right about what it implicitly denies and wrong about what it explicitly asserts. The *only* force of saying that texts do not refer to nontexts is just the old pragmatist chestnut that any specification of a referent is going to be in some vocabulary. Thus one is really comparing two descriptions of a thing rather than a description with the thing-in-itself...
>
> There are, alas, people nowadays who owlishly inform us 'philosophy has *proved*' that language does not refer to anything nonlinguistic, and thus that everything one can talk about is a text. This claim is on a par with the claim that Kant proved that we cannot know about things-in-themselves. Both claims rest on a phoney contrast between some sort of nondiscursive unmediated vision of the real and the way we actually talk and think. Both falsely infer from 'We can't think without concepts, or talk without words' to 'We can't think or talk except about what has been created by our thought and talk'.

A further connection is then often made, especially in American scholarship. From the assumption that texts cannot talk about 'reality', it soon begins to appear that the only thing they can talk about is 'their inability to do so'.[13] Rorty quotes Gerald Graff's remark that 'from the thesis that language cannot correspond to reality, it is a short step to the current revisionist mode of interpretation that specializes in reading all literary works as commentaries on their own epistemological problematics'. He then remarks,

> It is in fact a rather long step, and a step backward. The tendency Graff speaks of is real enough, but it is a tendency to think that literature can take the place of philosophy by *mimicking* philosophy—by being, of all things, *epistemological*. Epistemology still looks classy to weak textualists. They think that by viewing a poet as having an epistemology they are paying him a compliment. They even think that in criticizing his theory of knowledge they are being something more than a mere critic—being, in fact, a philosopher. Thus conquering warriors might mistakenly think to impress the populace by wrapping themselves in shabby togas stripped

from the local senators. Graff and others who have pointed to the weirdly solemn pretentiousness of much recent textualist criticism are right, I think, in claiming that such critics want to have the supposed prestige of philosophy without the necessity of offering arguments.[14]

Probably no one has done a better job than John Ellis at pointing out the flaws in Derrida's argument.[15] Derrida's charge that the entire Western tradition, including de Saussure, is guilty of ethnocentrism in promoting speech above writing, is a major historical misunderstanding. De Saussure openly opposed the ethnocentrism of Western linguists who had tended to elevate the written language above speech. They inevitably focused on cultures with a lengthy written tradition, and, focusing on written texts, developed their philology around written materials. De Saussure reversed this by demonstrating that the oral language is the driving agent of change in any language.[16]

As for arguing that writing is prior to speech, the countervailing evidence is abundant. To quote what Ellis marshals:

> 1. Speech quite clearly existed long before the invention of writing.
> 2. There still exist in the world languages that are spoken but not written, but none that are written without being spoken.
> 3. There are large numbers of individuals who speak without writing, but none who write without speaking (except when their physical capacity to produce speech is deficient).
> 4. There are many different forms of writing, but linguists of all persuasions agree that *no* form of writing in general use is adequate to record all that there is in language; intonation, stress, pitch, and other communicative features are not adequately dealt with even in the best writing systems. All writing systems are *in principle* only attempts to represent languages that *must* in varying degrees be incomplete.[17]

Derrida tries to cover himself without frankly admitting it:

> If 'writing' signifies inscription and especially the durable institution of a sign (and that is the only irreducible kernel of the concept of writing), writing in general covers the entire field of linguistic signs. In that field a certain sort of instituted signifiers may then appear, 'graphic' in the narrow and derivative sense of the word, ordered by a certain relationship

12. R. Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. xxxv.

13. To use the language of I. Wright, 'History, Hermeneutics, Deconstruction', in J. Hawthorn (ed.), *Criticism and Theory* (London: Edward Arnold, 1984), p. 90, whose essay led me to these particular remarks by Rorty.

14. R. Rorty, 'Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism', in his *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Brighton: Harvester, 1982), pp. 154-56.

15. J.M. Ellis, *Against Deconstruction* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 18-28.

16. Ellis, *Against Deconstruction*, pp. 19-20.

17. Ellis, *Against Deconstruction*, p. 21.

with other instituted—hence 'written', even if they are 'phonic'—signifiers. The very idea of institution—hence of the arbitrariness of the sign—is unthinkable before the possibility of writing and outside its horizon.[18]

Ellis points out three holes in the argument. First, the idea that the institution of signs is unthinkable before the *possibility* of writing is useless. 'To assert that as soon as speech arises, writing it down is possible, might *at best* be to argue for the *equal* status of speech and writing.'[19] But that would not meet the exigencies of Derrida's insistence that writing is prior, and in any case the evidence is against it. Secondly, Derrida has warped the meaning of the word 'writing' by saying that the 'only irreducible kernel of the concept of writing' is the 'durable institution of signs'. That is not true. 'What is irreducibly essential to the idea of writing is the *visual* recoding of the sign.'[20] This key omission is what permits him to proceed to the next error, and it is the most important. Thirdly, he falls into a logical mistake. It is worth quoting Ellis at length:

> We begin with three terms: language, speech, and writing. The first contains the second and third. The question is now which of these last two has priority. Derrida is attempting to prove that the third has priority over the second, in the face of some obvious arguments to the contrary. To do so, he replaces the first triad of terms (language, speech, writing) with a different triad: writing, phonic, graphic. He substitutes the second triad for the first, and now writing has precedence over everything.
>
> It is not difficult to see what is wrong with this procedure. First of all, the nature of the phenomenon concerned has *not* been changed. If we decide arbitrarily to call language 'writing', speech 'phonic' and writing 'graphic', we have not changed the relation of the three entities: what we ordinarily call 'language' still stands in the same relationship to speech and writing whether we use these three names or the other three. Secondly, this procedure does, of course, involve a misuse of English. Language does *not* mean writing, and if we use 'writing' to substitute for 'language' we have misspoken.[21]

18. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, p. 44.
19. Ellis, *Against Deconstruction*, p. 23.
20. Ellis, *Against Deconstruction*, p. 24.
21. Ellis, *Against Deconstruction*, p. 24. The same problems exist, of course, in French, the language in which Derrida writes. Ellis's argument is not weakened by his reference to 'misuse of English'.

Derrida's real concern, of course, is a kind of moralizing condemnation of speech, because it seems to some to be closer to tying language and presence together. So Derrida brands it 'logocentrism' and, in charged moralistic expressions, defends the priority of writing.[22]

It would not be hard to show that a great deal of Derrida's thought resorts to extreme and sometimes misleading antithesis. From de Saussure's insight that thought or concepts without words are impossible, and that formally words are arbitrary, and that (in a slightly exaggerated expression) the meanings of words turn on difference, what extreme and disputable inferences have been drawn! It is one thing to say, 'Man does not live in relation to being as such, but in relation to being as it is present to him, and that means in language'.[23] It is certainly appropriate to work through the difficulties language has in 'presenting' being. It is another to resort to what Decombes calls 'the grammatical reduction of ontological propositions'.[24]

Contrast, then, this line of thought, which has as its aim the establishment of the view that texts have an excess of meaning but no univocal or objective meaning, that all interpretation so imposes its own grid on the text that the responsible way forward is creatively to discover oppositions and contradictions 'in' the text and thus to deconstruct it by setting it against itself, contrast this, I say, with the concerns of de Saussure. Among the early working axioms that modern linguistics developed (still a working axiom among most contemporary linguists, provided they have not been overly influenced by deconstruction) is that anything that can be said in one language can be said in another. Of course, very often it will not be said in the same way. Never can everything that is said in one language be said as briefly in the receptor language. But in principle there is no semantic weight—denotation, connotation, emotional colouring or whatever—that cannot be got across in the receptor language.

Clearly these are two very different worlds. De Saussure's world entertains no doubt that texts have specific meaning that is in principle recoverable; Derrida denies both points.

22. For a detailed critique, see Ellis, *Against Deconstruction*, pp. 30-66.
23. R.W. Funk, *Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 51.
24. V. Descombes, *Objects of All Sorts: A Philosophical Grammar* (trans. S. Scott-Fox and J. Harding; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 112-37.

My purpose here is not to mediate this particular dispute, though I have tried to do so elsewhere.[25] I am simply pointing out that linguistic and literary developments are taking place at such a pace that it is not always noticed that in some cases the offspring are eating their parents. Where that is the case one cannot responsibly treat parents and offspring as independent interpretative techniques or approaches, each of which brings a valuable slant to the text, to the interpretation of the text. Some of the (post)modern options are mutually destructive, and we are going to have to choose, and defend our choice.

II

I turn now to the essays that make up this section of the book. Each year at SBL we have held two sessions of the Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics unit. One has been devoted to a defined topic, and contributors have been invited; the other has been 'open', in order to spur as broad a diversity of contributions as possible. The essays in this section of *On Discourse and Other Topics* have been drawn from the second session in each of the last two years.

Of course, they might have dealt with an enormous breadth of issues, and deployed a remarkable range of subdisciplines. In fact, four of the five deal with the meaning of a single word or short expression, usually with respect to a particular context. Thus four of the five following essays serve incidentally to display the range of approaches that can be taken in what used to be called 'word studies'. Two of these are remarkably 'classical' in approach: anyone trained in biblical studies can readily follow the argument undaunted by new technical jargon. A third is essentially classical in approach, but sometimes uses a little of the terminology cherished by linguists since de Saussure. All three have one important feature in common: they resort to the IBYCUS system and Thesaurus Linguae Graecae to secure the data that are then examined. The fourth study in this group, however, approaches its target expression through 'text rhetoric'.

The only study of the five that does not focus on a single expression is as broad as the others are narrow. It attempts to survey some of the interpretative problems in Paul as they are cast in contemporary linguistics and translation theory. It may be useful to summarize the five papers.

25. D.A. Carson, *The Gagging of God* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, forthcoming).

The general essay, 'Interpreting the Language of St Paul: Grammar, Modern Linguistics and Translation Theory' by Dennis L. Stamps, argues that in addition to the kind of interpretative theological pluralism widely shown today to belong to all interpretative endeavours, we are now faced with 'a pluralism in grammatical theory'. Contemporary linguistic theory has generated developments in lexical semantics that question the approach (or at least the popular utilization) of a standard tool like BAGD, while developments in syntax question the usefulness and accuracy of large parts of BDF. But while challenging the standard works, these linguistic developments are not built on a monolithic theoretical basis: Chomskian linguistics, text linguistics, systemic linguistics and other theories all jostle for a place at the table.

In addition, there are older problems on which there is still no universal agreement: for example, the precise nature of the Greek of the New Testament and its place in the Hellenistic world, and the impact of diverse translation theories. Turning to Paul, his long and complex sentences, difficult euphemisms, expressions with wide-ranging denotations and connotations (e.g. σάρξ), disputed structures with considerable exegetical significance (e.g. πίστις θεοῦ), peculiar style (and even what 'style' means!), forms of argumentation and rhetoric, all conspire, Stamps suggests, to leave more questions open-ended than we have been accustomed to in the past.

Of the four studies of words or short expressions, the first three utilize, in different ways, the IBYCUS system and the data collected by the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae project, and the first two are the most traditional in approach, but certainly not less interesting for that.

The first, 'On the Use of the Word παστός in Patristic Greek' by Eugene N. Lane, follows up an earlier article in which he argued that the word παστός in Greek of the Hellenistic and Roman periods always refers, 'in authors who are careful with its meaning', to a bridal cloth or a canopy of some sort, and then, especially in the epigrammatists, comes to be used 'as a sort of banal symbol of marriage or of sexual union'.[26] It does not refer to a bridal bed or a bridal chamber, despite the claims of modern dictionaries, and despite the misunderstanding even of some sources in late antiquity. The original article included a treatment of the occurrences of the word in the Septuagint, and noted the Vulgate's mistaken rendering *thalamus*. Lane's present article probes the occurrences in Patristic Greek.

26. E.N. Lane, 'ΠΑΣΤΟΣ', *Glotta* 66 (1988), pp. 100-23.

In a work remarkable for its informed and subtle reading, Lane in his present study argues that earlier usages continue, but with one or two remarkable developments. Some writers clearly understand the meaning of the word. In both pagan and Christian writings παστός is still used in a non-comprehending way 'as a banal symbol of marriage'. But many of the church fathers use it in such a way that the marriage itself is symbolic, not least when they are engaged in allegorical interpretations of Ps. 19.5 and Joel 2.15-16. Further, it is only in Christian authors that παστός becomes confused with παστάς, which is phonically similar but not etymologically related. This probably accounts for the translation error *thalamus* in the Vulgate and for the confusion in modern scholarship.

The essay by Andreas J. Köstenberger, 'Syntactical Background Studies to 1 Timothy 2.12 in the New Testament and Extrabiblical Greek Literature', like that of Lane, is far from deploying the tools and technical vocabulary of linguistics developed this side of de Saussure. In some respects it reflects a traditional approach to syntax. But it is innovative in its use of the IBYCUS system to define and resolve a well-known problem in 1 Tim. 2.12. The passage in question reads: διδάσκειν δὲ γυναικὶ οὐκ ἐπιτρέπω οὐδὲ αὐθεντεῖν ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ. Köstenberger views the meaning of αὐθεντεῖν, based on traditional word studies, an open matter: the evidence is not decisive. After surveying the more important literature on the force of οὐδέ in similar contexts, he sets himself the task of recovering every instance in the Greek New Testament, in the LXX, and in the relevant extrabiblical Greek literature of the construction: (1) negated finite verb[27] + (2) infinitive + (3) οὐδέ + infinitive, and, if available, + (4) ἀλλά + infinitive.

What he argues, in brief, is that without exception in the substantial number of examples, the two infinitives joined by οὐδέ in this construction are either both positive in connotation but their exercise is prohibited or their existence denied owing to circumstances or conditions adduced in the context, or both viewed negatively by the author, and consequently their exercise is prohibited or to be avoided or their existence is denied. In no case was one viewed positively and the

27. Strictly speaking, as his examples show, this element is restricted in the extrabiblical sources to negated finite verbs *in the indicative*, which is of course relevant to 1 Tim. 2.12, though of course it makes his conclusions a little less comprehensive.

other negatively. The results for contemporary exegesis of 1 Tim. 2.12 are significant.

The third study, by H. Alan Brehm, is titled 'The Meaning of Ἑλληνιστής in Acts in Light of a Diachronic Analysis of ἑλληνίζειν'. The well-known *crux interpretum* at Acts 6.1 cannot easily be resolved, owing primarily to the rarity of the noun in the New Testament and related Hellenistic materials, but also to the stark fact that the proposed solutions do not tie up the loose ends—for example, it is difficult to make any solution mesh easily with the other occurrences of Ἑλληνιστής in Acts (6.9; 9.29; 11.20) and with Paul's use of the parallel term Ἑβραῖοι in Phil. 3.5 and 2 Cor. 11.22. The dominant three solutions, of course, are (1) that 'Hebrews' and 'Hellenists' refer in both cases to Jews, but to distinctions in linguistic orientation: the first group spoke Aramaic, and the second Greek; (2) that the two terms refer to groups with different attitudes to the law and to temple ritual; (3) that the two terms refer to a geographic distinction, viz. Jews from Palestine and Jews from the Diaspora respectively (a solution that substantially overlaps, though not in connotation, with the first solution). There are of course many variations on these solutions.

What Brehm does is examine, with the help of IBYCUS and the TLG database, the use of the cognate verb in the relevant literature. In the first instance his approach is diachronic. This enables him to demonstrate that in the first century both the linguistic and the cultural usages occur. Synchronic, syntagmatic and paradigmatic examinations of the relevant expressions in the New Testament follow. Brehm concludes that Pauline usage must be judged different from that of Acts, and that in Acts 6.1 the best distinction is the linguistic one.

Micheal Palmer contributes the final essay: 'τί οὖν; The Inferential Question in Paul's Letter to the Romans with a Proposed Reading of Romans 4.1'. Influenced by the linguistic theory of Leech,[28] Palmer seeks to establish what kind of discourse marker τί οὖν; is in the letters of Paul, particularly in Romans. By 'discourse marker' he refers to a linguistic unit that signals 'a relationship between discourse units larger than individual sentences or utterances'. Palmer concludes that, with variations, τί οὖν; displays two major and quite different functions. The expression may introduce a question that is based on a false inference in order to eliminate a potentially distracting argument from the flow of the rhetoric; alternatively, introduced questions that carry no implied

28. G. Leech, *Principles of Pragmatics* (LLL; London: Longman, 1983).

false inference function so as to create pauses that focus on some crucial principle in the argument.

Palmer classifies every instance in Romans, drawing attention to subtle details as he proceeds. He finds the rhetorical structure at the beginning of ch. 4 sufficient warrant to support further the suggestion of R.B. Hays,[29] to the effect that Rom. 4.1 be punctuated, τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; εὑρηκέναι Ἀβραὰμ τὸν προπάτορα ἡμῶν κατὰ σάρκα; ('What then shall we say? Have we found Abraham [to be] our forefather according to the flesh?').

29. 'Have we Found Abraham to be our Forefather according to the Flesh? A Reconsideration of Romans 4:1', *NovT* 27 (1985), pp. 76-98.